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Brian Rosebury [11]B. Rosebury [1]B. J. Rosebury [1]
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Profile: Brian Rosebury (University of Central Lancashire)
  1. Brian Rosebury (2011). Moore's Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.
  2. Brian Rosebury (2011). The Political Logic of Victim Impact Statements. Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (1):39-67.
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  3. Brian Rosebury (2009). Private Revenge and its Relation to Punishment. Utilitas 21 (1):1-21.
    In contrast to the vast literature on retributive theories of punishment, discussions of private revenge are rare in moral philosophy. This paper reviews some examples, from both classical and recent writers, finding uncertainty and equivocation over the ethical significance of acts of revenge, and in particular over their possible resemblances, in motive, purpose or justification, to acts of lawful punishment. A key problem for the coherence of our ethical conception of revenge is the consideration that certain acts of revenge may (...)
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  4. Brian Rosebury (2009). Reply to Silcox on Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):109-113.
    In earlier work, I argued that examples supposed to substantiate consequential moral luck can lose their anomalous appearance if due account is taken of the moral obligation to discharge epistemic responsibilities, and of the different scope and focus of this obligation for the agent as contrasted with the observer. In his recent JMP article, Mark Silcox argues that my explanatory strategy is dependent on an unacceptable commitment to an ‘ineliminable epistemic gulf’ between first-person and third-person perspectives. Here I attempt a (...)
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  5. Brian Rosebury (2008). Respect for Just Revenge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):451-471.
    The paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extra-legal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgement we may make of such acts. While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not (...)
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  6. Brian Rosebury (2004). Book Review: Deontic Morality and Control. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):112-115.
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  7. Brian Rosebury (2003). On Punishing Emotions. Ratio Juris 16 (1):37-55.
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  8. B. Rosebury (2000). The Historical Contingency of Aesthetic Experience. British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (1):73-88.
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  9. Brian Rosebury (2000). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals and Perplexities. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 109 (1):132-135.
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  10. Brian Rosebury (1998). The Unnatural Lottery. Philosophical Review 107 (2):291-293.
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  11. Brian Rosebury (1997). Irrecoverable Intentions and Literary Interpretation. British Journal of Aesthetics 37 (1):15-30.
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  12. Brian Rosebury (1995). Moral Responsibility and "Moral Luck&Quot;. Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.
    This paper argues that "moral luck," understood as a susceptibility of moral desert to lucky or unlucky outcomes, does not exist. The argument turns on the claim that epistemic inquiry is an indissoluble part of moral responsibility, and that judgment on the moral decision making of others should and can adjust for this fact; test cases which aim to isolate moral dilemmas from epistemic consideration misrepresent our moral experience. If the phenomena believed by some philosophers to exemplify "moral luck" as (...)
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  13. B. J. Rosebury (1979). Fiction, Emotion and ’Belief’: A Reply to Eva Schaper. British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (2):120-130.