13 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Benjamin Bayer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
  1.  15
    Benjamin Bayer, Why Internalists Need an Enriched Theory of Perceptual and Conceptual Awareness to Escape From Bergmann's Dilemma.
    Michael Bergmann (2006) has argued that an internalistic view of justification faces a dilemma. Assuming as internalism does that to have a justified belief, subjects must be aware of the justifiers of the belief and of their relevance to the truth of the belief, Bergmann notes that one is either aware of this relevance conceptually or not. But, says Bergmann, if the required awareness is conceptual, internalism is encumbered with an infinite regress. If it is not-if it is only "weak (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer (2013). How We Choose Our Beliefs. Philosophia (1):1-13.
    Recent years have seen increasing attacks on the "deontological" conception (or as we call it, the guidance conception) of epistemic justification, the view that epistemology offers advice to knowers in forming beliefs responsibly. Critics challenge an important presupposition of the guidance conception: doxastic voluntarism, the view that we choose our beliefs. We assume that epistemic guidance is indispensable, and seek to answer objections to doxastic voluntarism, most prominently William Alston's. We contend that Alston falsely assumes that choice of belief requires (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Benjamin Bayer (2007). How Not to Refute Quine: Evaluating Kim's Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):473-495.
    This paper offers an interpretation of Quine’s naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  72
    Benjamin Bayer (2015). The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):233-252.
    This paper evaluates recent proposals for compatibilism about doxastic freedom, and attempts to refine them by applying Fischer and Ravizza’s moderate reasons-responsiveness compatibilism to doxastic freedom. I argue, however, that even this refined version of doxastic compatibilism is subject to challenging counter-examples and is more difficult to support than traditional compatibilism about freedom of action. In particular, it is much more difficult to identify convincing examples of the sort Frankfurt proposed to challenge the idea that responsibility requires alternative possibilities.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  86
    Benjamin Bayer (2010). Quine's Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Benjamin Bayer, Metaethical Problems for Ethical Egoism, Reconsidered.
    Until recently it has been conventional to assume that ethical egoism is "ethical" is name, alone, and that no account that considers one's own interests as the standard of moral obligation could count as seriously "ethical." In recent years, however, philosophers have shown increasing respect for more sophisticated forms of ethical egoism which attempt to define self-interest in enriched terms characterizing self-interest as human flourishing in both material and psychological dimensions. But philosophers are still skeptical that any conception of self-interest (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  55
    Benjamin Bayer, From Folk Psychology to Folk Epistemology: The Status of Radical Simulation.
    In this paper I consider one of the leading philosophic-psychological theories of “folk psychology,” the simulation theory of Robert Gordon. According to Gordon, we attribute mental states to others not by representing those states or by applying the generalizations of theory, but by imagining ourselves in the position of a target to be interpreted and exploiting our own decision-making skills to make assertions which we then attribute to others as ‘beliefs’. I describe a leading objections to Gordon’s theory—the problem of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  78
    Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  60
    Benjamin Bayer, A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.
    This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning and function of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Benjamin Bayer (2007). Varieties of Naturalized Epistemology: Criticisms and Alternatives. Dissertation, University of Illinois
    “Naturalized epistemology” is a recent attempt to transform the theory of knowledge into a branch of natural science. Traditional epistemologists object to this proposal on the grounds that it eliminates the distinctively philosophical content of epistemology. In this thesis, I argue that traditional philosophers are justified in their reluctance to accept naturalism, but that their ongoing inability to refute it points to deeper problems inherent in traditional epistemology. I establish my thesis first by critiquing three versions of naturalism, showing that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  23
    Benjamin Bayer (2000). Salmon, Wesley C. Causality and Explanation. Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):729-730.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  40
    Benjamin Bayer, Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.
    I defend of a version of doxastic voluntarism, by criticizing an argument advanced recently by Pamela Hieronymi against the possibility of belief at will. Conceiving of belief at will as believing immediately in response to practical reasons, Hieronymi claims that none of the forms of control we exercise over our beliefs measure up to this standard. While there is a form of direct control we exercise over our beliefs, "evaluative control," she claims it does not give us the power to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography