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  1. Ben Eggleston, Bind Me to the Mast, and Not Just for a Little While: Comments on Kierland.
    In “The Desire Theory of Claim-Rights,” Brian Kierland presents an analysis of the concept of a claim-right according to which one person has a claim-right against another just in case there is a perfect correlation between (1) whether the second person has a duty owed to the first and (2) whether the first wants the second to do the act in question. I respond by suggesting that in certain cases, including a variant of the case of Ulysses and the Sirens, (...)
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  2. Ben Eggleston, 1. Introduction.
    Woody Allen once said that ninety percent of success is just showing up. But success is one thing; morality is another. Consequentialists, especially, may think that the moral quality of one’s conduct depends on the difference one makes. Still, consequentialists may also think that even if one isn’t making a difference, the moral quality of one’s conduct can be affected by whether one is participating (even if only ineffectually, or redundantly) in an endeavor that does make a difference. So consequentialists (...)
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  3. Ben Eggleston, Philosophy and Medicine.
    Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J., Department of Philosophy and Kennedy Institute of Ethics.
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  4. Ben Eggleston, Review of Goldman. [REVIEW]
    On the first two pages of a book called Bridge Made Easy, one finds the following advice: if you have a balanced hand with 16–18 high-card points and an ace, king, or queen in at least three of the four suits, then your bid should be ‘1 No Trump’. What makes this advice good (assuming that it is) are certain underlying justifying considerations—considerations about balancing the conflicting aims of (1) winning very many points, if one makes one’s bid (which would (...)
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  5. Ben Eggleston, The Ineffable and the Incalculable: G. E. Moore on Moral Expertise.
    According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with (...)
     
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  6. Ben Eggleston, The Toxin and the Tyrant: Two Tests for Gauthier's Theory of Rationality.
    Hume famously said that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”2 Let us assume, with Hume, that reason does not, because it cannot, tell a person which ends to pursue. In other words, let us assume that although reason can apprise a person of the availability of various ends and of the costs and benefits likely to attend the pursuit of those ends,3 it cannot judge the desirability of those ends themselves. Assuming all this—assuming, in (...)
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  7. Ben Eggleston (2014). Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.
    Reflective equilibrium is often credited with extending the idea of accounting for the data from its familiar home in the sciences to the realm of moral philosophy. But careful consideration of the main concepts of this idea—the data to be accounted for and the kind of accounting it is appropriate to expect of a moral theory—leads to a revised understanding of the “accounting for the data” perspective as it applies to the discipline of moral theory selection. This revised understanding is (...)
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  8. Ben Eggleston & Dale Miller (eds.) (2014). The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism. Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a comprehensive overview of one of the most important and frequently discussed accounts of morality.
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  9. Ben Eggleston (2013). Paradox of Happiness. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  10. Ben Eggleston (2013). Rejecting The Publicity Condition: The Inevitability of Esoteric Morality. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):29-57.
    It is often thought that some version of what is generally called the publicity condition is a reasonable requirement to impose on moral theories. In this article, after formulating and distinguishing three versions of the publicity condition, I argue that the arguments typically used to defend them are unsuccessful and, moreover, that even in its most plausible version, the publicity condition ought to be rejected as both question-begging and unreasonably demanding.
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  11. Ben Eggleston, Dale E. Miller & D. Weinstein (eds.) (2011). John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life. Oxford University Press.
    The 'Art of Life' is John Stuart Mill's name for his account of practical reason. In this volume, eleven leading scholars elucidate this fundamental, but widely neglected, element of Mill's thought. Mill divides the Art of Life into three 'departments': 'Morality, Prudence or Policy, and Æsthetics'. In the volume's first section, Rex Martin, David Weinstein, Ben Eggleston, and Dale E. Miller investigate the relation between the departments of morality and prudence. Their papers ask whether Mill is a rule utilitarian and, (...)
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  12. Ben Eggleston (2010). Practical Equilibrium: A Way of Deciding What to Think About Morality. Mind 119 (475):549 - 584.
    Practical equilibrium, like reflective equilibrium, is a way of deciding what to think about morality. It shares with reflective equilibrium the general thesis that there is some way in which a moral theory must, in order to be acceptable, answer to one’s moral intuitions, but it differs from reflective equilibrium in its specification of exactly how a moral theory must answer to one’s intuitions. Whereas reflective equilibrium focuses on a theory’s consistency with those intuitions, practical equilibrium also gives weight to (...)
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  13. Ben Eggleston (2010). Rules and Their Reasons : Mill on Morality and Instrumental Rationality. In Ben Eggleston, Dale E. Miller & D. Weinstein (eds.), John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter addresses the question of what role Mill regards rules as playing in the determination of morally permissible action by drawing on his remarks about instrumentally rational action. First, overviews are provided of consequentialist theories and of the rule-worship or incoherence objection to rule-consequentialist theories. Then a summary is offered of the considerable textual evidence suggesting that Mill’s moral theory is, in fact, a rule-consequentialist one. It is argued, however, that passages in the final chapter of A System of (...)
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  14. Ben Eggleston (2010). Review of Martin Peterson, An Introduction to Decision Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
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  15. Ben Eggleston (2009). Tim Mulgan, the Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), Pp. VI + 313. Utilitas 21 (1):123-125.
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  16. Ben Eggleston (2009). The Problem of Rational Compliance with Rules. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):19-32.
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  17. Ben Eggleston (2007). Conflicts of Rules in Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):329-349.
    Just about any proponent of a rule-based theory of morality must eventually confront the question of how to resolve confl icts among the rules that the theory endorses. Is there a priority rule specifying which rules must yield to which, as in Rawls’s lexical ordering of the fi rst principle of his theory of justice over the second?3 Must the agent intuitively bal-.
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  18. Ben Eggleston (2005). Reformulating Consequentialism: Railton's Normative Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (3):449 - 462.
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  19. Ben Eggleston (2004). Procedural Justice in Young's Inclusive Deliberative Democracy. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (4):544-549.
  20. Ben Eggleston (2004). Alan H. Goldman, Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Pp. XI+210. [REVIEW] Utilitas 16 (1):113-115.
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  21. Ben Eggleston (2004). Review of Henry West, An Introduction to Mill's Utilitarian Ethics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (6).
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  22. Ben Eggleston (2003). Does Participation Matter? An Inconsistency in Parfit's Moral Mathematics. Utilitas 15 (01):92-.
    Consequentialists typically think that the moral quality of one's conduct depends on the difference one makes. But consequentialists may also think that even if one is not making a difference, the moral quality of one's conduct can still be affected by whether one is participating (even if only ineffectually, or redundantly) in an endeavour that does make a difference. Derek Parfit discusses this issue participation in the chapter of Reasons and Persons that he devotes to what he calls . In (...)
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  23. Ben Eggleston (2003). Everything is What It is, and Not Another Thing: Comments on Austin. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):101-105.
    To specify the aspects of Austin’s position that I want to focus on, let me start by reviewing some of the things that Austin says in order to characterize ethical intuitionism. He writes, “I take an ethical intuition to be a type of synthetic a priori insight into the necessary character of reality specifically concerning that which is right and/or good” (p. 205), and he adds that he regards “ethical intuition as a source of foundationally justified belief” (p. 205). He (...)
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  24. Ben Eggleston (2000). Should Consequentialists Make Parfit's Second Mistake? A Refutation of Jackson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):1 – 15.
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