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  1. Sigbjørn Birkeland & Bertil Tungodden (2014). Fairness Motivation in Bargaining: A Matter of Principle. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 77 (1):125-151.
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  2. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2013). Heterogeneity in Fairness Views: A Challenge to the Mutualistic Approach? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):84-85.
    This commentary argues that the observed heterogeneity in fairness views, documented in many economic experiments, poses a challenge to the partner choice theory developed by Baumard et al. It also discusses the extent to which their theory can explain how people consider inequalities due to pure luck.
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  3. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2013). Liberal Resourcism: Problems and Possibilities. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (4):348-369.
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  4. Giacomo Bonanno, Martin van Hees, Christian List & Bertil Tungodden (2009). Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Ambiguity Aversion. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):247-248.
    The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg became known as “paradoxes”. The Ellsberg (...)
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  5. Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2009). On the Possibility of Nonaggregative Priority for the Worst Off. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):258-285.
    We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with promoting the benefits (e.g., wellbeing) of individuals and explore the possibility of such theories ascribing some priority to benefits to those who are worse off—without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits) ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alternatives by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second worst off, and so on) (...)
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  6. Bertil Tungodden (2009). Equality and Priority. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oup Oxford.
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  7. Giacomo Bonanno, Christian List, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2008). Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):301-302.
    ABSTRACT The past fifteen years or so have witnessed considerable progress in our understanding of how the human brain works. One of the objectives of the fast-growing field of neuroscience is to deepen our knowledge of how the brain perceives and interacts with the external world. Advances in this direction have been made possible by progress in brain imaging techniques and by clinical data obtained from patients with localized brain lesions. A relatively new field within neuroscience is neuroeconomics, which focuses (...)
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  8. Alexander W. Cappelen, Ole F. Norheim & Bertil Tungodden (2008). Genomics and Equal Opportunity Ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (5):361-364.
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  9. Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune Jansen Hagen & Bertil Tungodden (2007). National Responsibility and the Just Distribution of Debt Relief. Ethics and International Affairs 21 (s1):151-166.
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  10. Barry Herman, Sanjay G. Reddy, Jonathan Shafter, Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune Jansen Hagen, Bertil Tungodden, Kunibert Raffer, Elizabeth A. Donnelly & Thomas J. Trebat (2007). Carnegie Council. Ethics and International Affairs 21.
     
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  11. Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2007). Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd..
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  12. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2007). Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd.
    in Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability, edited by John Roemer and Kotaro Suzumura, (Palgrave Publishers Ltd., forthcoming 2007), ch.11.
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  13. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2006). A Liberal Egalitarian Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):393-408.
    A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. (...)
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  14. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2006). Relocating the Responsibility Cut: Should More Responsibility Imply Less Redistribution? Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (3):353-362.
    Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, bertil.tungodden{at}nhh.no ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Liberal egalitarian theories of justice argue that inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors should be eliminated, but that inequalities arising from responsibility factors should be accepted. This article discusses how the fairness argument for redistribution within a liberal egalitarian framework is affected by a relocation of the cut between responsibility and non-responsibility factors. The article also discusses the claim (...)
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  15. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2006). Who Are the Least Advantaged? In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Oxford University Press.
    The difference principle, introduced by Rawls (1971, 1993), is generally interpreted as leximin, but this is not how he intended it. Rawls explicitly states that the difference principle requires that aggregate benefits (e.g., average or total) to those in the least advantaged group be given lexical priority over benefits to others, where the least advantaged group includes more than the strictly worst off individuals. We study the implications of adopting different approaches to the definition of the least advantaged group and (...)
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  16. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2003). Reward and Responsibility: How Should We Be Affected When Others Change Their Effort? Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):191-211.
    University of Oslo and Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Norway We look at how one should reward effort without rewarding talent. One way to approach this issue is to ask how an increase in one individual's effort should be allowed to affect the post-tax income of others. The article provides characterizations of three main classes of redistribution mechanism on the basis of how these answer this question. Key Words: reward • effort • responsibility • equal opportunity • distributive (...)
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  17. Bertil Tungodden (2003). The Value of Equality. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):1-44.
    Over the years, egalitarian philosophers have made some challenging claims about the nature of egalitarianism. They have argued that egalitarian reasoning should make us reject the Pareto principle; that the Rawlsian leximin principle is not an egalitarian idea; that the Pigou–Dalton principle needs modification; that the intersection approach faces deep problems; that the numbers should not count within an egalitarian framework, and that egalitarianism should make us reject the property of transitivity in normative reasoning. In this paper, taking the recent (...)
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  18. Bertil Tungodden (2000). Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option? Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):229-245.
    The most influential egalitarian perspective is undoubtedly Rawls's (1971, 1993), which assigns absolute priority to the least advantaged in society (the difference principle). However, many have claimed that even though an egalitarian perspective should imply some priority to the worst off, the Rawlsian perspective is too demanding. One response to this criticism is to argue in favour of an egalitarian perspective that never assigns absolute priority to the worse off, but which still includes limited priority to those members of society (...)
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