Taking account of Kant's unpublished mss., the author presents a close textual interpretation of Kant's logic of concepts.

The two main challenges of the theory of conceptual content presented by Robert Brandom in Making It Explicit are to account for a referential dimension of conceptual content and to account for the objectivity of conceptual norms. Brandom tries to meet both these challenges in chapter 8 of his book. I argue that the accounts presented there can only be understood if seen against the background of Brandom's theory of communication developed in chapter 7. This theory is motivated by the (...) well-known problem that semantic holism threatens the possibility of communication because it has the consequence that words mean different things in different mouths. Brandom offers a solution to this problem in terms of what he calls recurrence commitments. I show that chapter 8 of Making It Explicit should be understood as arguing that a practice that includes acknowledging interpersonal recurrence commitments institutes both conceptual contents with a referential dimension and objective conceptual norms. I close by raising the objection that Brandom's argument can only show that conceptual norms are communally shared and not that they are objective. I propose an emendation of this argument, having recourse to a practice Brandom refers to as rational rectification in his new book Between Saying and Doing. (shrink)

This volume contains his programmatic essay 'Towards an Analytic Pragmatism', in which Brandom shows how analytic philosophy can broaden its perspective so as ...

I argue that close examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblances shows that he is proposing a theory about the development of language over time. According to this theory, a concept is enlarged to a newly discovered object when it is similar to other objects falling under this concept. However, being empirical, theories of language-development cannot be regarded as philosophical positions. I therefore argue that Wittgenstein puts forward this theory only for therapeutical reasons. He thereby wants to bring the metaphysical (...) question “Why do we call all games ‘games’?” back to its everyday use. (shrink)

I argue that close examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblances shows that he is proposing a theory about the development of language over time. According to this theory, a concept is enlarged to a newly discovered object when it is similar to other objects falling under this concept. However, being empirical, theories of language-development cannot be regarded as philosophical positions. I therefore argue that Wittgenstein puts forward this theory only for therapeutical reasons. He thereby wants to bring the metaphysical (...) question “Why do we call all games ‘games’?” back to its everyday use. (shrink)

Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", (...) "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Vor dem Hintergrund der wachsenden Bedeutung der Stadt als Lebensraum wird in der Humangeographie seit 50 Jahren diskutiert, wie sich dieser Raum gerecht gestalten und nutzen lässt. Einen klassischen Beitrag zu dieser Diskussion liefern Henri Lefebvres Überlegungen zum „Recht auf Stadt“. Anlass für unsere aktuelle Beschäftigung mit der Frage ist die zunehmende Digitalisierung städtischer Infrastrukturen und des städtischen Alltagslebens: Dazu gehören erstens die Smart-City-Strategien mit ihren digital gesteuerten Verkehrsleit- und Energieversorgungssystemen etc.; zweitens der sogenannte Plattformurbanismus, der Dienstleistungsaktivitäten plattformbasiert organisiert. (...) In diesem interdisziplinär angelegten Beitrag fragen wir, welche Herausforderungen die in den letzten Jahren zunehmende Durchdringung der Stadt mit digitalen Infrastrukturen und plattformbasierten Ökonomien im Hinblick auf das Recht auf Stadt stellt. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Entwicklungen zu Ungerechtigkeiten führen, und nehmen dafür Nancy Frasers Theorie der Gerechtigkeit und ihr Grundprinzip gleicher Teilhabe zur Hilfe. Mit der Konzentration auf Frasers These, dass Ungerechtigkeiten der Verteilung und der Anerkennung gemeinsam auftreten, beleuchten wir die Smart City und den Plattformurbanismus. Dabei setzen wir uns kritisch mit bereits existierenden Arbeiten auseinander, um darüber hinausgehend zu zeigen, dass und wie Ungerechtigkeiten in der Dimension der Verteilung und der Anerkennung miteinander wechselwirken. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how it is to be explained that an action or object X counts as Y. I argue that John Searle's notion of a constitutive rule should not be employed because it involves a confusion. Instead, I propose an explanatory framework containing the following three elements: 1) The X-action or object is involved in certain social practices. 2) These practices confer properties on the X-items, in addition to their physical properties. 3) In virtue of these (...) additional properties the X-items fall under the Y-concept. Moreover, I stress that the social practices mentioned under 1) look differently from case to case and involve various constellations of prescriptive rules and interpersonal patterns of intentions. To illustrate and corroborate these claims, I discuss several cases of socially constituted actions and objects, in particular, the case of money, where I reject Searle's claim that something counts as money in virtue of giving its owner the right to buy something. (shrink)