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Profile: Bart Streumer (University of Groningen)
  1. Bart Streumer (2014). Gert , Joshua . Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 218. $65.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (3):608-612.
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  2. Bart Streumer (ed.) (2014). Irrealism in Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  3. Bart Streumer (2013). Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.
    According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that (...)
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  4. Bart Streumer (2013). Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (4):450-470.
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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  5. Bart Streumer (2013). I. Normative and Descriptive Properties. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 310.
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  6. Bart Streumer (2013). Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. OUP. 310-336.
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
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  7. Bart Streumer (2011). Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then (...)
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  8. Bart Streumer (2011). Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall, Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):200-202.
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  9. Bart Streumer (2010). Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell.
    To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of practical reasoning.
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  10. Bart Streumer (2010). Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):79 - 86.
    Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer's examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of (...)
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  11. Bart Streumer (2008). Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.
    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties.
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  12. Bart Streumer (2007). Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
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  13. Bart Streumer (2007). Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. [REVIEW] Times Literary Supplement (9 November).
    Analytic philosophers are often accused of ignoring the large questions that philosophy should be about and of concentrating instead on small technical questions that no one else is interested in. This accusation is not entirely unfounded. However, in order to answer large philosophical questions, we often need to answer many smaller and more technical ones first, whether or not anyone is interested in the answers to them. In his excellent new book The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy (...)
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  14. Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Entailment. Erkenntnis 66 (3):353 - 374.
    What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p 1,…,p n and q, if the conjunction of p 1,…, and p n entails q, then there is a reason against a person’s both believing that p 1,…, and that p n and believing the negation of q. I argue that this (...)
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  15. Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
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  16. Bart Streumer (2005). Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005.
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  17. Bart Streumer (2005). Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown. Utilitas 17 (2):226-230.
    Campbell Brown is right that my argument against semi-global consequentialism relies on the principle of agglomeration. However, semi-global consequentialists cannot rescue their view simply by rejecting this principle.
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  18. Brad Hooker & Bart Streumer (2004). Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 57--74.
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  19. Bart Streumer (2003). Can Consequentialism Cover Everything? Utilitas 15 (2):237-47.
    Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.
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  20. Bart Streumer (2003). Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'? European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.
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