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  1. Ben Colburn (2014). Disadvantage, Autonomy, and the Continuity Test. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2).
    The Continuity Test is the principle that a proposed distribution of resources is wrong if it treats someone as disadvantaged when they don't see it that way themselves, for example by offering compensation for features that they do not themselves regard as handicaps. This principle — which is most prominently developed in Ronald Dworkin's defence of his theory of distributive justice — is an attractive one for a liberal to endorse as part of her theory of distributive justice and disadvantage. (...)
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  2. Ben Colburn (2013). Autonomy and End of Life Decisions: A Paradox. In. In Juha Räikkä & Jukka Varelius (eds.), Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Springer. 69--80.
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  3. Ben Colburn (2012). Autonomy-Minded Anti-Perfectionism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:233-241.
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  4. Ben Colburn (2012). In Defence of Comprehensive Liberalism. Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.
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  5. Ben Colburn (2012). Responsibility and School Choice in Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 46 (2):207-222.
    Consider the following argument for school choice, based on an appeal to the virtues of the market: allowing parents some measure of choice over their particular children's education ultimately serves the interests of all children, because creating a market mechanism in state education will produce improvements through the same pressures that lead to greater efficiency and quality when markets are deployed in more familiar contexts. The argument fails, because it is committed to a principle of equal concern, which (after analysis) (...)
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  6. Ben Colburn (2011). Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences. Utilitas 23 (1):52-71.
    Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster's explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterized by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our (...)
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  7. Ben Colburn (2010). Anti-Perfectionisms and Autonomy. Analysis 70 (2):247-256.
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  8. Ben Colburn (2010). Autonomy and Liberalism. Routledge.
    Introduction: What is liberalism? -- Three conceptions of autonomy -- A theory of autonomy -- Autonomy and anti-perfectionism -- Autonomy-minded liberalism -- Multicultural liberalism.
     
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  9. Ben Colburn (2010). Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):291-293.
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  10. Ben Colburn (2008). Debate: The Concept of Voluntariness. Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (1):101–111.
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  11. Ben Colburn (2008). Forbidden Ways of Life. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):618-629.
    I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could (...)
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  12. Ben Colburn (2008). Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2):318-321.
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