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Barry Dainton [18]Barry F. Dainton [13]
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Profile: Barry Francis Dainton (University of Liverpool)
  1. Barry Dainton, Coming Together: The Unity of Consciousness.
    After a survey of relevant issues, the focus turns onto the question of how best to make sense of the unity of consciousness in experiential terms. Elucidations appealing to higher-order mental states and phenomenal space are found wanting; different ways of construing unity as a primitive feature of consciousness are then considered and compared Matters are brought to a close with a brief look at different approaches to the diachronic unity of consciousness.
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  2. Barry Dainton, Temporal Consciousness.
    In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are nevertheless conscious of change. Still others (...)
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  3. Barry Dainton, Line and Reality.
    For those with an interest in the most fundamental components of reality, reflecting on the simplest of things can yield a rich harvest. Consider two buttons, of exactly the same shade of red, one round and made of plastic, the other square and made of wood. Each button is clearly a distinct object in its own right: each is composed of a different portion of matter, each has its own spatial location. But are the buttons completely distinct? It might seem (...)
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  4. Barry Dainton, Précis: Stream of Consciousness.
    That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states – our bodily sensations, thoughts, mental images and so on. Since once wakened we tend to stay awake for several hours, tracing out continuous routes through whatever environment we happen to find ourselves in, it is (...)
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  5. Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.) (forthcoming). Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.
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  6. Barry Dainton (2012). On Singularities and Simulations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1):42.
  7. Barry Dainton (2012). Self-Hood and the Flow of Experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):161-200.
    Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (...)
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  8. Barry Dainton (2011). Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):238-261.
  9. Barry Dainton (2011). Reviews Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. By Galen Strawson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, Pp.448. Philosophy 86 (1):127-134.
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  10. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. 382.
  11. Barry Dainton (2010). Phenomenal Holism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):113-139.
    According to proponents of ‘phenomenal holism’, the intrinsic characteristics of the parts of unified conscious states are dependent to some degree on the characteristics of the wholes to which they belong. Although the doctrine can easily seem obscure or implausible, there are eminent philosophers who have defended it, amongst them Timothy Sprigge. In Stream of Consciousness (2000) I found Sprigge’s case for phenomenal holism problematic on several counts; in this paper I re-assess some of these criticisms. Recent experimental work suggests (...)
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  12. Barry Dainton (2009). Causation and Laws of Nature. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues in Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  13. Barry Dainton (2008). Sensing Change. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.
    We can anticipate what is yet to happen, remember what has already happened, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, the here and now. So much seems common sense. So much so that it is no surprise to see Thomas Reid, that pre-eminent champion of common sense in philosophy, advocating precisely this position.
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  14. Barry Dainton (2008). The Experience of Time and Change. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.
    Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, (...)
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  15. Barry Dainton (2008). The Phenomenal Self. Oxford University Press.
    Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather (...)
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  16. Barry F. Dainton (2007). Coming Together: The Unity of Conscious Experience. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 209--222.
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  17. Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far (...)
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  18. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-Order Consciousness and Phenomenal Space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).
    Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenomenal (...)
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  19. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. Psyche 10 (1).
    That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states.
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  20. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Replies to Commentators. Psyche.
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  21. Barry F. Dainton (2004). The Self and the Phenomenal. Ratio 17 (4):365-89.
    As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of (...)
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  22. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Unity and Introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore. Psyche 10 (1).
    Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the.
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  23. Barry F. Dainton (2004). Unity in the Void: Reply to Revonsuo. Psyche 10 (1).
    While agreeing with me on many issues, Revonsuo rejects my claim that phenomenal states could be co-conscious without being spatially related (in experience). In defence of my claim I described a thought-experiment in which.
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  24. Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...)
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  25. Barry Dainton (2002). Book Review: The Subject in Question—Sartre's Critique of Husserl in the Transcendence of the Ego. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):473-478.
  26. Barry F. Dainton (2002). The Gaze of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2):31-48.
    According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in (...)
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  27. Barry Dainton (2001). Time and Space. Acumen Press.
    Is the passage of time a basic feature of reality or merely illusory?
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  28. Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
    Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
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  29. Barry F. Dainton (1996). Survival and Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:17 - 36.
    (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996: 17-36) I If I am to survive until some later date, what must happen, and what must not happen, over the intervening period? I am talking here about survival in the strict sense. Take an earlier and a later person, if they are one and the same, what is it about them that makes this so? In addressing this question the preferred tool has long been the exploitation of imaginary or science fiction cases. We (...)
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  30. Barry Dainton (1995). Gregory McCulloch, The Mind and its World Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 15 (6):415-417.
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  31. Barry F. Dainton (1992). Time and Division. Ratio 5 (2):102-128.
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