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Profile: Bernard Berofsky (Columbia University)
  1.  84
    Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, (...)
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  2.  49
    Bernard Berofsky (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the most detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy currently available. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A (...)
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  3.  9
    Bernard Berofsky (2015). Freedom as Creativity. Journal of Philosophy 112 (7):373-395.
    Determinism poses a prima facie problem about free will only if the latter is understood as counterfactual power, understood categorically, rather than self-determination. A key premise of the defense of incompatibilism provided by the Consequence Argument, namely, that laws are unalterable, presupposes that laws include more than the fundamental laws of physics. This premise is challenged by appeal to actual cases. The necessitarian assumptions embodied in that premise can be successfully challenged by a new and improved version of the regularity (...)
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  4. Bernard Berofsky (2002). Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
     
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  5. Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
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  6.  17
    Bernard Berofsky (2012). Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
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  7.  19
    Bernard Berofsky (2003). Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 107.
  8.  20
    Bernard Berofsky (2000). Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.
  9.  13
    Bernard Berofsky (1967). Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):136-141.
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  10.  42
    Bernard Berofsky (2003). Identification, the Self, and Autonomy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):199-220.
    Autonomy, we suppose, is self-regulation or self-direction. There is a distinct idea that is easily confused with self-direction, namely, self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Although it will turn out paradoxically that autonomy is neither self-regulation nor self-realization, it is reasonable to suppose that the former is a superior candidate. My teacher of Indian religion, Dr. Subodh Roy, blind from birth, chose not to undergo an operation that would have made him sighted because he believed, perhaps rightly, that the ability to see (...)
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  11.  10
    Bernard Berofsky (1977). The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):103-118.
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  12.  45
    Bernard Berofsky (2006). The Myth of Source. Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
    If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...)
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  13.  54
    Bernard Berofsky (1958). Minkus-Benes on Incorrigibility. Mind 67 (April):264-266.
  14.  79
    Bernard Berofsky (1987). Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. Routledge.
    Introduction No philosophical problem is more deserving of the title 'the free will problem' than that concerning the assessment of the claim that a ...
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  15.  8
    Bernard Berofsky (1973). Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 70 (11):331-334.
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  16.  76
    Bernard Berofsky (1964). Determinism and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475.
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  17.  6
    Bernard Berofsky (1970). Conceptions of Freedom. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 67 (7):208-220.
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  18.  8
    Bernard Berofsky (1983). Hume and the Problem of Causation by Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg. Journal of Philosophy 80 (8):478-492.
  19.  46
    Bernard Berofsky (1973). The Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):568-569.
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  20.  28
    Bernard Berofsky (1971). Determinism. Princeton University Press.
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  21. Bernard Berofsky (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.
  22. Bernard Berofsky (2004). Autonomy and Free Will. In J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy. Cambridge
    If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the world one happened to inhabit even if it is deterministic, (...)
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  23.  4
    Bernard Berofsky (1999). The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):142-143.
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  24.  4
    Bernard Berofsky (1992). Freedom Within Reason by Susan Wolf. Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):202-208.
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  25.  26
    Bernard Berofsky (1968). The Regularity Theory. Noûs 2 (4):315-340.
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  26.  7
    Bernard Berofsky (1989). Belief and Responsibility. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer 95--122.
  27.  11
    Bernard Berofsky & Isaac Levi (2012). Foreword. Journal of Philosophy 109 (8-9):469-469.
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  28.  7
    Bernard Berofsky (1980). The Irrelevance of Morality to Freedom. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:38-47.
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  29.  17
    Bernard Berofsky (2000). Review: Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135 - 140.
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  30.  23
    Bernard Berofsky (1998). Through Thick and Thin: Mele on Autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):689-697.
  31.  13
    Arthur C. Danto, Bernard Berofsky, Isaac Levi & Charles D. Parsons (2003). In Memoriam. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):272-272.
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  32.  16
    Bernard Berofsky (1966). Causality and General Laws. Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):148-157.
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  33.  19
    Arthur C. Danto, Bernard Berofsky, Isaac Levi & Charles D. Parsons (2003). In Memoriam: James J. Walsh. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):272 -.
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  34.  5
    Stephen C. Pepper & Bernard Berofsky (1969). Review Article. Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):147-156.
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  35.  11
    Bernard Berofsky (1992). On the Absolute Freedom of the Will. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):279 - 289.
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  36.  16
    Bernard Berofsky (1969). Review Article: Freedom and Determinism, Edited by Keith Lehrer. Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):147-156.
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  37.  2
    Bernard Berofsky (2013). In Memoriam: Arthur C. Danto. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):581-582.
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  38.  1
    Bernard Berofsky (2015). IX. Determinism Defined. In Determinism. Princeton University Press 268-270.
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  39.  1
    Bernard Berofsky (2015). VIII. Deterministic Accounts. In Determinism. Princeton University Press 253-267.
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  40.  1
    Bernard Berofsky (2015). X. The Alleged Triviality of Determinism. In Determinism. Princeton University Press 273-281.
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  41.  9
    Bernard Berofsky (1977). The Metaphysics of Freedom. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4 (2):161-186.
  42.  7
    Bernard Berofsky (1999). The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View, by Morton White. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):142-143.
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  43.  4
    Bernard Berofsky (1970). Purposive Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):311 - 320.
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  44. Theodor W. Adorno, Bernard Berofsky, Robert H. Blank, Andre L. Bonnicksen, Irene Bloom & Joshua A. Fogel (1996). Books Available for Review. Auslegung 21:159.
     
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  45. Frederick C. Beiser, Wolfgang Benhabib, John McCole, Bernard Berofsky, Robert H. Blank & Andre L. Bonnicksen (1996). Books Available. Auslegung 21.
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  46. Bernard Berofsky (2015). Acknowledgments. In Determinism. Princeton University Press
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  47. Bernard Berofsky (2011). Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: Dispositional Analyses of Free Will. In Robert Kane (ed.), Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Ed.
  48. Bernard Berofsky (1997). Freedom Without Self. In C. H. Manekin (ed.), Freedom and Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives. University of Maryland
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  49. Bernard Berofsky (2015). Introduction. In Determinism. Princeton University Press 1-6.
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  50. Bernard Berofsky (2015). Index. In Determinism. Princeton University Press 325-330.
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