Search results for 'Believing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eric Schwitzgebel (2001). In-Between Believing. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.score: 21.0
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  2. Russell B. Goodman (1974). Is Seeing Believing? Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.score: 21.0
  3. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.score: 18.0
    Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What (...)
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  4. Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Knowing That P Without Believing That P. Noûs 47 (2):371-384.score: 18.0
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. (...)
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  5. Pamela Hieronymi (2009). Believing at Will. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.score: 18.0
    It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify (...)
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  6. Chantal Bax (2013). Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.score: 18.0
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
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  7. Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.score: 18.0
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite (...)
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  8. Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2003). Believing in Things. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.score: 18.0
    I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only (...)
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  9. Adam Leite (2008). Believing One's Reasons Are Good. Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.score: 18.0
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation (...)
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  10. Pascal Engel (1998). Believing, Holding True, and Accepting. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.score: 18.0
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships (...)
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  11. Shaun Nichols (2004). Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39.score: 18.0
    Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction.
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  12. Colin Cheyne (2009). A Paradox of Justified Believing. Ratio 22 (3):278-290.score: 18.0
    The following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification: (1) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood, (2) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification, (3) Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably-believed epistemic principle are justified. I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and (...)
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  13. Gregory W. Dawes (2012). Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.score: 18.0
    Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any (...)
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  14. Alfred R. Mele (1986). Incontinent Believing. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.score: 18.0
    In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be (...)
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  15. Nikolaj Nottelman (2007). Is Believing at Will 'Conceptually Impossible'? Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124.score: 18.0
    In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments (...)
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  16. Elisabeth Schellekens (2005). Seeing is Believing' and 'Believing is Seeing. Acta Analytica 20 (4):10-23.score: 18.0
    The principal concern of my paper is a distinction between two ways of appreciating works of art, characterised here in terms of the phrases ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’. I examine this distinction in the light of an epistemological requirement at times at least grounded in what David Davies, in his Art as Performance , refers to as the ‘common sense theory of art appreciation’ in order to assess exactly what aspect of the philosophical approach generally (...)
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  17. Andrew Cullison (2007). Privileged Access, Externalism, and Ways of Believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.score: 18.0
    By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
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  18. David B. Suits (2006). Really Believing in Fiction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):369–386.score: 18.0
    How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories (...)
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  19. Ward E. Jones (2002). Explaining Our Own Beliefs: Non-Epistemic Believing and Doxastic Instability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.score: 18.0
    It has often been claimed that ourbelieving some proposition is dependent uponour not being committed to a non-epistemicexplanation of why we believe that proposition.Very roughly, I cannot believe that p andalso accept a non-epistemic explanation of mybelieving that p. Those who have assertedsuch a claim have drawn from it a range ofimplications: doxastic involuntarism, theunacceptability of Humean naturalism, doxasticfreedom, restrictions upon the effectiveness ofpractical (Pascalian) arguments, as well asothers. If any of these implications are right,then we would do well to (...)
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  20. Keith Ward (2002). Believing in Miracles. Zygon 37 (3):741-750.score: 18.0
    David Hume’s arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context-dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science. (edited).
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  21. Benjamin Bayer, Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.score: 18.0
    I defend of a version of doxastic voluntarism, by criticizing an argument advanced recently by Pamela Hieronymi against the possibility of belief at will. Conceiving of belief at will as believing immediately in response to practical reasons, Hieronymi claims that none of the forms of control we exercise over our beliefs measure up to this standard. While there is a form of direct control we exercise over our beliefs, "evaluative control," she claims it does not give us the power (...)
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  22. Edward Stein (1997). Can We Be Justified in Believing That Humans Are Irrational? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):545-565.score: 18.0
    In this paper, the author considers an argument against the thesis that humans are irrational in the sense that we reason according to principles that differ from those we ought to follow. The argument begins by noting that if humans are irrational, we should not trust the results of our reasoning processes. If we are justified in believing that humans are irrational, then, since this belief results from a reasoning process, we should not accept this belief. The claim that (...)
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  23. Michael J. Murray & Jeffrey Schloss (eds.) (2009/2010). The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Over the last two decades, scientific accounts of religion have received a great deal of scholarly and popular attention both because of their intrinsic interest and because they are widely as constituting a threat to the religion they analyse. The Believing Primate aims to describe and discuss these scientific accounts as well as to assess their implications. The volume begins with essays by leading scientists in the field, describing these accounts and discussing evidence in their favour. Philosophical and theological (...)
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  24. Thomas Tyson (1992). Does Believing That Everyone Else is Less Ethical Have an Impact on Work Behavior? Journal of Business Ethics 11 (9):707 - 717.score: 18.0
    Researchers consistently report that individuals see themselves acting far more ethically than comparable others when confronted with ethically uncertain work-related behaviors. They suggest that this belief encourages unethical conduct and contributes to the degeneration of business ethics; however, they have not specifically investigated the consequences of this belief. If undesirable work behaviors actually do occur, educators and other ethics advocates would be strongly encouraged to dispel this widely held notion.In the present study, data was collected from college students and practicing (...)
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  25. Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. :1-18.score: 18.0
    Believing at will is possible. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.974631.
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  26. Christian Smith (2003). Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    What kind of animals are human beings? And how do our visions of the human shape our theories of social action and institutions? In Moral, Believing Animals>, Christian Smith advances a creative theory of human persons and culture that offers innovative, challenging answers to these and other fundamental questions in sociological, cultural, and religious theory. Smith suggests that human beings have a peculiar set of capacities and proclivities that distinguishes them significantly from other animals on this planet. Despite the (...)
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  27. A. Dole (2009). Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Philosophical Review 118 (2):250-253.score: 18.0
    Preface ix Acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction: towards an acceptable fideism 1 The metaquestion: what is the issue about the ‘justifiability’ of religious belief? 4 Faith-beliefs 6 Overview of the argument 8 Glossary of special terms 18 2 The ‘justifiability’ of faith-beliefs: an ultimately moral issue 26 A standard view: the concern is for epistemic justifiability 26 The problem of doxastic control 28 The impossibility of believing at will 29 Indirect control over beliefs 30 ‘Holding true’ and ‘taking to be (...)
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  28. John Lamont (1996). Believing That God Exists Because the Bible Says So. Faith and Philosophy 13 (1):121-124.score: 18.0
    The paper considers René Descartes’ assertion that believing that God exists because the Bible says so, and believing that what the Bible says is true because God says it, involves circular reasoning. It argues that there is no circularity involved in holding these beliefs, and maintains that the appearance of circularity results from an equivocation. It considers a line of argument that would defend the rationality of holding these beliefs, but does not try to prove its soundness.
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  29. Thomas C. Ryckman (1989). On Believing, Saying and Expressing. Synthese 79 (2):191 - 200.score: 18.0
    Examines the connections among believing, saying, and expressing in situations where the sentence used is a declarative sentence containing at least one proper name. Proposes a new way of understanding these connections. Develops an argument for the thesis that, although we typically believe the singular propositions expressed by our uses of name sentences, we rarely use such sentences because we believe those propositions.
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  30. Klemens Kappel (2014). Believing on Trust. Synthese 191 (9):2009-2028.score: 18.0
    The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, (...)
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  31. Dana Radcliffe (1997). Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145-151.score: 18.0
    Many philosophers hold that it is conceptually impossible to form a belief simply by willing it. Noting the failure of previous attempts to locate the presumed incoherence, Dion Scott-Kakures offers a version of the general line that voluntary believing is conceptually impossible becuse it could not qualify as a basic intentional actions. This discussion analyzes his central argument, explaining how it turns on the assumption that a prospective voluntary believer must regard the desired belief as not justified, given her (...)
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  32. Manfred Kerber & Michael Kohlhase (2012). Reasoning Without Believing: On the Mechanisation of Presuppositions and Partiality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (4):295 - 317.score: 18.0
    (2012). Reasoning without believing: on the mechanisation of presuppositions and partiality. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 295-317. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2012.705962.
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  33. G. Scott Davis (2012). Believing and Acting: The Pragmatic Turn in Comparative Religion and Ethics. OUP Oxford.score: 18.0
    How should religion and ethics be studied if we want to understand what people believe and why they act the way they do? In the 1980s and '90s postmodernist worries about led to debates that turned on power, truth, and relativism. Since the turn of the century scholars impressed by 'cognitive science' have introduced concepts drawn from evolutionary biology, neurosciences, and linguistics in the attempt to provide 'naturalist' accounts of religion. Deploying concepts and arguments that have their roots in the (...)
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  34. Mark Mercer (2010). In Defence of Believing Wishfully. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):211-224.score: 18.0
    To believe a proposition wishfully is to believe it because one wants to believe it, and not because one has evidence or reason that it is true. Is it wise to be open to believing wishfully? After criticising one popular argument that we ought be closed to believing wishfully, I develop an argument that being closed to believing wishfully is to labour under a debilitating prejudice. As a rule, then, we ought to be open to believing (...)
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  35. Damian Cox & Michael Levine (2004). Believing Badly. Philosophical Papers 33 (3):309-328.score: 18.0
    This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person's beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of (...)
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  36. Ward E. Jones (2004). Pragmatic Believing and its Explanation (El Creer Pragmático y Su Explicatión). Critica 36 (108):3 - 36.score: 18.0
    Most explanations of beliefs are epistemically or pragmatically rationalizing. The distinction between these two types involves the explainer's differing expectations of how the believer will behave in the face of counter-evidence. This feature suggests that rationalizing explanations portray beliefs as either (i) a consequence of the believer's following a norm, or (ii) part of a sub-intentional goal-oriented system. Which properly characterizes pragmatic believing? If there were pragmatic norms for believing, I argue, they would not be consciously followable. Yet (...)
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  37. Stephen Stuart (2013). On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You're Not [Book Review]. Australian Humanist, The 111 (111):22.score: 18.0
    Stuart, Stephen Review(s) of: On being certain: Believing you are right even when you're not, by Robert A. Burton, St Martin's Griffin, New York, 2008, (xiv + 256 pp., index, pbk, ISBN 978-0-312-54152-1).
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  38. Phillip Cary (1996). Believing the Word. Faith and Philosophy 13 (1):78-90.score: 18.0
    Our concept of knowing of other persons ought to include respect for them. Since respect implies considering whether what they say is true, I propose that believing others’ words is a necessary condition of knowing them. I explore the contribution such belief makes to knowledge of other persons, as well as some surprising but welcome implications, including theological consequences.
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  39. Roderick M. Chisholm (1983). Believing as an Intentional Concept'. In Herman Parret (ed.), On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches. W. De Gruyter. 48--56.score: 18.0
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  40. Jeffrey Schloss & Michael J. Murray (eds.) (2009/2010). The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Over the last two decades, scientific accounts of religion have received a great deal of scholarly and popular attention both because of their intrinsic interest and because they are widely as constituting a threat to the religion they analyse. The Believing Primate aims to describe and discuss these scientific accounts as well as to assess their implications. The volume begins with essays by leading scientists in the field, describing these accounts and discussing evidence in their favour. Philosophical and theological (...)
     
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  41. John Turri (2011). Believing For a Reason. Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.score: 16.0
    This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.
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  42. Kieran Setiya (2008). Believing at Will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.score: 16.0
    Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in "Deciding to Believe," attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.
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  43. David M. Braun (2002). Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.score: 16.0
    We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.
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  44. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2001). Believing in Words. Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.score: 16.0
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  45. Simon J. Evnine (1999). Believing Conjunctions. Synthese 118 (2):201-227.score: 16.0
    I argue that it is rational for a person to believe the conjunction of her beliefs. This involves responding to the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes. In addition, I suggest that in normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction just is to believe its conjuncts.
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  46. Kent Bach (1997). Thinking and Believing in Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):105-105.score: 16.0
    Mele views self-deception as belief sustained by motivationally biased treatment of evidence. This view overlooks something essential, for it does not reckon with the fact that in self-deception the truth is dangerously close at hand and must be repeatedly suppressed. Self-deception is not so much a matter of what one positively believes as what one manages not to think.
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  47. Mikel Burley (2012). Believing in Reincarnation. Philosophy 87 (02):261-279.score: 16.0
    Is it absurd to believe that, in the absence of bodily continuity, personal identity could be retained? Bernard Williams argued for an affirmative answer to this question partly on the basis of a well-known thought experiment. Some other philosophers, including D. Z. Phillips, have accepted, or appear to have accepted, Williams' conclusion.Yet the argument has the consequence of dismissing as absurd the sorts of reincarnation beliefs which, within their proper contexts, have a meaningful role in the lives of many millions (...)
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  48. Susan Dwyer & Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Believing in Language. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):338-373.score: 16.0
    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language--e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue that ordinary speakers believe the propositions expressed by certain sentences of linguistic theory, and that linguistics (...)
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