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Beth A. Dixon [7]Beth Dixon [4]
  1. Beth Dixon (forthcoming). Fables and Philosophy in Advance. Teaching Ethics.
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  2. Beth Dixon (2015). Ethical Rules and Particular Skills. Childhood and Philosophy 11 (21):67-79.
    In this paper I explore what the P4C philosophical novel can contribute to deciding how we should use ethical rules in moral education. As I see it the philosophical novel urges us to regard ethical rule-following with some suspicion. Instead we are directed to appreciate the particular contexts and circumstances of ethical thinking, saying, and doing. But if we don’t teach ethics by the rules, then what is the alternative pedagogy? One possibility is to cultivate ethical expertise by analogy to (...)
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  3. Beth A. Dixon (2013). Learning to See Food Justice. Agriculture and Human Values 31 (2):1-10.
    Ethical perception involves seeing what is ethically salient about the particular details of the world. This kind of seeing is like informed judgment. It can be shaped by what we know and what we come to learn about, and by the development of moral virtue. I argue here that we can learn to see food justice, and I describe some ways to do so using three narrative case studies. The mechanism for acquiring this kind of vision is a “food justice (...)
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  4. Beth A. Dixon (2004). Responsibility for Belief. Teaching Ethics 4 (2):57-76.
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  5. Beth A. Dixon (2002). Narrative Cases. Teaching Ethics 3 (1):29-47.
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  6. Beth Dixon (2001). Animal Emotion. Ethics and the Environment 6 (2):22-30.
    : Recent work in the area of ethics and animals suggests that it is philosophically legitimate to ascribe emotions to nonhuman animals. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that emotionality is a morally relevant psychological state shared by humans and nonhumans. What is missing from the philosophical literature that makes reference to emotions in nonhuman animals is an attempt to clarify and defend some particular account of the nature of emotion, and the role that emotions play in a characterization of human (...)
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  7. Beth A. Dixon (1998). On Women and Animals: A Reply to Gruen and Gaard. Environmental Ethics 20 (2):221-222.
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  8. Beth A. Dixon (1996). The Feminist Connection Between Women and Animals. Environmental Ethics 18 (2):181-194.
    Comparison of similarities between women and animals does not necessarily show that animals are oppressed, much less that they are oppressed by patriarchy. Moreover, by seeking to establish symbolic connections, ecofeminists run the risk of essentializing women as emotional and bodily and closer to nature than men. Feminists have little to gain by concentrating exclusively on how the concepts of woman and animal overlap. Likewise, there is little to be gained for animal liberation by comparing women and animals in theory (...)
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  9. Beth A. Dixon (1995). The Moral Status of Animal Training. Between the Species: A Journal of Ethics 11:54.
     
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  10. Beth Dixon (1992). Gender and the Problem of Personal Identity. The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):259-263.
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