68 found
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  1.  18
    B. H. Slater (1981). Direct Tableaux Proofs. Analysis 41 (4):192 - 194.
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  2.  1
    B. H. Slater (forthcoming). Namely-Riders: An Update. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
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  3.  36
    B. H. Slater (2001). Prior's Analytic Revised. Analysis 61 (269):86–90.
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  4. B. H. Slater (1991). Liar Syllogisms and Related Paradoxes. Analysis 51 (3):146 - 153.
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  5.  38
    B. H. Slater (1995). Paraconsistent Logics? Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):451 - 454.
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  6.  7
    B. H. Slater (2005). Logic and Arithmetic. In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2004. Praha: Filosofia
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  7.  84
    B. H. Slater (1992). Thought Unlimited. Mind 101 (402):347-353.
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  8.  51
    B. H. Slater (1986). Prior's Analytic. Analysis 46 (2):76 - 81.
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  9.  19
    B. H. Slater (2006). Grammar and Sets. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):59 – 73.
    'Philosophy arises through misconceptions of grammar', said Wittgenstein. Few people have believed him, and probably none, therefore, working in the area of the philosophy of mathematics. Yet his assertion is most evidently the case in the philosophy of Set Theory, as this paper demonstrates (see also Rodych 2000). The motivation for twentieth century Set Theory has rested on the belief that everything in Mathematics can be defined in terms of sets [Maddy 1994: 4]. But not only are there notable items (...)
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  10. B. H. Slater (2005). The Epsilon Logic of Fictions. In John Woods, Kent A. Peacock & A. D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Toronto Press 33--48.
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  11.  9
    B. H. Slater (1988). Hilbertian Reference. Noûs 22 (2):283-297.
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  12.  2
    B. H. Slater (1973). Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 23 (92):224-229.
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  13.  51
    B. H. Slater (1974). Logic and Grammar. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):122-131.
    I have written a number of articles recently that have a rather remarkable character. They all point out trivial grammatical facts that, at great cost, have not been respected in twentieth century Logic. A major continuous strand in my previous work, with this same character, I will first summarise, to locate the kind of fact that is involved. But then I shall present an overview of the more recent, and more varied (...)
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  14.  3
    B. H. Slater (1974). The Examiner Examined. Analysis 35 (2):49 - 50.
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  15.  8
    B. H. Slater (1991). The Epsilon Calculus and its Applications. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:175-205.
    The paper presents and applies Hilbert's Epsilon Calculus, first describing its standard proof theory, and giving it an intensional semantics. These are contrasted with the proof theory of Fregean Predicate Logic, and the traditional (extensional) choice function semantics for the calculus. The semantics provided show that epsilon terms are referring terms in Donnellan's sense, enabling the symbolisation and validation of argument forms involving E-type pronouns, both in extensional and intensional contexts. By providing for transparency in intensional constructions they support a (...)
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  16. B. H. Slater (1988). Prolegomena to Formal Logic. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  17.  1
    B. H. Slater (1993). Epsilon Identities. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 16 (1):153-180.
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  18.  4
    B. H. Slater (1986). E-Type Pronouns And E-Terms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (March):27-38.
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  19.  31
    B. H. Slater, Motivation by de Se Beliefs.
    I have become more convinced, over the years, by the truth of Wittgenstein’s characterisation of philosophy as arising through misconceptions of grammar. Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near (...)
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  20.  4
    B. H. Slater (1992). Conditional Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):76 – 81.
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  21.  13
    B. H. Slater (1979). Internal and External Negations. Mind 88 (352):588-591.
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  22.  4
    B. H. Slater (1988). Excluding the Middle. Critica 20 (60):55 - 71.
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  23.  1
    B. H. Slater (1988). Subjuntives. Critica 20 (58):97 - 106.
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  24.  12
    B. H. Slater (1973). Is "Heterological" Heterological? Mind 82 (327):439-440.
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  25. B. H. Slater (1989). Modal Semantics. Logique Et Analyse 127 (8):195-209.
     
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  26.  5
    B. H. Slater (1972). The Foundations of Logic. Mind 81 (321):42-56.
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  27.  20
    B. H. Slater (1993). Probabilistic Foundations for Operator Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):517-530.
  28.  18
    B. H. Slater (2000). Quantifier/Variable-Binding. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (3):309-321.
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  29.  2
    B. H. Slater (1993). Farewell to Opacity. Dialectica 47 (1):37-53.
    SummaryThis paper firms up previous arguments for referential transparency in intensional constructions by providing conclusive proofs of this, both formal and informal. Centrally the paper uses epsilon terms to symbolise referring expressions, and so it obtains the rigid designators needed to allow the same object to be referred to in all worlds and minds. The details of several contrary ideas are examined to reinforce the claim that they are incorrect. But also certain world‐dependent or mind‐dependent objects are identified, using epsilon (...)
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  30.  11
    B. H. Slater (1999). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Critica 31 (92):67 - 92.
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  31.  1
    B. H. Slater (1979). “It's on the Middle of My Tongue”. Philosophical Investigations 2 (1):51-52.
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  32.  12
    B. H. Slater (1994). The Epsilon Calculus' Problematic. Philosophical Papers 23 (3):217-242.
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  33.  10
    B. H. Slater (1987). Hilbertian Tense Logic. Philosophia 17 (4):96-96.
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  34.  11
    B. H. Slater (2002). Syntactic Liars. Analysis 62 (274):107–109.
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  35.  8
    B. H. Slater (1976). A Grammatical Point About Disjunction. Philosophy 51 (196):226 - 228.
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  36.  10
    B. H. Slater (1979). Aristotle's Propositional Logic. Philosophical Studies 36 (1):35 - 49.
  37.  3
    B. H. Slater (1979). Wittgenstein's Later Logic. Philosophy 54 (208):199 - 209.
    Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics was poorly received by the critics when it was first published, and only a few sympathetic commentators have made much of it since then. The book has not had a great success, because the majority of people interested in the philosophy of mathematics these days have a quite different approach to the subject from Wittgenstein. But not only that, they have a quite different logic from Wittgenstein. I believe one of the main sources (...)
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  38.  2
    B. H. Slater (1997). De-Mystieylng Situations. Philosophical Papers 26 (2):165-178.
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  39.  2
    B. H. Slater (1979). Singular Subjects. Dialogue 18 (03):362-372.
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  40.  7
    B. H. Slater (1998). Peirce's Graphs Amended. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):101-106.
    One of the claims made for C. S. Peirce's existential graphs has been that they are a deductively complete formulation of first-order logic with identity. As Peirce presented them, this is true only for certain versions of first-order logic :those which do not include terms for individuals. I amend Peirce's rules here, showing, in particular, how they are capable of demonstrating that, for instance, ?Jack is in the kitchen? contradicts ?Jack is not in the kitchen?
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  41.  9
    B. H. Slater (2004). Ramsey's Tests. Synthese 141 (3):431 - 444.
    This paper starts by criticising some olderaccounts of conditionals based on the so-called `Ramsey Test', and ends by proposing their replacement, in part with a material account, in part with a probabilistic account using epsilon terms. The combined replacement is in fact closer to Ramsey's ideas. But there is also a resemblance between the latter and a more recent account of conditionals, which relates some of them to causality. The comparison (...)
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  42.  1
    B. H. Slater (1988). Contradiction and Freedom. Philosophy 63 (245):317 - 330.
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  43.  8
    B. H. Slater (1994). Getting Kant Right. Synthese 99 (2):305 - 306.
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  44.  5
    B. H. Slater (1992). Routley's Formulation of Transparency. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):215-224.
    Routley?s Formula says, for instance, that if it is believed there is a man then there is something which is believed to be a man. In this paper I defend the formula; first directly, but then by looking at work by Gensler and Hintikka against it, and at the original work of Routley, Meyer and Goddard for it. The argument ultimately reduces to a central point about the extensionality of objects in Routley, Meyer and Goddard?s intensional system, i.e. in its (...)
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  45.  6
    B. H. Slater (1982). Incomplete Assertions. Studia Logica 41 (2-3):293 - 296.
    Fregean logic has difficulty with certain arguments in which there is cross-reference between premises and conclusion. In this paper I describe a method of handling arguments of the troublesome kind: It involves replacing standard quantifiers with explicit existential statements, and turns standard logic into a free one. A validation procedure is provided for the logic.
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  46.  5
    B. H. Slater (1984). Sensible Self-Containment. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (135):163-164.
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  47.  5
    B. H. Slater (1989). Hilbertian Tense Logic. Philosophia 19 (1):96-96.
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  48.  1
    B. H. Slater (1984). 'Experiencing' Architecture. Philosophy 59 (228):253 - 258.
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  49.  5
    B. H. Slater (2001). Seeing Pains. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):65-81.
    P.M.S. Hacker, recounting some of Wittgenstein's views, says (Hacker 1996, p134): [T]he pervasive conception of behaviour that has informed philosophical psychology for the last three centuries has misrepresented human behaviour as 'bare bodily movement', from which it is supposed we infer, by analogy or inference to best explanation, the inner state and so on from which the behaviour might be thought to arise … But we see the pain in a person's face hear the glee in his chortles, (...)
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  50.  1
    B. H. Slater (1996). Non-Conditional 'If's. Ratio 9 (1):47-55.
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