Search results for 'Belief-desire models' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Henk Bij de Weg, Reason and the Structure of Davidson's "Desire-Belief Model&Quot;.score: 438.0
    Abstract of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg -/- In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model (DBM). First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” (a main element of his concept of reason) has two distinct meanings. An (...)
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  2. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2011). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.score: 292.0
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  3. Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos (2010). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.score: 292.0
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  4. Desire Beyond Belief (2004). Reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Eds. Frank Jackson and Graham Priest, Oxford University Press, 2004, 78-93. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:77-92.score: 280.0
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  5. G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.score: 249.0
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...)
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  6. Richard Bradley (2007). The Kinematics of Belief and Desire. Synthese 156 (3):513-535.score: 249.0
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of (...)
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  7. Frederick Stoutland (2001). Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire Model. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):83-106.score: 243.3
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  8. J. Nicolas Kaufmann (1995). The Belief-Desire Model of Decision Theory Needs a Third Component: Prospective Intentions. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 178:215-228.score: 243.3
     
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  9. Horacio Arlo-Costa, John Collins & Isaac Levi (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2-5.score: 226.0
  10. Rainer Reisenzein (2009). Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.score: 224.0
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and its relation (...)
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  11. Paul Hurley (2002). A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-Desire Theory. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):1-20.score: 220.0
    This paper argues that Donald Davidson''s account ofassertions of evaluative judgments contains ahere-to-fore unappreciated strategy forreconciling the meta-ethical ``inconsistenttriad.'''' The inconsistency is thought to resultbecause within the framework of thebelief-desire theory assertions of moraljudgments must have conceptual connections withboth desires and beliefs. The connection withdesires is necessary to account for theinternal connection between such judgments andmotivation to act, while the connection withbeliefs is necessary to account for theapparent objectivity of such judgments.Arguments abound that no class of utterancescan coherently be understood (...)
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  12. Meaning Logic (1983). For the Most Clearly Understood Models of (I) Belief,(Ii) How the Impact of Sensory Experience Changes Belief, and (Hi) How Beliefs Together with Desires Influence Actions. In Alex Orenstein & Rafael Stern (eds.), Developments in Semantics. Haven. 2--221.score: 215.0
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  13. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.score: 211.0
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give (...)
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  14. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.score: 200.0
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while belief (...)
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  15. Alan Hájek & Philip Pettit (2004). Desire Beyond Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.score: 200.0
    David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the `Desire-as- Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. (...)
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  16. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael (forthcoming). Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning. Mind and Language.score: 200.0
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  17. John Milliken (2008). In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):563 - 571.score: 200.0
    Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the (...)
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  18. John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.score: 200.0
    Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative examples (...)
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  19. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous Psychology and the Belief/Desire Thesis. The Monist 61 (October):573-91.score: 196.0
  20. Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2004). A Developmental Shift in Processes Underlying Successful Belief‐Desire Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (6):963-977.score: 196.0
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  21. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.score: 192.0
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  22. Charles B. Cross (2008). Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.score: 192.0
    I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (...)
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  23. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion. Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.score: 188.0
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  24. D. Collins (1988). Belief, Desire, and Revision. Mind 97 (July):333-42.score: 188.0
  25. David Sobel & David Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.score: 184.0
    We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
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  26. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.score: 183.0
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behavioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains influential in economics, especially in `revealed preference' theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common confusions (...)
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  27. Gerald W. Barnes (1977). Some Remarks on Belief and Desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.score: 176.0
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  28. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism About Belief and Desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.score: 176.0
  29. David Lewis (1988). Desire as Belief. Mind 97 (418):323-32.score: 168.0
    Argues for the humean theory of motivation on the grounds that rejecting it requires rejecting decision theory.
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  30. David Lewis (1996). Desire as Belief II. Mind 105 (418):303-13.score: 168.0
  31. Christopher Gauker (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.score: 168.0
    Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law.
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  32. Huw Price (1989). Defending Desire-as-Belief. Mind 98 (January):119-27.score: 168.0
  33. Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.score: 168.0
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
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  34. James Lenman (1996). Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):291-301.score: 168.0
    My concern here is with the Humean claim that no purely cognitive state could, in combination with appropriate other beliefs, but with nothing else, originate a process of rational motivation. The starting point of such motivation must always include some other element: a desire. Let's call this claim, following David McNaughton the belief-desire theory, or BDT for short. The theory is widely believed but intensely controversial. I argue here that it is true.
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  35. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2011). Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.score: 168.0
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  36. Alfred R. Mele (1988). Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention. Philosophia 18 (2-3):239-242.score: 168.0
    An influential belief/desire analysis of intention proposed by robert audi does not provide sufficient conditions for intention. Intending to "a" entails being settled upon "a"-Ing (or upon trying to "a"), And it entails being willing to "a". But an agent can satisfy audi's conditions for intending to "a" and yet be neither settled upon "a"-Ing (or trying to "a") nor willing to "a". The objection raised poses a serious problem for belief/desire analyses of intention in general.
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  37. Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.score: 168.0
    We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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  38. Finn Spicer (2004). Emotional Behaviour and the Scope of Belief-Desire Explanation. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 51--68.score: 168.0
    In our everyday psychologising, emotions figure large. When we are trying to explain and predict what a person says and does, that person’s emotions are very much among the objects of our thoughts. Despite this, emotions do not figure large in our philosophical reconstruction of everyday psychological practice—in philosophical accounts of the rational production and control of behaviour. Barry Smith has noted this point: We frequently mention people’s emotional sates when assessing how they behave, when trying to understand why they (...)
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  39. Alfred F. MacKay (1982). The Incredibility of Rejecting Belief-Desire-Action Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:117 - 126.score: 168.0
    If the conceptions of belief, desire, and action resemble phlogiston in their scientific standing, how is it that so many true, singular, causal claims about human behavior are made using these concepts? Alexander Rosenberg appeals to the distinction between attributive and referential uses of language to handle this objection. It is argued that this does not work, and that the truth of our singular, causal explanations of human behavior is little short of miraculous given his account of the nomological situation.
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  40. Consuelo Preti (2000). Belief and Desire Under the Elms. Protosociology 14:270-284.score: 168.0
     
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  41. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.score: 167.0
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  42. Greg Sherkoske (2010). Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire Revisited. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):1-11.score: 148.0
    Proponents of Humean belief-desire psychology often appeal to the metaphor of direction of fit. Roughly, the distinction between belief and desire boils down to the differing relationship between the attitude, its content, and the way the world is. Belief in P will tend to go out of existence when confronted with the introduced (perception-like) state of not P. The desire that p will, by contrast, persist in face of the introduced state that not P. The world is to be (...)
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  43. H. A. Costa, J. Collins & I. Levi (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2-5.score: 148.0
    The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results against DAB our Opinionation or Indifference (...)
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  44. Neil Sinhababu (2013). The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything. Noûs 47 (4):680-696.score: 144.0
    I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire-belief view can explain why (...)
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  45. John Collins (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2 - 5.score: 144.0
    Rationalizations of deliberation often make reference to two kinds of mental state, which we call belief and desire. It is worth asking whether these kinds are necessarily distinct, or whether it might be possible to construe desire as belief of a certain sort — belief, say, about what would be good. An expected value theory formalizes our notions of belief and desire, treating each as a matter of degree. In this context the thesis that desire is belief might amount to (...)
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  46. James Hawthorne (2004). Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.score: 144.0
    Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian updating that maintain order-independence. I will (...)
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  47. J. Robert G. Williams, Counterfactual Desire as Belief.score: 144.0
    Bryne & H´ajek (1997) argue that Lewis’s (1988; 1996) objections to identifying desire with belief do not go through if our notion of desire is ‘causalized’ (characterized by causal, rather than evidential, decision theory). I argue that versions of the argument go through on certain assumptions about the formulation of decision theory. There is one version of causal decision theory where the original arguments cannot be formulated—the ‘imaging’ formulation that Joyce (1999) advocates. But I argue this formulation is independently objectionable. (...)
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  48. Donna Torrens (1999). Individual Differences and the Belief Bias Effect: Mental Models, Logical Necessity, and Abstract Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (1):1 – 28.score: 144.0
    This study investigated individual differences in the belief bias effect, which is the tendency to accept conclusions because they are believable rather than because they are logically valid. It was observed that the extent of an individual's belief bias effect was unrelated to a number of measures of reasoning competence. Instead, as predicted by mental models theory, it was related to a person's ability to generate alternative representations of premises: the more alternatives a person generated, the less likely they (...)
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  49. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2013). Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams's Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039.score: 144.0
    I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences.
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  50. Jan-Willem Romeijn & Olivier Roy (2014). Radical Uncertainty: Beyond Probabilistic Models of Belief. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1221-1223.score: 144.0
    Over the past decades or so the probabilistic model of rational belief has enjoyed increasing interest from researchers in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Of course, such probabilistic models were used for much longer in economics, in game theory, and in other disciplines concerned with decision making. Moreover, Carnap and co-workers used probability theory to explicate philosophical notions of confirmation and induction, thereby targeting epistemic rather than decision-theoretic aspects of rationality. However, following Carnap’s early applications, philosophy has more (...)
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