This second edition features a new 48-page Afterword--1980 updating Professor Beardsley's classic work.

This second edition features a new 48-page Afterword--1980 updating Professor Beardsley's classic work.

Many philosophers apparently still accept the proposition that there is such a thing as intrinsic value, i.e., that some part of the value of some things (objects, events, or states of affairs) is intrinsic value. John Dewey's attack seems not to have dislodged this proposition, for today it is seldom questioned. I propose to press the attack again, in terms that owe a great deal to Dewey, as I understand him.

"For those of us who want to know what philosophers have said about beauty and the arts, this book will be especially useful.”—The Philosophical Review At once a treatise for professionals and a guide for newcomers to the subject, ...

In writing this book I have received a considerable variety of assistance, which I am glad to acknowledge.

Essays explore the philosophy of art, the definition of a work of art, the aims of art criticism, and the nature of creativity.

In writing this book I have received a considerable variety of assistance, which I am glad to acknowledge.

One version of moral error theory maintains that the central problem with morality is an ontological commitment to irreducible normativity. This paper argues that this version of error theory ultimately depends on an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, and that Ockham’s Razor should not be applied to irreducible normativity. This is because the appeal to Ockham’s Razor always contains an intractable element of epistemic circularity; and if this circularity is not vicious, we can construct a sound argument for the existence of (...) irreducibly normative truths that contains a similar kind of epistemic circularity. This argument is a version of Pascal’s Wager which I call “Parfit’s Wager,” because it is based on a passage from Derek Parfit’s On What Matters. It states that, if we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we are more likely to be believing what we ought to believe compared to not believing that there are such truths, and that this indicates that we ought rationally to believe that there are such truths, justifying the ontological commitment to irreducible normativity in the process. (shrink)

For the events "e" and "f" to be identical, They must have the same subject and spatio-Temporal location, And their (participial) property-Descriptions must belong to the same "modification set" (e.G., Reddening, Reddening slowly, Reddening in july). The same criterion applies to actions, Which are here treated strictly as a proper subclass of events (john's closing the door = the door's being closed by john = the door's becoming closed). Actions related by goldman's "causal generation" are therefore distinct, But those related (...) by his other three types of act-Generation are not. This conclusion requires abandonment of the view--Questionable on other grounds--That causal contexts are thoroughly extensional. (shrink)

A guide to developing logical thought and expression through discussion and exercises.

What implications does goodman's "languages of art" have for the theory and practice of art criticism? to account for the cognitive value of pictorial representations, It apparently requires to be supplemented by a concept of depiction, Or indefinite reference. For goodman's theory of expression to be convincing, Criteria are needed to discriminate exemplification in goodman's sense from the mere possession of labels. Some of the fundamental criteria of evaluation very widely used by art critics do not seem to be those (...) called for, Or authorized, By goodman's sketchy but highly significant theory of aesthetic value. (shrink)

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic initiated major disruptions to higher education systems. Physical spaces that previously supported interpersonal interaction and community were abruptly inactivated, and faculty largely took on the responsibility of accommodating classroom structures in rapidly changing situations. This study employed interviews to examine how undergraduate Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) instructors adapted instruction to accommodate the mandated transition to virtual learning and how these accommodations supported or hindered community and belonging during the onset of the pandemic. (...) Interviews with 25 STEM faculty at an undergraduate Hispanic Serving Institution revealed a wide range of accommodations they made to their courses and how they managed communication with students. Faculty strived to support student belonging with responses ranging from caring to crisis management, though some faculty expressed feelings of powerlessness when unable to accommodate certain challenges. The case of a responsive and flexible instructor is presented to highlight a productive response to a crisis. These retrospective findings point to strategies to support faculty teaching in virtual learning environments in the future; increasing opportunities for student–student and student–faculty interaction, supporting faculty in learning technologies that support these interactions and addressing faculty’s feelings of powerlessness. (shrink)

This paper affirms the proposition, denied by albert hofstadter ("journal of philosophy", volume 59, 1962), that the study of the meaning and ground of value judgments is a proper branch of aesthetics. hofstadter objects that the use of 'aesthetic value' involves a "category mistake"; however, this objection is based on an apparent failure to understand a derivative or instrumental definition. hofstadter's own position is also criticized. it is argued (a) that his theory of aesthetic validity, while commendable in some respects, (...) is too abstract and too general; and (b) that beauty is not a necessary condition of aesthetic value, a proposition strongly objected to by hofstadter. (staff). (shrink)

2. In the first place, the term "power" is used to refer to processes which are held to go on at particular times, and to be accessible to direct experience. It is not clear to me why our experiences of activity are not "explicit", or why they are not to be regarded as manifested to the senses ; but possibly these assertions could be defended on the ground that the experiences in question are phenomenologically distinctive in some way.