In what follows I offer a parodic brief (you'll know it by the numbered paragraphs) against analytic style philosophy just as it is that style characteristic of professional philosophy of science. I discuss the ad hoc resilience and sophisticated disdain variously operative in analytic discourse, including reviews of the maverick rhetoricism of the late Paul Feyerabend and others towards a critique of the postmodern condition in science and philosophy. What I name continental style philosophical thinking primarily regards the historical and (...) expressly hermeneutic style of thinking found in the reflections on science characteristic of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.(1) Other continental approaches to the philosophy of science growing out of the phenomenological critiques of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty may be expected to be more congenial to analytic sensibilities as suggested by the recent resurgence of interest in the common roots of continental and analytic style philosophic thinking in Husserl and Frege.(2) An approach combining both hermeneutic and phenomenological styles with a sensitivity to the themes of mainstream or analytic philosophy of science is characteristic of the essays and books of, for one important example, Patrick A. Heelan, but also Joseph Kockelmans and Ted Kisiel, Robert Crease and Joseph Rouse, and so on - among rather not a lot of others. Although scholars advocating continental approaches to the philosophy of science routinely refer to traditional adherents of analytic style philosophy of science, there is no reciprocal recognition on the part of analytical philosophers of science. And as a result there is no received (i.e., there is no acknowledged or recognized) tradition of continental scholarship within the professional establishment of the philosophy of science.(3) Thus the philosophy of science remains an analytic discipline, with continental perspectives excluded by the sovereign expedient of disregard, an absence of critical reference which effects the professional annihilation of scholarship. It is this factor that accounts for - that commands - the mixed style of the present essay.. (shrink)
By now it is clear that the word postmodern has a settled into an insurmountable usage in the ﬁeld of architecture and this in addition to its continuing currency for art critics and theorists, social analysts, and political and literary theorists, not to mention journalists and philosophers. Nevertheless no one less inﬂuential for the real or built presence of postmodernism than Charles Jencks could complain that with respect to architecture, critics apply the term as a kind of catchall, so (...) that postmodernism is used for "everything that was diﬀerent from high modernism, and usually this meant skyscrapers with funny shapes, brash colors, and exposed technology."1.. (shrink)
Nietzsche’s imperative call, Werde, der Du bist - Become the one you are - is, to say the least, an odd sort of imperative: dissonant and yet intrinsically inspiring. Thus Alexander Nehamas in an essay on this very theme names it the “most haunting of Nietzsche’s haunting aphorisms.” 1 Expressed as it is in The Gay Science, “Du sollst der werden, der du bist” (GS 270, KSA 3, p. 519) - Thou shalt -.
In what follows, I seek to offer a Nietzschean complement to Jacques Taminiaux's reading of Heidegger's first lecture course on Nietzsche, The Will to Power as Art. Because what Taminiaux calls Heidegger's "connivance" with Nietzsche reflects the engaged affinity of one thoughtstyle for another, from the explicit perspective of the first, Taminiaux's reading presumes without raising the question of relation between thinkers.
As one who practices a marginalized approach to the philosophy of science, I have reason to tease mainstream, analytic philosophers about their desire to imitate scientists. But recent events have turned the tables on my joke. In essays and op-ed pieces, physicists are repaying the philosophers' compliment--not only by adopting, as popular science writers have long done, the role of cultural critic, but also by assuming the mantle of philosophy. Science, once the arbiter of scientific truth, now proposes to vet (...) the truth about everything else. I am of course referring to the Sokal controversy. (shrink)
At the extreme limit of suffering [ Leiden: pathos] nothing indeed remains but the conditions of time or space. At this moment, the man forgets himself because he is entirely within the moment; the God forgets himself because he is nothing but time; and both are unfaithful. Time because at such a moment it undergoes a categoric change and beginning and end simply no longer rhyme within it; man because, at this moment, he has to follow the categorical..
The stylistic role of music in The Birth of Tragedy2 requires less a review of Nietzsche’s personal sensitivity to music (though this matters) or an account of his friendship with Richard Wagner (although this is a crucial element) than it..
Hermeneutic, phenomenological, genealogical and postmodern critiques of science may be conceived as a radicalization of those contemporary analyses of science which take their point of departure from the fundamental principle of complementarity and recognize that science can never be a mirror of nature; that there are no neutral observers; that all experiments are theory-laden; that there are no simple facts. These perspectives sensitize us to the historical, political, social, and cultural dimensions of science. They force us to revisit the epistemological (...) claims of science and insist that we ask whether and to what extent the idea of scientific privilege can be sustained. (shrink)
Nietzsche and Heidegger pose important philosophical questions to science and its technological projects. The resultant contributes to what may be called a continental philosophy of science and the author argues that only such a rigorously critical approach to the question of science permits a genuinely philosophical reflection on science. More than a thoughtful reflection on science, however, the heart of philosophy is also at stake in such reflections. The author defends that if Nietzsche proposes the resources of art to defend (...) us against truth and the deadly insights of tragic knowledge, then Nietzsche's more arresting claim is his equation of science and art, just as Heidegger aligns techne and poiesis. For Nietzsche, science and art draw upon the same creative powers and both science and art are directed to the purpose of life. /// O ponto de partida deste artigo é o reconhecimento de que Friedrich Nietzsche e Martin Heidegger são dois filósofos que colocam questões profundamente relevantes acerca da Ciência e dos seus projectos tecnológicos. Neste sentido, o plano da autora consiste em demonstrar a viabilidade e a importância do modo não-analítico, ou continental, de fazer Filosofia da Ciência, argumentando que uma reflexão genuinamente filosófica acerca da Ciência não se pode dispensar de um confronto com o modo crítico de fazer filosofia representado tanto por Nietzsche como por Heidegger. Para a autora, os pensamentos críticos destes pensadores acerca da Ciência são bem mais do que uma mera reflexão filosófica acerca da Ciência; na verdade, o que aqui está em causa é propriamente saber de que se trata quando a questão é a da própria Filosofia. Assim, e na medida em que Nietzsche propõe os recursos da arte para nos defender contra as invectivas da verdade e as intuições fatais do conhecimento trágico, a autora do artigo defende que o mais interessante na posição nietzscheana tem a ver com o seu modo de equacionar a relação entre Ciência e Arte, tal como Heidegger acabará por alinhar techne e poiesis. O fundo da questão está em que para Nietzsche tanto a Ciência como a Arte recorrem aos mesmos poderes criativos, para além de que a Ciência e a Arte estão orientadas para a defesa do mesmo propósito: a Vida. (shrink)
This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account (...) for the lability of the term "paradigm". This was due not to Kuhn's unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to the cold war political circumstances surrounding the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Following a discussion of Fleck's anatomical allusions, I include a brief discussion of Aristotle (on menstruation and darkened mirrors) and conclude with a reference to the productivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche. (shrink)
On the political nature of the analytic - continental distinction in professional philosophy and the general tendency to discredit continental philosophy while redesignating the rubric as analytically conceived.
Nietzsche's creative and fundamental account of chaos in both its cosmic, universal as well as its humane context, recalls the ancient Greek meaning of chaos rather than its modern, disordered, decadent significance. In this generatively primordial sense, chaos corresponds not to the watery nothingness of Semitic myth or modern, scientific entropy but creative, uncountenancedly abundant potency. And in such an archaic sense, Nietzsche's chaos is a word for both nature and art. Nietzsche's creative conception of chaos equates it with the (...) will to power: as the foundational essence of the world "to all eternity." This same correspondence is also the stylistic prerequisite for creating oneself as a work of art. /// O artigo começa por demonstrar até que ponto a mais fundamental explicação criadora dada por Nietzsche a respeito do caos, em seu contexto tanto cósmico e universal como meramente humano, constitui uma evocação do antigo sentido que Ihe foi dado pelos Gregos, mais do que uma adesão à significação moderna do mesmo, desordenada e decadente. Para Nietzsche, com efeito, o caos em seu sentido generativo mais primordial, não corresponde nem à ambiguidade do nada inerente ao mito semítico nem ao sentido moderno, científico, da entropia, mas sim a uma potência criadora assinalada por uma abundãncia inesgotável Mostra-se, assim, até que ponto, em conformidade com o sentido arcaico do termo, o caos em Nietzsche constitui um nome que se dá tanto à natureza como à arte. Mais, o presente artigo mostra ainda até que ponto a concepqao nietzschiana do caos o transforma em algo equivalente à vontade depoder, ou seja, na essãncia fundadora do mundo "para toda a eternidade". Desta correspondência, aliás, resulta a condição estilistica para que cada um se crie a si mesmo como verdadeira obra de arte. (shrink)