Search results for 'Belief-policies' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Rik Peels (2013). Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility. Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.
    William Alston has provided a by now well-known objection to the deontological conception of epistemic justification by arguing that since we lack control over our beliefs, we are not responsible for them. It is widely acknowledged that if Alston’s argument is convincing, then it seems that the very idea of doxastic responsibility is in trouble. In this article, I attempt to refute one line of response to Alston’s argument. On this approach, we are responsible for our beliefs in virtue of (...)
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  2. Paul Weingartner, Elena Klevakina-Uljanov, Gerhard Schurz & International Conference on Scientific and Religious Belief (1994). Scientific and Religious Belief.
     
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  3.  17
    Paul Helm (1994). Belief Policies. Cambridge University Press.
    How do we form and modify our beliefs about the world? It is widely accepted that what we believe is determined by evidence, and is therefore not directly under our control; but according to what criteria is the credibility of the evidence established? Professor Helm argues that no theory of knowledge is complete without standards for accepting and rejecting evidence as belief-worthy. These standards, or belief-policies, are not themselves determined by evidence, but determine what counts as credible evidence. Unlike (...)
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  4.  11
    Trenton Merricks (1996). Review of Paul Helm's Belief Policies. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):449-454.
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  5.  11
    Stephen Maitzen (1997). Belief Policies. Philosophical Review 106 (3):448-450.
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    L. Jonathan Cohen (1997). Belief Policies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):736-738.
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    Richard Fumerton (1996). EPISTEMOLOGY Belief Policies. Philosophical Books 37 (2):122-123.
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  8. P. Marshall (1991). Book Review : Belief, Values and Policies: Conviction Politics in a Secular Age, by Duncan B. Forrester. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. Viii + 110 Pp. N.P. [REVIEW] Studies in Christian Ethics 4 (1):94-95.
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  9. René van Woudenberg (2012). Belief is Involuntary. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):111-131.
    This paper argues for the claim that belief is involuntary. Evidence in favour of it comes from various thought experiments. However, other thought experiments might be taken to indicate that belief is not involuntary (thought experiments regarding such policies as the policy to consider only evidence in favour of a claim and to neglect contrary evidence, or the policy to join a group of believers in a claim, or the policy to apply some form of self-suggestion). It is argued that (...)
     
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  10.  5
    Sheldon Zink, Stacey Wertlieb, John Catalano & Victor Marwin (2005). Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS Policies. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (4):6 – 10.
    The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) waiting list was designed as a just and equitable system through which the limited number of organs is allocated to the millions of Americans in need of a transplant. People have trusted the system because of the belief that everyone on the list has an equal opportunity to receive an organ and also that allocation is blind to matters of financial standing, celebrity or political power. Recent events have revealed that certain practices and (...)
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  11.  38
    Govind Persad (2015). On H. M. Oliver’s “Established Expectations and American Economic Policies”. Ethics 125 (3):829-832,.
    In this retrospective for Ethics, I discuss H.M. Oliver’s “Established Expectations and American Economic Policies.” This article, by a then-modestly-famous economist, has been ignored (no citations) since its 1940 publication. Yet it bears directly on a normative problem at the intersection of ethics and economics that challenges today’s policymakers but has received comparatively little philosophical attention: how should we balance potentially desirable institutional change against the disruption of established expectations? -/- Oliver details how the principle of fulfilling established expectations cuts (...)
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  12.  96
    Keith Frankish (1998). Natural Language and Virtual Belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press 248.
    This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs.
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  13.  11
    Pavlos Peppas, Samir Chopra & Norman Foo, Distance Semantics for Relevance-Sensitive Belief Revision.
    Possible-world semantics are provided for Parikh’s relevance-sensitive model for belief revision. Having Grove’s system-of-spheres construction as a base, we consider additional constraints on measuring distance between possible worlds, and we prove that, in the presence of the AGM postulates, these constraints characterize precisely Parikh’s axiom (P). These additional constraints essentially generalize a criterion of similarity that predates axiom (P) and was originally introduced in the context of Reasoning about Action. A by-product of our study is the identification of two possible (...)
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  14.  6
    Margreet Z. Zwarteveen (1998). Identifying Gender Aspects of New Irrigation Management Policies. Agriculture and Human Values 15 (4):301-312.
    Instead of technological policyprescriptions, the search for solutions to managementproblems in irrigation systems is increasingly soughtin organizational and institutional reforms. Thereseems to be an emerging consensus that water and moneysavings can be brought about by (1) treating water asan economic good; and (2) decentralizing themanagement of irrigation water. Policies based on thisconsensus are being implemented in a large number ofcountries. On the basis of insights derived fromfeminist economics, the paper identifies and discussesgender biases of new irrigation management policies.The paper shows (...)
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  15.  10
    Noël Laverny & Jérôme Lang (2005). From Knowledge-Based Programs to Graded Belief-Based Programs, Part I: On-Line Reasoning. Synthese 147 (2):277 - 321.
    Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) are a powerful notion for expressing action policies in which branching conditions refer to implicit knowledge and call for a deliberation task at execution time. However, branching conditions in KBPs cannot refer to possibly erroneous beliefs or to graded belief, such as “if my belief that φ holds is high then do some action α else perform some sensing action β”.
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  16.  3
    Jacquelyn Shaw & Jocelyn Downie (2014). Welcome to the Wild, Wild North: Conscientious Objection Policies Governing Canada's Medical, Nursing, Pharmacy, and Dental Professions. Bioethics 28 (1):33-46.
    In Canada, as in many developed countries, healthcare conscientious objection is growing in visibility, if not in incidence. Yet the country's health professional policies on conscientious objection are in disarray. The article reports the results of a comprehensive review of policies relevant to conscientious objection for four Canadian health professions: medicine, nursing, pharmacy and dentistry. Where relevant policies exist in many Canadian provinces, there is much controversy and potential for confusion, due to policy inconsistencies and terminological vagueness. Meanwhile, in Canada's (...)
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  17.  9
    Okan Germiyanoglu (2015). Temporalité de l’État, temporalité de l’ennemi. Structuration et influence des systèmes de croyances chez les hauts fonctionnaires du Quai d’Orsay dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Temporalités 21.
    La lutte contre le terrorisme constitue un des axes de la politique étrangère des États. La France mène, ces vingt dernières années, une politique correspondant aux recommandations officielles élaborées par les hauts fonctionnaires du Quai d’Orsay. Or, loin d’une culture commune partagée par tous, la vision du terrorisme des diplomates français révèle plusieurs temporalités subjectives fondées sur des interactions qui les structurent et dépendent de processus de reconnaissance et de son déni entre acteurs sur la scène internationale. Les croyances philosophiques (...)
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  18.  30
    Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). The Evolution of Misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
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  19. Jake Chandler (2013). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to (...)
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  20.  20
    Fenrong Liu (2009). Diversity of Agents and Their Interaction. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):23-53.
    Diversity of agents occurs naturally in epistemic logic, and dynamic logics of information update and belief revision. In this paper we provide a systematic discussion of different sources of diversity, such as introspection ability, powers of observation, memory capacity, and revision policies, and we show how these can be encoded in dynamic epistemic logics allowing for individual variation among agents. Next, we explore the interaction of diverse agents by looking at some concrete scenarios of communication and learning, and we propose (...)
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  21.  42
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
    We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination with a principle (...)
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  22. Samuel L. Popkin (2006). The Factual Basis of “Belief Systems”: A Reassessment. Critical Review 18 (1-3):233-254.
    Converse contended that the ideological disorganization, attitudi?nal inconsistency, and limited information of American voters make them a politically disengaged mass, not a responsible electorate. I illustrate the shortcomings of Converse's line of reasoning by showing that he misread his two most prominent examples of the electoral consequences of his theory: voting on the Vietnam War in the 1968 New Hampshire primary, and public opinion about the 1948 Taft?Hartley Act. In both cases, voters were better able to sort candidates and policies (...)
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  23. J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
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  24.  74
    Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Belief and Self-Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Issues 26.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some degree (...)
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  25. Daniel Whiting (2013). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press
    That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism (...)
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  26. Susanna Rinard (2015). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
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  27. Alex Worsnip (2016). Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.
    ABSTRACTMany discussions of the ‘preface paradox’ assume that it is more troubling for deductive closure constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All that we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive (...)
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  28.  94
    David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
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  29.  54
    Wolfgang Spohn (2012). The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications. Oxford University Press.
    Wolfgang Spohn presents the first full account of the dynamic laws of belief, by means of ranking theory. This book is his long-awaited presentation of ranking theory and its ramifications.
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  30. Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
  31. Neil Van Leeuwen (2014). Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief. Cognition 133 (3):698-715.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...)
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  32. Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 2:1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
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  33. Dennis Whitcomb (2014). Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief? In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vits (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press
    This article critically examines numerous attempts to build a knowledge-first ethics of belief.
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  34. Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
    People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right (...)
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  35. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
    Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript].
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  36. Nikolaj Nottelmann & Rik Peels (2013). Some Metaphysical Implications of a Credible Ethics of Belief. In New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content. Palgrave Macmillan 230-250.
    Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in all contexts count (...)
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  37. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Reasons and Belief's Justification. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press
    There has been a considerable amount of debate about the norms of belief, but little discussion to date about what the reasons associated with these norms demand from us. By working out an account of what reasons demand, we can better understand the nature of justification.
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  38. Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
    It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires (...)
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  39. L. Jonathan Cohen (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.
    In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And (...)
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  40.  75
    Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss (2013). Against Belief Normativity. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press
    We have argued against the thesis that content is essentially normative (Glüer & Wikforss 2009). In the course of doing so, we also presented some considerations against the thesis that belief is essentially normative. In this paper we clarify and develop these considerations, thereby paving the road for a fully non-normative account of the nature of belief.
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  41. David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer (2013). Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):19-50.
    Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) (...)
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  42.  87
    Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
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  43.  63
    Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.) (2005). God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Festschrift for Nicholas Wolterstorff). Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophy of religion in the Anglo-American tradition experienced a 'rebirth' following the 1955 publication of New Essays in Philosophical Theology (eds. Antony Flew and Alisdair MacIntyre). Fifty years later, this volume of New Essays offers a sampling of the best work in what is now a very active field, written by some of its most prominent members. A substantial introduction sketches the developments of the last half-century, while also describing the 'ethics of belief' debate in epistemology and showing how it (...)
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  44. Daniel Whiting (2014). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by (...)
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  45.  66
    Finnur Dellsén (2016). Understanding Without Justification or Belief. Ratio 29 (2).
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among epistemologists in the nature of understanding, with some authors arguing that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology. But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view, understanding is a species of knowledge. Although this view has recently been challenged in various ways, even the critics of the standard view have assumed that understanding requires justification and belief. I argue that it requires (...)
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  46. Anders Nes (2016). Assertion, Belief, and ‘I Believe’-Guarded Affirmation. Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):57-86.
    According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition that p. (...)
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  47.  24
    Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.
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  48. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-275.
    This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in (...)
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  49. Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2015). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...)
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  50.  78
    Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro (2015). Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator. CLE E-Prints 15 (8):01-11.
    In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...)
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