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Profile: Bennett Helm (Franklin and Marshall College)
  1. Bennett W. Helm (forthcoming). Truth, Objectivity, and Emotional Caring: Filling in the Gaps of Haugeland's Existentialist Ontology. In Zed Adams (ed.), Mind, Meaning, and Understanding: The Philosophy of John Haugeland.
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  2. Bennett W. Helm (2012). Accountability and Some Social Dimensions of Human Agency. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):217-232.
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  3. Bennett W. Helm (2011). Responsibility and Dignity: Strawsonian Themes. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Bennett W. Helm (2011). Strawsonian Themes. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 217.
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  5. Bennett W. Helm (2011). Why We Believe in Induction. Hume Studies 19 (1):117-140.
  6. Bennett W. Helm (2010). Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimacy, Identification, and the Social Nature of Persons. Oxford University Press.
    Bennett Helm re-examines our common understanding of ourselves as persons in light of the phenomena of love and friendship.
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  7. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and (...)
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  8. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Love as Intimate Identification. Philosophic Exchange 40:20--37.
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  9. Bennett W. Helm (2009). The Import of Human Action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action. Automatic Press/Vip. 89--100.
    My central philosophical concern for many years has been with what it is to be a person. Of course, we persons are agents, indeed agents of a special sort, so understanding personhood has of course led me to think about that special sort of agency. Yet my background in the philosophy of mind leads me to think that any account of this special sort of agency must appeal to psychological capacities that are themselves grounded in an account of the relation (...)
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  10. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Love, Identification, and the Emotions. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):39--59.
  11. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Self-Love and the Structure of Personal Values. In Verena Mayer & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins. 11--32.
  12. Bennett W. Helm, Friendship. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Friendship, as understood here, is a distinctively personal relationship that is grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other, for the other's sake, and that involves some degree of intimacy. As such, friendship is undoubtedly central to our lives, in part because the special concern we have for our friends must have a place within a broader set of concerns, including moral concerns, and in part because our friends can help shape who (...)
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  13. Bennett W. Helm, Love. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This essay focuses on personal love, or the love of particular persons as such. Part of the philosophical task in understanding personal love is to distinguish the various kinds of personal love. For example, the way in which I love my wife is seemingly very different from the way I love my mother, my child, and my friend. This task has typically proceeded hand-in-hand with philosophical analyses of these kinds of personal love, analyses that in part respond to various puzzles (...)
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  14. Bennett W. Helm (2008). Plural Agents. Noûs 42 (1):17–49.
    Genuine agents are able to engage in activity because they find it worth pursuing—because they care about it. In this respect, they differ from what might be called “mere intentional systems”: systems like chess-playing computers that exhibit merely goal-directed behavior mediated by instrumental rationality, without caring. A parallel distinction can be made in the domain of social activity: plural agents must be distinguished from plural intentional systems in that plural agents have cares and engage in activity because of those cares. (...)
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  15. Bennett W. Helm (2002). Action for the Sake of ...: Caring and the Rationality of (Social) Action. Analyse and Kritik 24 (2):189--208.
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  16. Bennett W. Helm (2002). Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- (...)
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  17. Bennett W. Helm (2002). Review: The Emotions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 111 (1):132-135.
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  18. Bennett W. Helm (2002). The Emotions. Philosophical Review 111 (1):132-135.
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  19. Bennett W. Helm (2001). Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.
    The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally mistaken and results (...)
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  20. Bennett W. Helm (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and (...)
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  21. Bennett W. Helm (2000). Emotional Reason How to Deliberate About Value. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):1-22.
    Deliberation about personal, non-moral values involves elements of both invention and discovery. Thus, we invent our values by freely choosing them, where such distinctively human freedom is essential to our defining and taking responsibility for the kinds of persons we are; nonetheless, we also discover our values insofar as we can deliberate about them rationally and arrive at non-arbitrary decisions about what has value in our lives. Yet these notions of invention and discovery seem inconsistent with each other, and the (...)
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  22. Bennett W. Helm (1996). Freedom of the Heart. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2):71--87.
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  23. Bennett W. Helm (1996). Carruthers, Peter. Language, Thought, and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Review of Metaphysics 50 (2):391-392.
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  24. Bennett W. Helm (1996). Integration and Fragmentation of the Self. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):43--63.
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  25. Bennett W. Helm (1994). The Significance of Emotions. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):319-331.
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  26. Bennett W. Helm (1994). Significance, Emotions, and Objectivity: Some Limits of Animal Thought. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
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  27. Bennett W. Helm (1993). Why We Believe in Induction: Standards of Taste and Hume's Two Definitions of Causation. Hume Studies 19 (1):117--140.