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  1. Benjamin W. Libet (2004). Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Over a long career, Libet has conducted experiments that have shown, in clear and concrete ways, how the brain produces conscious awareness.
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  2. Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Can Conscious Experience Affect Brain Activity? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):24-28.
    The chief goal of Velmans' article is to find a way to solve the problem of how conscious experience could have bodily effects. I shall discuss his treatment of this below. First, I would like to deal with Velmans' treatment of my own studies of volition and free will in relation to brain processes. Unconscious Initiation and Conscious Veto of Freely Voluntary Acts Velmans appropriately refers to our experimental study that found that onset of an electrically observable cerebral process preceded (...)
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  3. Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Cerebral Physiology of Conscious Experience: Experimental Studies in Human Subjects. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins 49--57.
  4. Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Timing of Conscious Experience: Reply to the 2002 Commentaries on Libet's Findings. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
  5. Benjamin W. Libet (2002). Do We Have Free Will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Oxford University Press 551--564.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...)
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  6. Benjamin W. Libet (2002). The Timing of Mental Events: Libet's Experimental Findings and Their Implications. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
    The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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  7. Howard Shevrin, Jess H. Ghannam & Benjamin W. Libet (2002). A Neural Correlate of Consciousness Related to Repression. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):334-41.
    In previous research Libet discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for (...)
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  8. Howard Shevrin, Jess H. Ghannam & Benjamin W. Libet (2002). Response to Commentary on A Neural Correlate of Consciousness Related to Repression. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):345-346.
  9. Patrick Haggard & Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Conscious Intention and Brain Activity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):47-63.
    The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. An influential series of experiments by Libet has suggested that conscious intentions arise as a result of brain activity. This contrasts with traditional concepts of free will, in which the mind controls the body. A more recent study by Haggard and Eimer has further examined the relation between intention and brain processes, concluding that conscious awareness of intention is linked to the choice or selection of (...)
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  10. Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain: Commentary on John Searle's Article (with Reply From Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):59-65.
    Commentary on John Searle's Article John Searle presents a philosopher's view of how conscious experience and free action relate to brain function. That view demands an examination by a neuroscientist who has experimentally investigated this issue.
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  11. Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Conscious and Unconscious Mental Activity. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):21-24.
  12. Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Time Factors in Conscious Processes: Reply to Gilberto Gomes. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):1-12.
    The critical reinterpretations of Libet's research by G. Gomes make speculative, unwarranted, and untested assumptions. These assumptions and arguments are analyzed and their status relative to Libet's findings is criticized.
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  13. Benjamin W. Libet (1999). Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...)
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  14. Benjamin W. Libet, Anthony Freeman & Keith Sutherland (1999). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic.
    It is widely accepted in science that the universe is a closed deterministic system in which everything can, ultimately, be explained by purely physical...
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  15. Benjamin W. Libet (1998). Do the Models Offer Testable Proposals of Brain Functions for Conscious Experience? In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven
  16. Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.
  17. Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Neural Processes in the Production of Conscious Experiences. In Max Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness. Routledge
  18. Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):33-35.
    Solutions to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness must accept conscious experience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmers suggests. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but I find basic flaws in these. Our own experimental investigations of brain processes causally involved in the development of conscious experience appear to meet Chalmers’ requirement. Even more directly, I had previously proposed a hypothetical ‘conscious mental field’ as an emergent property of appropriate neural activities, with the attributes of integrated subjective (...)
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  19. Benjamin W. Libet (1994). A Testable Theory of Mind-Brain Interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):119-26.
    The paper begins by contrasting the unitary nature of conscious experience with the demonstrable localization of neural events. Philosophers and neuroscientists have developed models to account for this paradox, but they have yet to be tested empirically. The author proposes a `Conscious Mental Field', which is produced by, but is phenomenologically distinct from, brain activity. The hypothesis is, in principle, open to experimental verification. The paper suggests appropriate surgical procedures and some of the difficulties that would need to be overcome (...)
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  20. Benjamin W. Libet (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).
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  21. Benjamin W. Libet (1993). Neurophysiology of Consciousness: Selected Papers and New Essays. Birkhauser.
    Behav. and Brain Sci., 8, 558-566. Libet, B. (1987). 'Consciousness: Conscious, Subjective Experience.' In Encyclopedia of Neuroscience , ed. G. Adelman. ...
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  22. Benjamin W. Libet (1993). The Neural Time Factor in Conscious and Unconscious Events. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174) 174--123.
  23. Benjamin W. Libet, E. W. Wright, B. Feinstein & D. K. Pearl (1992). Retroactive Enhancement of a Skin Sensation by a Delayed Cortical Stimulus in Man: Evidence for Delay of a Conscious Sensory Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 1 (3):367-75.
    Sensation elicited by a skin stimulus was subjectively reported to feel stronger when followed by a stimulus to somatosensory cerebral cortex , even when C was delayed by up to 400 ms or more. This expands the potentiality for retroactive effects beyond that previously known as backward masking. It also demonstrates that the content of a sensory experience can be altered by another cerebral input introduced after the sensory signal arrives at the cortex. The long effective S-C intervals support the (...)
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  24. Benjamin W. Libet (1989). Conscious Subjective Experience Vs. Unconscious Mental Functions: A Theory of the Cerebral Processes Involved. In Rodney M. J. Cotterill (ed.), Models of Brain Function. Cambridge University Press
  25. Benjamin W. Libet (1985). Subjective Antedating of a Sensory Experience and Mind-Brain Theories: Reply to Honderich. Journal of Theoretical Biology 114:563-70.
  26. Benjamin W. Libet (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  27. Benjamin W. Libet (1982). Brain Stimulation in the Study of Neuronal Functions for Conscious Sensory Experiences. Human Neurobiology 1:235-42.
  28. Benjamin W. Libet (1981). The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P.S. Churchland. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197.
    Evidence that led to the hypothesis of a backwards referral of conscious sensory experiences in time, and the experimental tests of its predictions, is summarized. Criticisms of the data and the conclusion by Churchland that this hypothesis is untenable are analysed and found to be based upon misconceptions and faulty evaluations of facts and theory. Subjective referral in time violates no neurophysiological principles or data and is compatible with the theory of "mental" and "physical" correspondence.
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  29. Benjamin W. Libet (1981). Timing of Cerebral Processes Relative to Concomitant Conscious Experiences in Man. In G. Adam, I. Meszaros & E.I. Banyai (eds.), Advances in Physiological Science.
     
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  30. Benjamin W. Libet, Feinstein E. W. & Pearl B. (1979). Subjective Referral of the Timing for a Cognitive Sensory Experience. Brain 102:193-224.
     
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  31. Benjamin W. Libet (1978). Neuronal Vs. Subjective Timing for a Conscious Sensory Experience. In P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser (eds.), Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Elsevier
     
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