Search results for 'Belief Change' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Inconsistent Belief Change (2005). The Agm Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change Kojitanaka. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):113-150.score: 570.0
     
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  2. Gustavo Cevolani (forthcoming). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the IGPL.score: 90.0
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some (...)
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  3. Alexander Bochman (2002). Entrenchment Versus Dependence: Coherence and Foundations in Belief Change. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (1):3-27.score: 90.0
    We describe the relation between coherence and foundations approaches to belief change in terms of a correspondence between epistemic entrenchment relations(Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988; Rott, 1992) and dependence consequence relations from Bochman (1999, 2000a).The general conclusion of the study is that dependence consequence relations are sufficiently expressive to subsume the notion of an epistemic entrenchment and its generalizations.
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  4. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.score: 90.0
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  5. Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Meyer & Ka-Shu Wong (2008). Iterated Belief Change and the Recovery Axiom. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):501 - 520.score: 90.0
    The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We (...)
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  6. Hans Rott (2011). Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.score: 90.0
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to (...)
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  7. Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose & Thomas Meyer (2003). Non-Prioritized Ranked Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):417-443.score: 90.0
    Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in (...)
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  8. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives. Hokkaido University Press.score: 90.0
    This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries (...)
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  9. Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (2011). AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.score: 87.0
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions" was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twentyfive years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change (...)
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  10. Hans Rott (1992). Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.score: 84.0
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple (...)
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  11. Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa & Theo A. F. Kuipers (2013). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Nomic Conjunctive Theories. Synthese 190 (16):3307-3324.score: 78.0
    In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and (...)
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  12. Abhaya C. Nayak (1994). Foundational Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.score: 78.0
    This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann's minimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the "supplementary postulates" of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of (...)
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  13. Sven Ove Hansson (2009). Replacement—a Sheffer Stroke for Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):127 - 149.score: 66.0
    By replacement is meant an operation that replaces one sentence by another in a belief set. Replacement can be used as a kind of Sheffer stroke for belief change, since contraction, revision, and expansion can all be defined in terms of it. Replacement can also be defined either in terms of contraction or in terms of revision. Close connections are shown to hold between axioms for replacement and axioms for contraction and revision. Partial meet replacement is axiomatically (...)
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  14. Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.score: 66.0
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the (...)
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  15. David Makinson (2011). Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.score: 66.0
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain (...)
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  16. Fenrong Liu, Jeremy Seligman & Patrick Girard (forthcoming). Logical Dynamics of Belief Change in the Community. Synthese:1-29.score: 66.0
    In this paper we explore the relationship between norms of belief revision that may be adopted by members of a community and the resulting dynamic properties of the distribution of beliefs across that community. We show that at a qualitative level many aspects of social belief change can be obtained from a very simple model, which we call ‘threshold influence’. In particular, we focus on the question of what makes the beliefs of a community stable under various (...)
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  17. Marcelo A. Falappa, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Maurício D. L. Reis & Guillermo R. Simari (2012). Prioritized and Non-Prioritized Multiple Change on Belief Bases. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):77-113.score: 63.0
    In this article we explore multiple change operators, i.e., operators in which the epistemic input is a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. We propose two types of change: prioritized change, in which the input set is fully accepted, and symmetric change, where both the epistemic state and the epistemic input are equally treated. In both kinds of operators we propose a set of postulates and we present different constructions: kernel changes and partial meet (...)
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  18. Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra (2010). Approaching the Truth Via Belief Change in Propositional Languages. In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. 47--62.score: 60.0
    Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective (...)
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  19. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2011). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories. Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.score: 60.0
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible (...)
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  20. Horacio Arló-Costa, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.score: 60.0
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen’s more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the (...)
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  21. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.score: 60.0
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the (...)
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  22. Abhaya C. Nayak (1994). Iterated Belief Change Based on Epistemic Entrenchment. Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390.score: 60.0
    In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by (...)
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  23. John Cantwell (1999). Some Logics of Iterated Belief Change. Studia Logica 63 (1):49-84.score: 60.0
    The problems that surround iterated contractions and expansions of beliefs are approached by studying hypertheories, a generalisation of Adam Grove's notion of systems of spheres. By using a language with dynamic and doxastic operators different ideas about the basic nature of belief change are axiomatised. It is shown that by imposing quite natural constraints on how hypertheories may change, the basic logics for belief change can be strengthened considerably to bring one closer to a theory (...)
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  24. Alexander Bochman (2001). A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. Springer.score: 60.0
    This is the first book that integrates nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change into a single framework from an artificial intelligence logic point-of-view.
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  25. James P. Delgrande, Abhaya C. Nayak & Maurice Pagnucco (2005). Gricean Belief Change. Studia Logica 79 (1):97 - 113.score: 60.0
    One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational (...)
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  26. George Kourousias & David C. Makinson (2007). Parallel Interpolation, Splitting, and Relevance in Belief Change. Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 (3):994-1002.score: 60.0
    The splitting theorem says that any set of formulae has a finest representation as a family of letter-disjoint sets. Parikh formulated this for classical propositional logic, proved it in the finite case, used it to formulate a criterion for relevance in belief change, and showed that AGMpartial meet revision can fail the criterion. In this paper we make three further contributions. We begin by establishing a new version of the well-known interpolation theorem, which we call parallel interpolation, use (...)
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  27. Oliver Schulte (1999). Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle. Synthese 118 (3):329-361.score: 60.0
    This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decision-theoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory – a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions – and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker (...)
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  28. John Cantwell (2000). Logics of Belief Change Without Linearity. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (4):1556-1575.score: 60.0
    Ever since [4], systems of spheres have been considered to give an intuitive and elegant way to give a semantics for logics of theory- or belief- change. Several authors [5, 11] have considered giving up the rather strong assumption that systems of spheres be linearly ordered by inclusion. These more general structures are called hypertheories after [8]. It is shown that none of the proposed logics induced by these weaker structures are compact and thus cannot be given a (...)
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  29. Nikos Gorogiannis & Mark D. Ryan (2002). Implementation of Belief Change Operators Using BDDs. Studia Logica 70 (1):131 - 156.score: 60.0
    While the theory of belief change has attracted a lot of interest from researchers, work on implementing belief change and actually putting it to use in real-world problems is still scarce. In this paper, we present an implementation of propositional belief change using Binary Decision Diagrams. Upper complexity bounds for the algorithm are presented and discussed. The approach is presented both in the general case, as well as on specific belief change operators (...)
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  30. David Makinson & George Kourousias (2006). Respecting Relevance in Belief Change. Análisis Filosófico 26 (1):53-61.score: 60.0
    In this paper dedicated to Carlos Alchourrón, we review an issue that emerged only after his death in 1996, but would have been of great interest to him: To what extent do the formal operations of AGM belief change respect criteria of relevance? A natural (but also debateable) criterion was proposed in 1999 by Rohit Parikh, who observed that the AGM model does not always respect it. We discuss the pros and cons of this criterion, and explain how (...)
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  31. Oliver Schulte, Minimal Belief Change and Pareto-Optimality.score: 60.0
    This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decisiontheoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory –a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions–and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker set of constraints (...)
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  32. William L. Harper (1975). Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals. Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.score: 57.0
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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  33. Brenda R. J. Jansen, Maartje E. J. Raijmakers & Ingmar Visser (2007). Rule Transition on the Balance Scale Task: A Case Study in Belief Change. Synthese 155 (2):211 - 236.score: 57.0
    For various domains in proportional reasoning cognitive development is characterized as a progression through a series of increasingly complex rules. A multiplicative relationship between two task features, such as weight and distance information of blocks placed at both sides of the fulcrum of a balance scale, appears difficult to discover. During development, children change their beliefs about the balance scale several times: from a focus on the weight dimension (Rule I) to occasionally considering the distance dimension (Rule II), guessing (...)
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  34. Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.score: 54.0
    This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite (...) change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state. (shrink)
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  35. Richard Booth, Thomas Meyer & Chattrakul Sombattheera (2012). A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (4):711 - 733.score: 54.0
    Most belief change operators in the AGM tradition assume an underlying plausibility ordering over the possible worlds which is transitive and complete. A unifying structure for these operators, based on supplementing the plausibility ordering with a second, guiding, relation over the worlds was presented in Booth et al. (Artif Intell 174:1339-1368, 2010). However it is not always reasonable to assume completeness of the underlying ordering. In this paper we generalise the structure of Booth et al. (Artif Intell 174: (...)
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  36. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology. Synthese 190 (5):781-786.score: 51.0
    Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a (...)
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  37. Sven Ove Hansson (2012). Finite Contractions on Infinite Belief Sets. Studia Logica 100 (5):907-920.score: 51.0
    Contractions on belief sets that have no finite representation cannot be finite in the sense that only a finite number of sentences is removed. However, such contractions can be delimited so that the actual change takes place in a logically isolated, finite-based part of the belief set. A construction that answers to this principle is introduced, and is axiomatically characterized. It turns out to coincide with specified meet contraction.
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  38. Matthew J. Ryan (2001). Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change. Theory and Decision 51 (1):73-87.score: 51.0
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  39. Jan van Eijck, Yet More Modal Logics of Preference Change and Belief Revision.score: 48.0
    We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’ [15] with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of [11] with relational substitutions [8] for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can be defined from preferences [29; 14; 5; 7], prove completeness (...)
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  40. Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky (1996). Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment. Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.score: 48.0
    In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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  41. Ravishankar Sarma, On Causal and Constructive Modeling of Belief Change.score: 47.0
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  42. Emiliano Lorini & Cristiano Castelfranchi (2007). The Cognitive Structure of Surprise: Looking for Basic Principles. Topoi 26 (1):133-149.score: 45.0
    We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny, implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal (...)
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  43. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Belief Change for Introspective Agents. Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.score: 45.0
  44. Eric Schwitzgebel (1999). Gradual Belief Change in Children. Human Development 42 (6):283-296.score: 45.0
  45. Zoltan Domotor (1980). Probability Kinematics and Representation of Belief Change. Philosophy of Science 47 (3):384-403.score: 45.0
    Bayesian, Jeffrey and Field conditionals are compared and it is shown why the last two cannot be reduced to the first. Maximum relative entropy is used in two kinds of justification of the Field conditional and the dispensability of entropy principles in general is discussed.
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  46. K. Britz (1999). A Power Algebra for Theory Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):429-443.score: 45.0
    Various representation results have been established for logics of belief revision, in terms of remainder sets, epistemic entrenchment, systems of spheres and so on. In this paper I present another representation for logics of belief revision, as an algebra of theories. I show that an algebra of theories, enriched with a set of rejection operations, provides a suitable algebraic framework to characterize the theory change operations of systems of belief revision. The theory change operations arise (...)
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  47. Daniel Hunter (1992). Book Review:Causation, Chance, and Credence: Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, Volume 1 Brian Skyrms, William L. Harper; Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics: Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, Volume 2 William L. Harper, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 59 (3):512-.score: 45.0
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  48. Peter Roeper (2004). A Sequent Formulation of Conditional Logic Based on Belief Change Operations. Studia Logica 77 (3):425 - 438.score: 45.0
    Peter Gärdenfors has developed a semantics for conditional logic, based on the operations of expansion and revision applied to states of information. The account amounts to a formalisation of the Ramsey test for conditionals. A conditional A > B is declared accepted in a state of information K if B is accepted in the state of information which is the result of revising K with respect to A. While Gärdenfors's account takes the truth-functional part of the logic as given, the (...)
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  49. Pavlos Peppas (2012). Comparative Possibility in Set Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):53-75.score: 45.0
    In a recent article, Zhang and Foo generalized the AGM postulates for contraction to include infinite epistemic input. The new type of belief change is called set contraction. Zhang and Foo also introduced a constructive model for set contraction, called nicely ordered partition, as a generalization of epistemic entrenchment. It was shown however that the functions induced from nicely ordered partitions do not quite match the postulates for set contraction. The mismatch was fixed with the introduction of an (...)
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  50. Sven Ove Hansson (2012). Global and Iterated Contraction and Revision: An Exploration of Uniform and Semi-Uniform Approaches. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):143-172.score: 45.0
    In order to clarify the problems of iterated (global) belief change it is useful to study simple cases, in particular consecutive contractions by sentences that are both logically and epistemically independent. Models in which the selection mechanism is kept constant are much more plausible in this case than what they are in general. One such model, namely uniform specified meet contraction, has the advantage of being closely connected with the AGM model. Its properties seem fairly adequate for the (...)
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