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  1. B. Jack Copeland (2011). From the Entscheidungsproblem to the Personal Computer–and Beyond. In Matthias Baaz (ed.), Kurt Gödel and the Foundations of Mathematics: Horizons of Truth. Cambridge University Press. 151.
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  2. B. Jack Copeland & Oron Shagrir (2011). Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable? Minds and Machines 21 (2):221-239.
  3. B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2010). Deviant Encodings and Turing's Analysis of Computability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):247-252.
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  4. B. Jack Copeland, Arthur Prior. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. B. Jack Copeland (2008). The Church-Turing Thesis. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
    There are various equivalent formulations of the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis is often misunderstood, particularly in recent writing in the philosophy of mind.
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  6. B. Jack Copeland, The Modern History of Computing. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  7. B. Jack Copeland & Oron Shagrir (2007). Physical Computation: How General Are Gandy's Principles for Mechanisms? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 17 (2):217-231.
    What are the limits of physical computation? In his ‘Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms’, Turing’s student Robin Gandy proved that any machine satisfying four idealised physical ‘principles’ is equivalent to some Turing machine. Gandy’s four principles in effect define a class of computing machines (‘Gandy machines’). Our question is: What is the relationship of this class to the class of all (ideal) physical computing machines? Gandy himself suggests that the relationship is identity. We do not share this view. We (...)
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  8. B. Jack Copeland (2006). Meredith, Prior, and the History of Possible Worlds Semantics. Synthese 150 (3):373 - 397.
    This paper charts some early history of the possible worlds semantics for modal logic, starting with the pioneering work of Prior and Meredith. The contributions of Geach, Hintikka, Kanger, Kripke, Montague, and Smiley are also discussed.
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  9. B. Jack Copeland (ed.) (2005). Alan Turing's Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker's Struggle to Build the Modern Computer. OUP Oxford.
    The mathematical genius Alan Turing (1912-1954) was one of the greatest scientists and thinkers of the 20th century. Now well known for his crucial wartime role in breaking the ENIGMA code, he was the first to conceive of the fundamental principle of the modern computer-the idea of controlling a computing machine's operations by means of a program of coded instructions, stored in the machine's 'memory'. In 1945 Turing drew up his revolutionary design for an electronic computing machine-his Automatic Computing Engine (...)
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  10. B. Jack Copeland (2003). The Chinese Room From a Logical Point of View. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
     
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  11. B. Jack Copeland (2002). Hypercomputation. Minds and Machines 12 (4):461-502.
  12. B. Jack Copeland (2002). The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):99-137.
    This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913-1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945-1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947-1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953-1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955-1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958-1959; Drake, 1959-1961; Kripke, 1958-1965.
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  13. B. Jack Copeland (2000). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity, and Property Identity, Aristotelian-Style. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):11-25.
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  14. B. Jack Copeland (2000). Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing's Views on the Mind-Machine Issue. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5-33.
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  15. B. Jack Copeland (2000). The Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):519-539.
    Turing''s test has been much misunderstood. Recently unpublished material by Turing casts fresh light on his thinking and dispels a number of philosophical myths concerning the Turing test. Properly understood, the Turing test withstands objections that are popularly believed to be fatal.
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  16. B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2000). What Turing Did After He Invented the Universal Turing Machine. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):491-509.
    Alan Turing anticipated many areas of current research incomputer and cognitive science. This article outlines his contributionsto Artificial Intelligence, connectionism, hypercomputation, andArtificial Life, and also describes Turing's pioneering role in thedevelopment of electronic stored-program digital computers. It locatesthe origins of Artificial Intelligence in postwar Britain. It examinesthe intellectual connections between the work of Turing and ofWittgenstein in respect of their views on cognition, on machineintelligence, and on the relation between provability and truth. Wecriticise widespread and influential misunderstandings of theChurch–Turing thesis (...)
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  17. B. Jack Copeland & Richard Sylvan (1999). Beyond the Universal Turing Machine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):46-66.
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  18. B. Jack Copeland (1998). Super Turing-Machines. Complexity 4 (1):30-32.
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  19. B. Jack Copeland (1998). Turing's O-Machines, Searle, Penrose and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128 - 138.
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  20. B. Jack Copeland (1997). Vague Identity and Fuzzy Logic. Journal of Philosophy 94 (10):514-534.
  21. B. Jack Copeland (ed.) (1996). Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford University Press.
    Logic and Reality is a collection of essays by philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, and computer scientists, celebrating the work of the late distinguished philosopher Arthur Prior on the eightieth anniversary of his birth. Topics range from philosophical discussions of the nature of time and of the nature of logic itself, to descriptions of computer systems that can reason and take account of the fact that they exist in a temporal world.
     
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  22. B. Jack Copeland (1996). Prior's Life and Legacy. In , Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford University Press. 1--40.
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  23. B. Jack Copeland (1996). What is Computation? Synthese 108 (3):335-59.
    To compute is to execute an algorithm. More precisely, to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture. The key issue is to delimit the phrase of a certain kind. I call this the problem of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard models of computation. The successful drawing of this distinction guards Turing's 1936 analysis of computation against (...)
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  24. B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361 - 377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks 'unorganised machines'. By the application of what he described as 'appropriate interference, mimicking education' an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of 'neurons' is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
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  25. B. Jack Copeland (1995). Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  26. B. Jack Copeland (1995). Commentary. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):83-96.
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  27. B. Jack Copeland (1995). On Vague Objects, Fuzzy Logic and Fractal Boundaries. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):83-96.
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  28. Diane Proudfoot & B. Jack Copeland (1994). Turing, Wittgenstein and the Science of the Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):497 – 519.
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  29. B. Jack Copeland (1993). The Curious Case of the Chinese Gym. Synthese 95 (2):173-86.
    Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
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