38 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Bernard Berofsky (Columbia University)
  1. Bernard Berofsky (2014). Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne. Mind:fzu097.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Bernard Berofsky (2012). Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Bernard Berofsky & Isaac Levi (2012). Foreword. Journal of Philosophy 109 (8-9):469-469.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Bernard Berofsky (2011). Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: Dispositional Analyses of Free Will. In Robert Kane (ed.), Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Ed.
  5. Bernard Berofsky (2011). Is Pathological Altruism Altruism? In Ariel Knafo Barbara Oakley (ed.), Pathological Altruism.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Bernard Berofsky (2006). The Myth of Source. Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
    If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Bernard Berofsky (2004). Autonomy and Free Will. In J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy. Cambridge.
    If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the world one happened to inhabit even if it is deterministic, (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Bernard Berofsky (2003). Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 107.
  11. Bernard Berofsky (2003). Identification, the Self, and Autonomy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):199-220.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Arthur C. Danto, Bernard Berofsky, Isaac Levi & Charles D. Parsons (2003). In Memoriam. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):272-272.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Arthur C. Danto, Bernard Berofsky, Isaac Levi & Charles D. Parsons (2003). In Memoriam: James J. Walsh. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):272 -.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Bernard Berofsky (2002). Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Bernard Berofsky (2000). Review: Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135 - 140.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Bernard Berofsky (2000). Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.
  17. Bernard Berofsky (1999). The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View, by Morton White. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):142-143.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Bernard Berofsky (1998). Through Thick and Thin: Mele on Autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):689-697.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Bernard Berofsky (1997). Freedom Without Self. In C. H. Manekin (ed.), Freedom and Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives. University of Maryland.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Theodor W. Adorno, Bernard Berofsky, Robert H. Blank, Andre L. Bonnicksen, Irene Bloom & Joshua A. Fogel (1996). Books Available for Review. Auslegung 21:159.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Frederick C. Beiser, Wolfgang Benhabib, John McCole, Bernard Berofsky, Robert H. Blank & Andre L. Bonnicksen (1996). Books Available. Auslegung 21.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Bernard Berofsky (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the most detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy currently available. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Bernard Berofsky (1992). On the Absolute Freedom of the Will. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):279 - 289.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Bernard Berofsky (1992). Review of Freedom Within Reason. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):202-208.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Bernard Berofsky (1989). Belief and Responsibility. In. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer. 95--122.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Bernard Berofsky (1987). Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. Routledge.
    Introduction No philosophical problem is more deserving of the title 'the free will problem' than that concerning the assessment of the claim that a ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Bernard Berofsky (1980). The Irrelevance of Morality to Freedom. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:38-47.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Bernard Berofsky (1977). The Metaphysics of Freedom. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4 (2):161-186.
  29. Bernard Berofsky (1973). The Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):568-569.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Bernard Berofsky (1971). Determinism. Princeton University Press.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Bernard Berofsky (1970). Purposive Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):311 - 320.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Bernard Berofsky (1969). Review Article: Freedom and Determinism, Edited by Keith Lehrer. Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):147-156.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Stephen C. Pepper & Bernard Berofsky (1969). Review Article. Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):147-156.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Bernard Berofsky (1968). The Regularity Theory. Noûs 2 (4):315-340.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Bernard Berofsky (1966). Causality and General Laws. Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):148-157.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Bernard Berofsky (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.
  37. Bernard Berofsky (1964). Determinism and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Bernard Berofsky (1958). Minkus-Benes on Incorrigibility. Mind 67 (April):264-266.