Search results for 'Belief and doubt Psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.score: 72.0
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies (...)
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  2. J. D. Trout (1991). Belief Attribution in Science: Folk Psychology Under Theoretical Stress. Synthese 87 (June):379-400.score: 72.0
    Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of (...)
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  3. Rico Vitz (2011). Thomas More and the Christian 'Superstition': A Puzzle for Hume's Psychology of Religious Belief. Modern Schoolman 88 (3-4):223-244.score: 72.0
    In this paper, I examine one particular element of Hume’s psychology of religious belief. More specifically, I attempt to elucidate his account of what I call the sustaining causes of religious belief—that is, those causes that keep religious beliefs alive in modern human societies. In attempting to make some progress at clarifying this element of Hume’s psychology, I examine one particular ‘experiment’—namely, the case of Thomas More, a man who is, by Hume’s own admission, a person (...)
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  4. Sadhan Chakraborti (ed.) (2009). Belief and Well-Being: An Exploration of Indian Psyche. Gangchil.score: 67.0
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  5. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous Psychology and the Belief/Desire Thesis. The Monist 61 (October):573-91.score: 64.0
  6. Simone Gozzano (1994). Rationality, Folk Psychology, and the Belief-Opinion Distinction. Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123.score: 63.0
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that (...)
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  7. John J. McGraw (2004). Brain & Belief: An Exploration of the Human Soul. Aegis Press.score: 63.0
    In this intriguing book, the concept of the soul is thoroughly investigated.
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  8. Terence E. Horgan (1992). From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.score: 60.0
  9. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya (1987). Doubt, Belief, and Knowledge. Indian Council of Philosophical Research in Association with Allied Publishers.score: 60.0
     
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  10. Wallace I. Matson (2011). Grand Theories and Everyday Beliefs: Science, Philosophy, and Their Histories. Oxford University Press.score: 57.0
    Accessibly written, this is a book for all who are interested in the foundations of 21st century thought and who wonder where the cracks might be.
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  11. Raymond Boudon (1994). The Art of Self-Persuasion: The Social Explanation of False Beliefs. Polity.score: 57.0
     
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  12. Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.score: 56.0
    We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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  13. Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young (1997). Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64.score: 54.0
    Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of (...)
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  14. Donald J. Cunningham, James B. Schreiber & Connie M. Moss (2005). Belief, Doubt and Reason: C. S. Peirce on Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):177–189.score: 54.0
    In this paper, we explore Peirce's work for insights into a theory of learning and cognition for education. Our focus for this exploration is Peirce's paper The Fixation of Belief (FOB), originally published in 1877 in Popular Science Monthly. We begin by examining Peirce's assertion that the study of logic is essential for understanding thought and reasoning. We explicate Peirce's view of the nature of reasoning itself—the characteristic guiding principles or ‘habits of mind’ that underlie acts of inference, the (...)
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  15. Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.score: 54.0
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for (...)
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  16. Julia Kristeva (2009). This Incredible Need to Believe. Columbia University Press.score: 54.0
    The big question mark (in guise of a preface) -- This incredible need to believe : interview with Carmine Donzelli -- From Jesus to Mozart : Christianity's difference? -- Suffering : Lenten lectures, March 19, 2006 -- The genius of Vatholicism -- Don't be afraid of European culture.
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  17. Harold I. Brown (ed.) (1972). Studies in the Philosophy of Mind: Essays,. Oxford,Blackwell.score: 54.0
     
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  18. Bernard W. Sigg (2010). Croire N'est Pas Penser: Réflexions d'Un Psychanalyste. Golias.score: 54.0
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  19. Nathan Stemmer (1983). The Roots of Knowledge. St. Martin's Press.score: 54.0
     
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  20. David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (forthcoming). When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief and the Power of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.score: 49.0
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras and Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren’t beliefs because they don’t guide behavior and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from four studies that folk (...) unambiguously views monothematic delusions as clear cases of belief. This calls into question widespread assumptions in the professional literature about belief’s stereotypical functional profile. We also show that folk psychology views delusional patients as holding contradictory beliefs. And we also show that frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief-ascription, more powerful than even a robust and consistent track record of non-verbal behavior. (shrink)
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  21. Marco Fenici (2011). What Does the False Belief Test Test? Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.score: 49.0
    The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very concept. (...)
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  22. Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin (2012). Making Folk Psychology Explicit. Philosophia 40 (1):139-163.score: 49.0
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable (...)
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  23. Jay L. Garfield (1988). Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind. MIT Press.score: 48.0
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  24. Mitchell Herschbach (2008). False-Belief Understanding and the Phenomenological Critics of Folk Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.score: 48.0
    The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role (...)
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  25. Eric Schwitzgebel (1997). Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology. Dissertation, University of California Berkeleyscore: 48.0
    In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.
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  26. Nicolas J. Zaunbrecher (2012). Suspending Belief and Suspending Doubt: The Everyday and the Virtual in Practices of Factuality. [REVIEW] Human Studies 35 (4):519-537.score: 48.0
    From an ethnomethodological perspective, this article describes social actors’ everyday and virtual stances in terms of their practices of provisional doubt and belief for the purpose of fact-establishment. Facts are iterated, reinforced, elaborated, and transformed via phenomenal practices configuring relations of equipment, interpretation, and method organized as “other” than, but relevant to, the everyday. Such practices in scientific research involve forms of suspended belief; in other areas they can instead involve forms of suspended doubt. As an (...)
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  27. Desheng Zong (2011). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):608-623.score: 47.0
    A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one--many or many--one relation. This belief is unfounded. A notion of psychological continuity expresses a one--many or many--one relation only if it includes, as a constituent, psychological properties whose relation with their bearers is one--many or many--one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state and its bearer when first tokened is not a one--many or many--one relation. It follows that (...)
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  28. Isaac Levi (1991). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.score: 47.0
    Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a (...)
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  29. Lawrence J. Kaye (1994). The Computational Account of Belief. Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53.score: 47.0
    Fodor and others who think that scientific, computational psychology will vindicate commonsense belief-desire psychology have maintained that belief can be identified with the explicit storage of a token with appropriate content. I review and develop problems for the explicit storage view and show that a more plausible account identifies belief with the disposition to use a token with appropriate content in explicit reasoning and planning processes and as a basis for action. I argue that this (...)
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  30. Andrew Cling (1991). The Empirical Virtues of Belief. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):303-23.score: 46.0
    Abstract Meeting the eliminativist challenge to folk psychology requires showing that beliefs have explanatory virtues unlikely to be duplicated by non?cognitive accounts of behavior. The explanatory power of beliefs is rooted in their intentionality. That beliefs have a distinctive kind of intentionality is shown by the distinctive intensionality of the sentences which report them. Contrary to Fodor, the fundamental explanatory virtues of beliefs are not to be found in their capacity to make causally inactive properties relevant to the explanation (...)
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  31. Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2013). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 47 (3).score: 45.0
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails (...)). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics. (shrink)
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  32. Kristin Andrews (2008). It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.score: 45.0
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs (...)
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  33. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What is This Thing Called 'Commonsense Psychology'? Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.score: 45.0
    What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology (...)
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  34. Ilkka Pyysia¨Inen (2003). True Fiction: Philosophy and Psychology of Religious Belief. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):109-125.score: 45.0
    The phenomenon of religious belief has been much discussed in philosophy of religion. However, a priori argumentation alone cannot establish what religious belief is like as a psychological attitude. Recent advances in the cognitive science of religion have paved the way for a new, naturalized philosophy of religion. Taking into account the relevant results and hypotheses presented within these disciplines, it is possible to develop a more empirically informed philosophy of religious belief. Instead of asking whether believing (...)
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  35. David Landy (2005). Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.score: 45.0
    Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic (...)
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  36. Ilkka Pyysiäinen (2003). True Fiction: Philosophy and Psychology of Religious Belief. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):109 – 125.score: 45.0
    The phenomenon of religious belief has been much discussed in philosophy of religion. However, a priori argumentation alone cannot establish what religious belief is like as a psychological attitude. Recent advances in the cognitive science of religion have paved the way for a new, naturalized philosophy of religion. Taking into account the relevant results and hypotheses presented within these disciplines, it is possible to develop a more empirically informed philosophy of religious belief. Instead of asking whether believing (...)
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  37. R. B. Braithwaite & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (1980). Science, Belief, and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R. B. Braithwaite. Cambridge University Press.score: 45.0
    This volume is a collection of original essays by eminent philosophers written for R. B. Braithwaite's eightieth birthday to celebrate his work and teaching. In one way or another, all the essays reflect his central concern with the impact of science on our beliefs about the world and the responses appropriate to that. Together they testify to the signal importance of his contributions in areas of philosophy bearing on this concern: the philosophy of science, especially of the statistical sciences, theories (...)
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  38. Steven Horst (1995). Eliminativism and the Ambiguity of `Belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.score: 45.0
    It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the (...)
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  39. J. L. Schellenberg (2007). The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Cornell University Press.score: 45.0
    The Wisdom to Doubt is a major contribution to the contemporary literature on the epistemology of religious belief.
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  40. Joseph Loizzo (2011). Personal Agency Across Generations: Evolutionary Psychology or Religious Belief? Sophia 50 (3):429-452.score: 45.0
    Although the authors of modern scientific psychology agreed on precious little, Freud and Jung both insisted that any complete science of psychology requires some way to explain the intergenerational inheritance of character traits or personal habits of mind and action. Yet neither they nor their heirs in contemporary philosophy, psychology or cognitive science have been able to provide a plausible conceptual framework, much less a mechanism to account for the conservation of forms of personal agency across multiple (...)
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  41. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives. Hokkaido University Press.score: 45.0
    This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries to (...)
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  42. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and Subdoxastic States. Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.score: 43.0
    It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized.
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  43. Paul Smolensky (1995). On the Projectable Predicates of Connectionist Psychology: A Case for Belief. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.score: 43.0
     
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  44. Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2012). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.score: 42.0
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly (...)
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  45. G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.score: 42.0
    This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically (...)
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  46. Patrick Suppes (2006). Ramsey's Psychological Theory of Belief. In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.score: 42.0
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  47. Mark Bauerlein (1997). The Pragmatic Mind: Explorations in the Psychology of Belief. Duke University Press.score: 42.0
    The Pragmatic Mind is a study of the pragmatism of Emerson, James, and Peirce and its overlooked relevance for the neopragmatism of thinkers like Richard Rorty, ...
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  48. Denis Fisette (1993). Belief in Psychology : A Study in the Ontology of Mind Jay L. Garfield Collection «A Bradford Book» Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1988, Xii, 168 P. [REVIEW] Dialogue 32 (01):208-.score: 42.0
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  49. Frank Fair (1989). Belief in Psychology. Teaching Philosophy 12 (3):293-296.score: 42.0
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