In this paper, I argue that moral and institutional evils, even though they are all contingent, are so pervasive and persistent that there is no practical way of responding to them that would lead eventually to theeradication of all of them. Instead, our practical task is to respond to these evils in ways that respect both the basic capabilities and their associated vulnerabilities that are constitutive of each human being. Todo this most effectively, one should offer unconditional forgiveness to the (...) perpetrators of evil. The attitude that can best underpin this forgiveness is one of a properly understood indefeasible hope, a hopethat always insists that each person is of greater worth than whatever he or she does. (shrink)
Reiner schurmann, Building on heidegger's thought, Has proposed a political philosophy which explicitly dispenses with questions concerning political organization. In this discussion, I point to the apparent practical necessity for restricted political coercion. This apparent necessity, I argue, Must either be shown to be illusory or must be taken to require questions concerning political organization. Since schurman has not as yet done either of these, Then his argument remains incomplete.
To clarify the sense of the complex positive phenomenon of silence, i engage in an intentional analysis of its occurrences. in making this analysis i use a method derived basically from husserl. through this method i establish that silence is 1) an active intentional performance necessary for the clarification of the sense of intersubjectivity, 2) an intentional performance which does not intend fully determinate objects, 3) that which interrupts the "and so forth" of a stream of performances which does intend (...) determinate objects of some sort, and 4) is a source of tension and oscillation among levels of expression and between the realms of expressive and non-expressive experience. (shrink)