Search results for 'Believing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  13
    Samuel Kahn (2014). The Interconnection Between Willing and Believing for Kant’s and Kantian Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):143-157.
    In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory.
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  2.  73
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2001). In-Between Believing. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.
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  3. Russell B. Goodman (1974). Is Seeing Believing? Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.
  4. Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Knowing That P Without Believing That P. Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. (...)
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  5.  58
    Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Knowing That P Without Believing That P. Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. (...)
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  6. Jeffrey Schloss & Michael J. Murray (eds.) (2009). The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    Over the last two decades, scientific accounts of religion have received a great deal of scholarly and popular attention both because of their intrinsic interest and because they are widely as constituting a threat to the religion they analyse. The Believing Primate aims to describe and discuss these scientific accounts as well as to assess their implications. The volume begins with essays by leading scientists in the field, describing these accounts and discussing evidence in their favour. Philosophical and theological (...)
     
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  7.  94
    Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
    There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that (...) at will is possible, namely that mind-reading is impossible, in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an imp.. (shrink)
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  8. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
    Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What (...)
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  9.  22
    Michael J. Murray & Jeffrey Schloss (eds.) (2009). The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    Over the last two decades, scientific accounts of religion have received a great deal of scholarly and popular attention both because of their intrinsic interest and because they are widely as constituting a threat to the religion they analyse. The Believing Primate aims to describe and discuss these scientific accounts as well as to assess their implications. The volume begins with essays by leading scientists in the field, describing these accounts and discussing evidence in their favour. Philosophical and theological (...)
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  10.  90
    Shaun Nichols (2004). Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39.
    Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction.
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  11. Pamela Hieronymi (2009). Believing at Will. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.
    It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify (...)
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  12. Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite (...)
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  13. Adam Leite (2008). Believing One's Reasons Are Good. Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation (...)
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  14.  15
    Christian Smith (2003). Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture. Oxford University Press.
    What kind of animals are human beings? And how do our visions of the human shape our theories of social action and institutions? In Moral, Believing Animals>, Christian Smith advances a creative theory of human persons and culture that offers innovative, challenging answers to these and other fundamental questions in sociological, cultural, and religious theory. Smith suggests that human beings have a peculiar set of capacities and proclivities that distinguishes them significantly from other animals on this planet. Despite the (...)
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  15. Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2003). Believing in Things. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
    I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only (...)
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  16. Chantal Bax (2013). Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
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  17.  33
    Matthias Steup (forthcoming). Believing Intentionally. Synthese:1-22.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, and subsequently acquire (...)
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  18.  95
    Pascal Engel (1998). Believing, Holding True, and Accepting. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships (...)
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  19.  31
    Klemens Kappel (2014). Believing on Trust. Synthese 191 (9):2009-2028.
    The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, (...)
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  20. Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Responsibility for Believing. Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
    Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...)
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  21. Dana Radcliffe (1997). Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145-151.
    Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible becuse it could not qualify as a basic intentional actions. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her (...)
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  22.  23
    Thomas Tyson (1992). Does Believing That Everyone Else is Less Ethical Have an Impact on Work Behavior? Journal of Business Ethics 11 (9):707 - 717.
    Researchers consistently report that individuals see themselves acting far more ethically than comparable others when confronted with ethically uncertain work-related behaviors. They suggest that this belief encourages unethical conduct and contributes to the degeneration of business ethics; however, they have not specifically investigated the consequences of this belief. If undesirable work behaviors actually do occur, educators and other ethics advocates would be strongly encouraged to dispel this widely held notion.In the present study, data was collected from college students and practicing (...)
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  23.  70
    Keith Ward (2002). Believing in Miracles. Zygon 37 (3):741-750.
    David Hume’s arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context-dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science. (edited).
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  24. Gregory W. Dawes (2012). Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer
    Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any (...)
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  25.  16
    Joshua Cockayne, David Efird, Daniel Molto, Richard Tamburro & Jack Warman (forthcoming). Non-Evidential Believing and Permissivism About Evidence: A Reply to Dan-Johan Eklund. Religious Studies:1-9.
    In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least (...)
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  26.  9
    Dana Radcliffe (1997). Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145 - 151.
    Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible becuse it could not qualify as a basic intentional actions. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her (...)
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  27.  37
    Justin P. McBrayer (2014). The Wager Renewed: Believing in God is Good for You. [REVIEW] Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):130.
    Not all of our reasons for belief are epistemic in nature. Some of our reasons for belief are prudential in the sense that believing a certain thing advances our personal goals. When it comes to belief in God, the most famous formulation of a prudential reason for belief is Pascal’s Wager. And although Pascal’s Wager fails, its failure is instructive. Pascal’s Wager fails because it relies on unjustified assumptions about what happens in the afterlife to those who believe in (...)
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  28.  45
    Alfred R. Mele (1986). Incontinent Believing. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.
    In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be (...)
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  29. Andrew Cullison (2007). Privileged Access, Externalism, and Ways of Believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.
    By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
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  30.  62
    Michael Martin (1983). Pascal's Wager as an Argument for Not Believing in God. Religious Studies 19 (1):57 - 64.
    Can Pascal's wager for the existence of God be turned against the religious believer and used as an argument for not believing in God? Although such an argument has been very briefly sketched by others its details have remained undeveloped. In this paper this argument is worked out in detail in the context of decision theory and is defended against objections. The result is a plausible argument for atheism.
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  31.  40
    David B. Suits (2006). Really Believing in Fiction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):369–386.
    How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories (...)
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  32.  41
    Ward E. Jones (2002). Explaining Our Own Beliefs: Non-Epistemic Believing and Doxastic Instability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.
    It has often been claimed that ourbelieving some proposition is dependent uponour not being committed to a non-epistemicexplanation of why we believe that proposition.Very roughly, I cannot believe that p andalso accept a non-epistemic explanation of mybelieving that p. Those who have assertedsuch a claim have drawn from it a range ofimplications: doxastic involuntarism, theunacceptability of Humean naturalism, doxasticfreedom, restrictions upon the effectiveness ofpractical (Pascalian) arguments, as well asothers. If any of these implications are right,then we would do well to (...)
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  33.  17
    Benjamin McMyler (2016). Obedience and Believing a Person. Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):58-77.
    I argue that there is a mutually illuminating parallel between the concept of obedience and the concept of believing a person. Just as both believing what a person says and believing what a person says for the reason that the person says it are insufficient for believing the person, so acting as a person demands and acting as a person demands for the reason that the person demands it are insufficient for obeying the person. Unlike the (...)
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  34.  43
    John Lamont (1996). Believing That God Exists Because the Bible Says So. Faith and Philosophy 13 (1):121-124.
    The paper considers René Descartes’ assertion that believing that God exists because the Bible says so, and believing that what the Bible says is true because God says it, involves circular reasoning. It argues that there is no circularity involved in holding these beliefs, and maintains that the appearance of circularity results from an equivocation. It considers a line of argument that would defend the rationality of holding these beliefs, but does not try to prove its soundness.
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  35.  37
    Thomas C. Ryckman (1989). On Believing, Saying and Expressing. Synthese 79 (2):191 - 200.
    Examines the connections among believing, saying, and expressing in situations where the sentence used is a declarative sentence containing at least one proper name. Proposes a new way of understanding these connections. Develops an argument for the thesis that, although we typically believe the singular propositions expressed by our uses of name sentences, we rarely use such sentences because we believe those propositions.
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  36.  39
    Benjamin Bayer, Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.
    I defend of a version of doxastic voluntarism, by criticizing an argument advanced recently by Pamela Hieronymi against the possibility of belief at will. Conceiving of belief at will as believing immediately in response to practical reasons, Hieronymi claims that none of the forms of control we exercise over our beliefs measure up to this standard. While there is a form of direct control we exercise over our beliefs, "evaluative control," she claims it does not give us the power (...)
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  37.  54
    D. Efird (2011). Make/Believing the World(S): Toward a Christian Ontological Pluralism * By Mark S. McLeod-Harrison. Analysis 71 (2):404-406.
    ‘We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth’, so Christians confess when they recite the Nicene Creed. Now if the argument of Mark S. McLeod-Harrison’s Make/Believing the World: Toward a Christian Ontological Pluralism is correct, God is not alone in that task. We human beings are makers of heaven and earth, too, in the sense that what exists is as it is because our minds have made it so, which is a kind of (...)
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  38.  12
    Brian Gates (2006). Religion as Cuckoo or Crucible: Beliefs and Believing as Vital for Citizenship and Citizenship Education. Journal of Moral Education 35 (4):571-594.
    The importance of motivational beliefs and, more specifically, religion, is identified as central for both citizenship and citizenship education. Whether they take an expressly religious form, or appear in a purportedly more open form, such as faith or world view, beliefs are at the core of human being. The tendency to speak more of shared values than beliefs in the context of educating citizens is open to question - values are not necessarily any more universally agreed, since they too are (...)
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  39.  64
    Colin Cheyne (2009). A Paradox of Justified Believing. Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
    The following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification: (1) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood, (2) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification, (3) Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably-believed epistemic principle are justified. I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and (...)
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  40.  14
    Phillip Cary (1996). Believing the Word. Faith and Philosophy 13 (1):78-90.
    Our concept of knowing of other persons ought to include respect for them. Since respect implies considering whether what they say is true, I propose that believing others’ words is a necessary condition of knowing them. I explore the contribution such belief makes to knowledge of other persons, as well as some surprising but welcome implications, including theological consequences.
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  41.  52
    Nikolaj Nottelman (2007). Is Believing at Will 'Conceptually Impossible'? Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124.
    In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments (...)
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  42.  3
    Ward E. Jones (2004). Pragmatic Believing and its Explanation. Critica 36 (108):3-36.
    Most explanations of beliefs are epistemically or pragmatically rationalizing. The distinction between these two types involves the explainer's differing expectations of how the believer will behave in the face of counter-evidence. This feature suggests that rationalizing explanations portray beliefs as either a consequence of the believer's following a norm, or part of a sub-intentional goal-oriented system. Which properly characterizes pragmatic believing? If there were pragmatic norms for believing, I argue, they would not be consciously followable. Yet an unallowable (...)
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  43.  49
    Elisabeth Schellekens (2005). Seeing is Believing' and 'Believing is Seeing. Acta Analytica 20 (4):10-23.
    The principal concern of my paper is a distinction between two ways of appreciating works of art, characterised here in terms of the phrases ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’. I examine this distinction in the light of an epistemological requirement at times at least grounded in what David Davies, in his Art as Performance , refers to as the ‘common sense theory of art appreciation’ in order to assess exactly what aspect of the philosophical approach generally (...)
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  44.  32
    Andrew Dole (2009). Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Philosophical Review 118 (2):250-253.
    Preface ix Acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction: towards an acceptable fideism 1 The metaquestion: what is the issue about the ‘justifiability’ of religious belief? 4 Faith-beliefs 6 Overview of the argument 8 Glossary of special terms 18 2 The ‘justifiability’ of faith-beliefs: an ultimately moral issue 26 A standard view: the concern is for epistemic justifiability 26 The problem of doxastic control 28 The impossibility of believing at will 29 Indirect control over beliefs 30 ‘Holding true’ and ‘taking to be (...)
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  45. Stephen Stuart (2013). On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You 'Re Not [Book Review]'. The Australian Humanist 111 (111):22.
    Stuart, Stephen Review of: On being certain: Believing you are right even when you're not, by Robert A. Burton, St Martin's Griffin, New York, 2008,.
     
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  46.  13
    Manfred Kerber & Michael Kohlhase (2012). Reasoning Without Believing: On the Mechanisation of Presuppositions and Partiality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (4):295 - 317.
    (2012). Reasoning without believing: on the mechanisation of presuppositions and partiality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 295-317. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2012.705962.
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  47.  17
    Mark Mercer (2010). In Defence of Believing Wishfully. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):211-224.
    To believe a proposition wishfully is to believe it because one wants to believe it, and not because one has evidence or reason that it is true. Is it wise to be open to believing wishfully? After criticising one popular argument that we ought be closed to believing wishfully, I develop an argument that being closed to believing wishfully is to labour under a debilitating prejudice. As a rule, then, we ought to be open to believing (...)
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  48.  3
    Wolfgang Raible (1983). Knowing and Believing – and Syntax. In Herman [Ed] Parret (ed.), On Believing. De la Croyance. Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches. De Gruyter 274-291.
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  49.  7
    Barbara Winters (1980). Reasonable Believing. Dialectica 34 (1):3-16.
    SummaryThe paper examines the conditions someone's believing must satisfy in order to be reasonable and argues that an important necessary condition concerns the nature of the origin and sustain‐ment of the belief. This requirement cannot be captured by conditions on logical relations among the believed propositions, but instead concerns the psychological process of reasoning, concluding, or basing one belief on another. The implications of this result for traditional epistemology are examined, and it is concluded that the most important issues (...)
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    Roderick M. Chisholm (1983). Believing as an Intentional Concept'. In Herman Parret (ed.), On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches. W. De Gruyter 48--56.
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