Search results for 'Belief-desire models' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Henk Bij de Weg, Reason and the Structure of Davidson's "Desire-Belief Model&Quot;.score: 336.0
    Abstract of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg -/- In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model (DBM). First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” (a main element of his concept of reason) has two distinct meanings. An (...)
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  2. Desire Beyond Belief (2004). Reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Eds. Frank Jackson and Graham Priest, Oxford University Press, 2004, 78-93. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:77-92.score: 280.0
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  3. G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.score: 231.0
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...)
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  4. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2011). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.score: 194.7
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  5. Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos (2010). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.score: 194.7
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  6. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.score: 183.0
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behavioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains influential in economics, especially in `revealed preference' theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common confusions (...)
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  7. Richard Bradley (2007). The Kinematics of Belief and Desire. Synthese 156 (3):513-535.score: 177.0
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of (...)
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  8. Horacio Arlo-Costa, John Collins & Isaac Levi (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2-5.score: 170.0
  9. Rainer Reisenzein (2009). Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.score: 168.0
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and its relation (...)
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  10. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.score: 167.0
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  11. Paul Hurley (2002). A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-Desire Theory. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):1-20.score: 164.0
    This paper argues that Donald Davidson''s account ofassertions of evaluative judgments contains ahere-to-fore unappreciated strategy forreconciling the meta-ethical ``inconsistenttriad.'''' The inconsistency is thought to resultbecause within the framework of thebelief-desire theory assertions of moraljudgments must have conceptual connections withboth desires and beliefs. The connection withdesires is necessary to account for theinternal connection between such judgments andmotivation to act, while the connection withbeliefs is necessary to account for theapparent objectivity of such judgments.Arguments abound that no class of utterancescan coherently be understood (...)
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  12. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.score: 152.0
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while belief (...)
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  13. A. Hajek & Philip Pettit (2004). Desire Beyond Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.score: 152.0
    David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the `Desire-as- Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. (...)
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  14. John Milliken (2008). In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):563 - 571.score: 152.0
    Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the (...)
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  15. John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.score: 152.0
    Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative examples (...)
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  16. Frederick Stoutland (2001). Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire Model. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):83-106.score: 146.0
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  17. J. Nicolas Kaufmann (1995). The Belief-Desire Model of Decision Theory Needs a Third Component: Prospective Intentions. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 178:215-228.score: 146.0
     
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  18. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.score: 145.7
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give (...)
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  19. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.score: 144.0
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  20. Charles B. Cross (2008). Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.score: 144.0
    I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (...)
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  21. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion. Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.score: 140.0
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  22. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous Psychology and the Belief/Desire Thesis. The Monist 61 (October):573-91.score: 140.0
  23. Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2004). A Developmental Shift in Processes Underlying Successful Belief‐Desire Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (6):963-977.score: 140.0
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  24. David Sobel & David Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.score: 136.0
    We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
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  25. D. Collins (1988). Belief, Desire, and Revision. Mind 97 (July):333-42.score: 132.0
  26. Meaning Logic (1983). For the Most Clearly Understood Models of (I) Belief,(Ii) How the Impact of Sensory Experience Changes Belief, and (Hi) How Beliefs Together with Desires Influence Actions. In Alex Orenstein & Rafael Stern (eds.), Developments in Semantics. Haven. 2--221.score: 129.0
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  27. Gerald W. Barnes (1977). Some Remarks on Belief and Desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.score: 128.0
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  28. Jun Zhang, Trey Hedden & Adrian Chia (2012). Perspective-Taking and Depth of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Sequential-Move Games. Cognitive Science 36 (3):560-573.score: 128.0
    Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual’s mental states to plan one’s action and to anticipate others’ actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated (...)
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  29. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism About Belief and Desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.score: 128.0
  30. David Lewis (1988). Desire as Belief. Mind 97 (418):323-32.score: 120.0
    Argues for the humean theory of motivation on the grounds that rejecting it requires rejecting decision theory.
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  31. David Lewis (1996). Desire as Belief II. Mind 105 (418):303-13.score: 120.0
  32. Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.score: 120.0
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
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  33. Huw Price (1989). Defending Desire-as-Belief. Mind 98 (January):119-27.score: 120.0
  34. Consuelo Preti (2000). Belief and Desire Under the Elms. Protosociology 14:270-284.score: 120.0
     
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  35. Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.score: 114.0
    I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and (...)
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  36. Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin (2012). Making Folk Psychology Explicit. Philosophia 40 (1):139-163.score: 114.0
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable (...)
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  37. Uku Tooming (2013). Without Pretense: A Critique of Goldman's Model of Simulation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 113.7
    In this paper I criticize Alvin Goldman's simulation theory of mindreading which involves the claim that the basic method of folk psychologically predicting behaviour is to form pretend beliefs and desires that reproduce the transitions between the mental states of others, in that way enabling to predict what the others are going to do. I argue that when it comes to simulating propositional attitudes it isn't clear whether pretend beliefs need to be invoked in order to explain relevant experimental results, (...)
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  38. Christopher Gauker (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.score: 112.0
    Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law.
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  39. James Lenman (1996). Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):291-301.score: 112.0
    My concern here is with the Humean claim that no purely cognitive state could, in combination with appropriate other beliefs, but with nothing else, originate a process of rational motivation. The starting point of such motivation must always include some other element: a desire. Let's call this claim, following David McNaughton the belief-desire theory, or BDT for short. The theory is widely believed but intensely controversial. I argue here that it is true.
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  40. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2011). Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.score: 112.0
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  41. Alfred R. Mele (1988). Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention. Philosophia 18 (2-3):239-242.score: 112.0
    An influential belief/desire analysis of intention proposed by robert audi does not provide sufficient conditions for intention. Intending to "a" entails being settled upon "a"-Ing (or upon trying to "a"), And it entails being willing to "a". But an agent can satisfy audi's conditions for intending to "a" and yet be neither settled upon "a"-Ing (or trying to "a") nor willing to "a". The objection raised poses a serious problem for belief/desire analyses of intention in general.
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  42. Finn Spicer (2004). Emotional Behaviour and the Scope of Belief-Desire Explanation. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 51--68.score: 112.0
    In our everyday psychologising, emotions figure large. When we are trying to explain and predict what a person says and does, that person’s emotions are very much among the objects of our thoughts. Despite this, emotions do not figure large in our philosophical reconstruction of everyday psychological practice—in philosophical accounts of the rational production and control of behaviour. Barry Smith has noted this point: We frequently mention people’s emotional sates when assessing how they behave, when trying to understand why they (...)
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  43. Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.score: 112.0
    We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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  44. Alfred F. MacKay (1982). The Incredibility of Rejecting Belief-Desire-Action Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:117 - 126.score: 112.0
    If the conceptions of belief, desire, and action resemble phlogiston in their scientific standing, how is it that so many true, singular, causal claims about human behavior are made using these concepts? Alexander Rosenberg appeals to the distinction between attributive and referential uses of language to handle this objection. It is argued that this does not work, and that the truth of our singular, causal explanations of human behavior is little short of miraculous given his account of the nomological situation.
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  45. David Hitchcock (2001). Pollock on Practical Reasoning. Informal Logic 22 (3).score: 112.0
    The epistemologist John Pollock has implemented computationally an architecture for a rational agent which he calls OSCAR. OSCAR models both practical and theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning. I argue that Pollock's model of practical reasoning, which has seven components, is superior not only to the two-component belief-desire model stemming from Aristotle, but also to the three-component belief-desire-intention model developed especially by Michael Bratman. Despite its advantages, Pollock's model of practical reasoning is incomplete in at least three respects: it (...)
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  46. Paisley Livingston (1994). What is Mimetic Desire? Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):291 – 305.score: 108.0
    This essay provides a conceptual analysis and reconstruction of the notion of mimetic desire, first proposed in Girard (1961). The basic idea behind the idea of mimetic desire is that imitation can play a key role in human motivational processes. Yet mimetic desire is distinguished from related notions such as social modelling and imitation. In episodes of mimetic desire, the process in which the imitative agent's desires are formed is oriented by a particular species of belief about the model or (...)
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  47. Cristiano Castelfranchi & Fabio Paglieri (2007). The Role of Beliefs in Goal Dynamics: Prolegomena to a Constructive Theory of Intentions. Synthese 155 (2):237 - 263.score: 108.0
    In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is, the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. (...)
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  48. Dan Ryder, Models in the Brain (Book in Progress).score: 108.0
    Chapter 1: Discussion of my a posteriori strategy and the nature of representation in models. Chapter 2: Presentation of the SINBAD theory of the cerebral cortex. Chapter 3: Demonstration of how SINBAD networks develop into genuinely representational models. Application of the theory to equivocal representation, misrepresentation, empty representation, and twin cases. Chapter 4: Representata as sources of correlation, a solution to the problem of teleological indeterminacy, useful vs. true representation, objectivity. Chapter 5: The non-representational use of representations in (...)
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  49. Paul Hurley (2007). Desire, Judgment, and Reason: Exploring the Path Not Taken. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (4):437 - 463.score: 102.0
    At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires (...)
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  50. Greg Sherkoske (2010). Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire Revisited. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):1-11.score: 100.0
    Proponents of Humean belief-desire psychology often appeal to the metaphor of direction of fit. Roughly, the distinction between belief and desire boils down to the differing relationship between the attitude, its content, and the way the world is. Belief in P will tend to go out of existence when confronted with the introduced (perception-like) state of not P. The desire that p will, by contrast, persist in face of the introduced state that not P. The world is to be (...)
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