Search results for 'Belief-desire models' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Henk Bij de Weg, Reason and the Structure of Davidson's "Desire-Belief Model".
    of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model . First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” has two distinct meanings. An implication of this is that Davidson’s DBM actually comprises two (...)
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  2.  18
    Nikolaj Nottelmann (2012). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass 7 (1):71-73.
    This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...)
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  3.  7
    Desire Beyond Belief (2004). Reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Eds. Frank Jackson and Graham Priest, Oxford University Press, 2004, 78-93. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:77-92.
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  4.  64
    Richard Bradley (2007). The Kinematics of Belief and Desire. Synthese 156 (3):513-535.
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of (...)
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  5.  37
    Rainer Reisenzein (2009). Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and its relation (...)
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  6.  55
    G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...)
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  7.  23
    Paul Hurley (2002). A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-Desire Theory. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):1-20.
    This paper argues that Donald Davidson''s account ofassertions of evaluative judgments contains ahere-to-fore unappreciated strategy forreconciling the meta-ethical ``inconsistenttriad.'''' The inconsistency is thought to resultbecause within the framework of thebelief-desire theory assertions of moraljudgments must have conceptual connections withboth desires and beliefs. The connection withdesires is necessary to account for theinternal connection between such judgments andmotivation to act, while the connection withbeliefs is necessary to account for theapparent objectivity of such judgments.Arguments abound that no class of utterancescan coherently be understood (...)
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  8. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael (2015). Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning. Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  9. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief ’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while (...)
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  10.  31
    John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.
    Is there a Moore ’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative (...)
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  11. Alan Hájek & Philip Pettit (2004). Desire Beyond Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.
    David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the `Desire-as- Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. (...)
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  12. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous Psychology and the Belief/Desire Thesis. The Monist 61 (October):573-91.
  13.  9
    D. Sobel & D. Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    The authors argue against direction of fit accounts of the distinction between belief and desire.
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  14.  75
    John Milliken (2008). In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):563 - 571.
    Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the (...)
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  15. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion. Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  16.  10
    Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2004). A Developmental Shift in Processes Underlying Successful Belief‐Desire Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (6):963-977.
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  17. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  18. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2013). Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams's Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039.
    I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences.
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  19.  62
    Charles B. Cross (2008). Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
    I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (...)
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  20.  47
    D. Collins (1988). Belief, Desire, and Revision. Mind 97 (July):333-42.
  21. David Sobel & David Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
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  22.  98
    Christian List & Franz Dietrich (2016). Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):249-281.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...)
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  23.  29
    Gerald W. Barnes (1977). Some Remarks on Belief and Desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.
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  24. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism About Belief and Desire. ProtoSociology 14:145-157.
  25.  9
    R. Weintraub (2007). Desire as Belief, Lewis Notwithstanding. Analysis 67 (2):116-122.
    In two curiously neglected papers, David Lewis claims to reduce to absurdity the supposition (commonly labeled DAB) that (some) desires are belief-like. My aim in this paper is to explain the significance of this claim and rebut the proof.
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  26. Gary Hatfield (1991). Representation and Rule-Instantiation in Connectionist Systems. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer
    There is disagreement over the notion of representation in cognitive science. Many investigators equate representations with symbols, that is, with syntactically defined elements in an internal symbol system. In recent years there have been two challenges to this orthodoxy. First, a number of philosophers, including many outside the symbolist orthodoxy, have argued that "representation" should be understood in its classical sense, as denoting a "stands for" relation between representation and represented. Second, there has been a growing challenge to orthodoxy under (...)
     
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  27. David Lewis (1988). Desire as Belief. Mind 97 (418):323-32.
    Argues for the humean theory of motivation on the grounds that rejecting it requires rejecting decision theory.
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  28.  9
    Gary Hatfield (1991). Representation in Perception and Cognition: Connectionist Affordances. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum 163--95.
    There is disagreement over the notion of representation in cognitive science. Many investigators equate representations with symbols, that is, with syntactically defined elements in an internal symbol system. In recent years there have been two challenges to this orthodoxy. First, a number of philosophers, including many outside the symbolist orthodoxy, have argued that "representation" should be understood in its classical sense, as denoting a "stands for" relation between representation and represented. Second, there has been a growing challenge to orthodoxy under (...)
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  29. David Lewis (1996). Desire as Belief II. Mind 105 (418):303-13.
  30. Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.
    We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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  31. Christopher Gauker (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.
    Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law.
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  32.  69
    Huw Price (1989). Defending Desire-as-Belief. Mind 98 (January):119-27.
  33.  47
    James Lenman (1996). Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):291-301.
    My concern here is with the Humean claim that no purely cognitive state could, in combination with appropriate other beliefs, but with nothing else, originate a process of rational motivation. The starting point of such motivation must always include some other element: a desire. Let's call this claim, following David McNaughton the belief-desire theory, or BDT for short. The theory is widely believed but intensely controversial. I argue here that it is true.
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  34.  37
    Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2011). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  35.  83
    Finn Spicer (2004). Emotional Behaviour and the Scope of Belief-Desire Explanation. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press 51--68.
    In our everyday psychologising, emotions figure large. When we are trying to explain and predict what a person says and does, that person’s emotions are very much among the objects of our thoughts. Despite this, emotions do not figure large in our philosophical reconstruction of everyday psychological practice—in philosophical accounts of the rational production and control of behaviour. Barry Smith has noted this point: We frequently mention people’s emotional sates when assessing how they behave, when trying to understand why they (...)
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  36.  37
    Alfred R. Mele (1988). Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention. Philosophia 18 (2-3):239-242.
    An influential belief/desire analysis of intention proposed by robert audi does not provide sufficient conditions for intention. Intending to "a" entails being settled upon "a"-Ing (or upon trying to "a"), And it entails being willing to "a". But an agent can satisfy audi's conditions for intending to "a" and yet be neither settled upon "a"-Ing (or trying to "a") nor willing to "a". The objection raised poses a serious problem for belief/desire analyses of intention in general.
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  37.  35
    Horacio Arlo-Costa, John Collins & Isaac Levi (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2-5.
  38.  35
    Nikolaj Nottelmann (2011). Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  39.  29
    Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give (...)
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  40. Neil Sinhababu (2013). The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything. Noûs 47 (4):680-696.
    I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire- belief view can explain (...)
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  41.  16
    Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos (2010). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  42.  5
    Alfred F. MacKay (1982). The Incredibility of Rejecting Belief-Desire-Action Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:117 - 126.
    If the conceptions of belief, desire, and action resemble phlogiston in their scientific standing, how is it that so many true, singular, causal claims about human behavior are made using these concepts? Alexander Rosenberg appeals to the distinction between attributive and referential uses of language to handle this objection. It is argued that this does not work, and that the truth of our singular, causal explanations of human behavior is little short of miraculous given his account of the nomological situation.
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  43.  49
    Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
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  44.  19
    Arthur Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates. University Press of America.
    First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which (...)
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  45.  6
    Björn Petersson (2000). Belief & Desire the Standard Model of Intentional Action : Critique and Defence.
    The scheme of concepts we employ in daily life to explain intentional behaviour form a belief-desire model , in which motivating states are sorted into two suitably broad categories. The BD model embeds a philosophy of action, i.e. a set of assumptions about the ontology of motivation with subsequent restrictions on psychologising and norms of practical reason. A comprehensive critique of those assumptions and implications is offered in this work, and various criticisms of the model are met. The model’s (...)
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  46. Consuelo Preti (2000). Belief and Desire Under the Elms. ProtoSociology 14:270-284.
  47.  50
    H. A. Costa, J. Collins & I. Levi (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2-5.
    The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results against DAB our Opinionation or Indifference (...)
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  48.  39
    Greg Sherkoske (2010). Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire Revisited. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):1-11.
    Proponents of Humean belief-desire psychology often appeal to the metaphor of direction of fit. Roughly, the distinction between belief and desire boils down to the differing relationship between the attitude, its content, and the way the world is. Belief in P will tend to go out of existence when confronted with the introduced (perception-like) state of not P. The desire that p will, by contrast, persist in face of the introduced state that not P. The world is to be (...)
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  49.  73
    James Hawthorne (2004). Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
    Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian updating that maintain order-independence. I will (...)
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  50. John Collins (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2 - 5.
    Rationalizations of deliberation often make reference to two kinds of mental state, which we call belief and desire. It is worth asking whether these kinds are necessarily distinct, or whether it might be possible to construe desire as belief of a certain sort — belief, say, about what would be good. An expected value theory formalizes our notions of belief and desire, treating each as a matter of degree. In this context the thesis that desire is belief might amount to (...)
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