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  1. Benoit Hardy-Vallée, Artificial Life, Natural Rationality and Probability Matching.
     
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  2. Benoit Hardy-Vallée, Do Collective Persons Have Brains? When Methodological Individualism Meets Mechanistic Agency.
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  3. Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Benoît Dubreuil (2010). Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):483-498.
    Research on folk epistemology usually takes place within one of two different paradigms. The first is centered on epistemic theories or, in other words, the way people think about knowledge. The second is centered on epistemic intuitions, that is, the way people intuitively distinguish knowledge from belief. In this paper, we argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the connection between the two paradigms, as well as to the mechanisms that underlie the use of both epistemic intuitions and theories. (...)
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  4. Benoit Hardy-Vallee & Benoît Dubreuil (2009). Réconcilier le Formel Et le Causal : Le Rôle de la Neuroéconomie. Revue de Philosophie Économique 10 (2):25.
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  5. Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Paul Thagard (2008). How to Play the Ultimatum Game: An Engineering Approach to Metanormativity. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):173 – 192.
    The ultimatum game is a simple bargaining situation where the behavior of people frequently contradicts the optimal strategy according to classical game theory. Thus, according to many scholars, the commonly observed behavior should be considered irrational. We argue that this putative irrationality stems from a wrong conception of metanormativity (the study of norms about the establishment of norms). After discussing different metanormative conceptions, we defend a Quinean, naturalistic approach to the evaluation of norms. After reviewing empirical literature on the ultimatum (...)
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  6. Benoit Hardy-Vallée (2007). Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):939–953.
    This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
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  7. Benoit Hardy-Vallee (2007). Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):939-953.
    This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
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  8. Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Pierre Poirier (2005). Structured Thoughts: The Spatial-Motor View. In E. Machery, M. Werning & G. Schurz (eds.), The Compositionality of Meaning and Content Volume Ii: Applications to Linguistics, Psychology and Neuroscience. Ontos Verlag.
    Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not (...)
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  9. Damián Justo, Julien Dutant, Benoît Hardy-Vallée, David Nicolas & Benjamin Q. Sylvand (2003). Delegation, Subdivision, and Modularity: How Rich is Conceptual Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):683-684.
    Contra Jackendoff, we argue that within the parallel architecture framework, the generality of language does not require a rich conceptual structure. To show this, we put forward a delegation model of specialization. We find Jackendoff's alternative, the subdivision model, insufficiently supported. In particular, the computational consequences of his representational notion of modularity need to be clarified.
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  10. Benoit Hardy-Vallée (2001). Max Kistler, Causalité et lois de la nature , Paris, Vrin, 1999, 311 p. Max Kistler, Causalité et lois de la nature , Paris, Vrin, 1999, 311 p. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 28 (2):447-450.
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