In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all (...) further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)
Great knowledge, skill, and judgment have gone into Allen Wood’s extraction from Kant’s texts, and partial defence, of a certain theory of freedom (see preceding essay). I shall later mention one respect in which I am not sure he has got Kant right, but otherwise the interpretation is flawless. I shall argue, however, that although it is worthwhile to identify Kant’s theory of freedom as Wood has helped us to do, the theory itself is worthless. I shall not list (...) the reasons that Wood anticipates being brought against the theory. I do have those too, being unconvinced that the concepts of noumenon and of timeless agency are really intelligible. When Kant says of a noumenon that “nothing happens in it” and yet that it “of itself begins its effects in the sensible world” (B 569), he implies that there is a making-begin which is not a happening; and I cannot understand that as anything but a contradiction. Kant himself has trouble relating timeless choices to the temporal world. On the one hand, “at the point in time when I act, I am never free” (KPV 94g 98e); on the other, “In the moment when he utters the lie, the guilt is entirely his” (B 585). Never mind. For present purpose I concede noumena, timeless agency, non-Humean causation - the lot. With all of that granted, the theory is still worthless. According to the theory, a free choice by my intelligible character causes me to have empirical character E. How can this be so, if there is also a deterministic causal explanation for my possession of E? How can a free choice cause this part of the natural causal chain without breaking the chain? Wood answers on Kant’s behalf that my intelligible choice causes not only my possession of E but also a complete natural causal history for my possession of E. Kant didn’t ever actually say this but Wood thinks that Kant’s theory “must” be construed in this way. I’m not sure that it must, but in the meantime I shall assume that it is. One significant fact about my character E is that I have beliefs about the Holocaust.. (shrink)
& A college development officer is offered a generous gift by a donor whose identity would embarrass the institution. Should the development officer accept? & A volunteer lies about his level of giving, but classmates believe him and match his "gift." Should donors be told the truth? & A development officer must explain to a donor the difference between naming an endowed chair and selecting the person to fill the chair. Where is the line between reasonable donor expectations and intrusion? (...) "There was a time, barely a generation ago, when most college fund raising was a placid, back-porch operation... That pattern, like so much in higher education, began to change dramatically... On the heels of all this change comes this splendid volume by Deni Elliot. The new fund-raising environment raises a host of ethical questions that were largely unknown or unrecognized by earlier generations of fund raisers... The great value of this book is that it provides some clear-eyed guidance through the ethical thicket that is modern higher education fund raising. The great charm of the book is that it provides this important service with such eloquence and good taste... Anyone involved in modern fund raising will find something of value in this book." -- G. Calvin MacKenzie, Academe "This volume provides college and university development officers and administrators practical help with recognizing difficult ethical situations and discerning the correct ethical response. It can also serve as a guide for donors who wonder what's reasonable for them to expect from fund raisers." -- Resources in Education Contributors: Allen Buchanan, James A. Donahue, Marilyn Batt Dunn, Deni Elliott, Bernard Gert, Judith M. Gooch, Bruce R. Hopkins, Frank Logan, Mary Lou Siebert, Holly Smith, and Eric B. Wentworth. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- PART I: COMPLEXITY IN ANIMAL MINDS -- Introduction: M.McGonigle-Chalmers -- Relational and Absolute Discrimination Learning by Squirrel Monkeys: Establishing a Common Ground with Human Cognition; B.T.Jones -- Serial List Retention by Non-Human Primates: Complexity and Cognitive Continuity; F.R.Treichler -- The Use of Spatial Structure in Working Memory: A Comparative Standpoint; C.De Lillo -- The Emergence of Linear Sequencing in Children: A Continuity Account and a Formal Model; M.McGonigle-Chalmers&I.Kusel (...) -- Sensitivity to Quantity: What Counts Across Species?; S.T.Boysen&A.M.Yocom -- PART II: COMPLEXITY IN ROBOTS -- Editorial Introduction; D.McFarland -- Towards Cognitive Robotics: Robotics, Biology and Developmental Psychology; M.Lee, U.Nehmzow&M.Rodriguez -- Structuring Intelligence: The Role of Hierarchy, Modularity and Learning in Generating Intelligent Behaviour; J.J.Bryson -- Epistemology, Access, and Computational Models; G.Luger -- Reasoning About Representations in Autonomous Systems: What P´Olya and Lakatos Have To Say; A.Bundy -- PART III: LANGUAGE, EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEX MIND -- Editorial Introduction; K.Stenning -- How to Qualify for a Cognitive Upgrade: Executive Control, Glass Ceilings, and the Limits of Simian Success; A.Clark -- Private Codes and Public Structures; C.Allen -- The Emergence of Complex Language; W.Hinzen -- Language Evolution: Enlarging the Picture; K.Stenning&M.Van Lambalgen -- Epilogue: Reminiscences of Brendan McGonigle -- Index. (shrink)
A. G. Greenwald and H. G. Shulman (1973) found that 2 tasks characterized by ideomotor (IM) compatibility could be perfectly timeshared (i.e., performed simultaneously without mutual interference). The 2 tasks were pronouncing “A” or “B” in response to hearing those letter names, and making a manual left or right response to seeing a left- or right-positioned arrow. M.-C. Lien, R. W. Proctor, and P. A. Allen (2002) did not replicate Greenwald and Shulman’s result, and concluded that their finding of (...) perfect timesharing of 2 IM-compatible tasks might not be replicable. In the present research, Experiment 1 replicated Greenwald and Shulman’s 1973 finding while also supporting the conclusion that Lien et al.’s nonreplication was due to their not instructing subjects to make 2 responses simultaneously in their timeshared task. Experiment 2 again replicated the perfect timesharing finding, using an alternative control procedure that mixed manual and vocal tasks in the same block. (shrink)
Descartes' place in history, by L. J. Lafleur.--A central ambiguity in Descartes, by S. Rosen.--Doubt, common sense and affirmation in Descartes and Hume, by H. J. Allen.--Some remarks on logic and the cogito, by R. N. Beck.--The cogito, an ambiguous performance, by J. B. Wilbur.--The modalities of Descartes' proofs for the existence of God, by B. Magnus.--Descartes and the phenomenological problem of the embodiment of consciousness, by J. M. Edie.--The person and his body: critique of existentialist responses to Descartes, (...) by P. A. Bertocci. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of (...) Exclusion; F.Berto Lessons from the Logic of Demonstratives; G.RussellThe Multitude View on Logic; M.Eklund Index. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of (...) Exclusion; F.Berto Lessons from the Logic of Demonstratives; G.RussellThe Multitude View on Logic; M.Eklund Index. (shrink)
Philosophers on Education provides the most comprehensive history of philosphers' views and impacts on the direction of education, from Plato to Dewey. As Amelie Oksenberg Rorty explains in describing a history of education, we are essentially describing and gaining the clearest understanding of the issues that presently concern and divide us. Philosophical reflection on education has usually been directed to the education of rulers, to those who are presumed to preserve and transmit--or to redirect and transform--the culture of sociey, its (...) knowledge and values. Every historical era is marked by a struggle among claimants to that power. It is only late in the history of liberal democracies that educational policy was formulated for and directed toward autonomous individuals who structure their own lives. The contributors to this collection recognize that history remains actively embedded and expressed in society's beliefs and practices, and that the study of the history of philosophy mandates reflection on its implications for education. The all new essays are written by some of the finest contemporary philosophers: Elizabeth Anderson, Annette C. Baier, Frederick B. Beiser, Eva T. H. Brann, M.F. Burnyeat, William Galston, Daniel Garber, Peter Gay, Alvin I. Goldman, Moshe Halbertal, Tova Hartman Halbertal, Simon Harrison, Barbara Herman, Genevieve Lloyd, Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard W. Miller, Roy P. Mottahedeh, Adam Phillips, Philip L. Quinn, C.D.C. Reeve, Patrick Riley, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Emma Rothschild, Alan Ryan, Richard Schacht, Josef Stern, Richard Tuck, Thomas E. Uebel, Jeremy Waldron, Allen Wood, Paul Woodruff, Jean S. Yolton, John W. Yolton, Zhang LoShan (pseudonym). (shrink)
