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  1. Bill Brewer, Berkeley and Modern Metaphysics.
    Notoriously, Berkeley combines his denial of the existence of mind-independent matter with the insistence that most of what common sense claims about physical objects is perfectly true (1975a, 1975b).1 As I explain (§ 1), he suggests two broad strategies for this reconciliation, one of which importantly subdivides. Thus, I distinguish three Berkeleyian metaphysical views. The subsequent argument is as follows. Reflection, both upon Berkeley’s ingenious construal of science as approaching towards an essentially indirect identification of the causal-explanatory ground of the (...)
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  2. Bill Brewer, Reference and Subjectivity.
    In ‘Fregean Reference Defended’ (1995), Sosa presents a sophisticated descriptive theory of reference, which he calls ‘fregean’, and which he argues avoids standard counterexamples to more basic variants of this approach. What is characteristic of a fregean theory, in his sense, is the idea that what makes a person’s thought about some object, a, a thought about that particular thing, is the fact that a uniquely satisfies an appropriate individuator which is suitably operative in her thinking.1 On his version, (FT), (...)
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  3. Bill Brewer (2013). Attention and Direct Realism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):421-435.
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  4. Bill Brewer (2011). In Perception. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. 68.
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  5. Bill Brewer (2011). Perception and Its Objects. Oxford University Press.
    Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the (...)
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  6. Bill Brewer (2011). Realism and Explanation in Perception. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that wc identify physical objccts, in thc first instance, by extension, as things like stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world in which we live. Of course, there is a substantive question of what it is to be y such things in the way relevant to categorization as a physical object. So this can hardly be the final word on the matter. Still, it is equally clear that this gives us all a (...)
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  7. Bill Brewer (2008). How to Account for Illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 168-180.
    The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its (...)
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  8. Bill Brewer (2007). Perception and its Objects. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.
    Physical objects are such things as stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in. (1) therefore expresses a commonsense commitment to physical realism: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.
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  9. Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
    It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view (CV).
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  10. Bill Brewer (2005). Do Sense Experiential States Have Conceptual Content? In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 217--230.
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  11. Bill Brewer (2005). Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states (...)
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  12. Bill Brewer (2004). Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):61-77.
    Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.
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  13. Bill Brewer (2004). Review: Stroud's Quest for Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):408 - 414.
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  14. Bill Brewer (2004). Self-Knowledge and Externalism. In J.M. Larrazabal & L.A. PC)rez Miranda (eds.), Language, Knowledge and Representation. Kluwer. 39-47.
    I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called.
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  15. Bill Brewer (2004). Stroud's Quest for Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):408-414.
    Barry Stroud begins his investigation into the metaphysics of colour with a discussion of the elusiveness of the genuinely philosophical quest for reality. He insists upon a distinction between two ways in which the idea of a correspondence between perceptions or beliefs and the facts may be understood: first, as equivalent to the plain truth of the perceptions/beliefs in question; second, as conveying the metaphysical reality of the corresponding features of the world. I begin by voicing some suspicion about this (...)
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  16. Bill Brewer (2002). Emotion and Other Minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
    What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by ‘emotional experience’ such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating (...)
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  17. Bill Brewer (2002). Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
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  18. Bill Brewer (2001). Précis of Perception and Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):405 - 416.
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  19. Bill Brewer (2001). Consciousness, Colour, and Content. Michael Tye. Mind 110 (439):869-874.
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  20. Bill Brewer (2001). Precis of Perception and Reason, and Response to Commentator (Michael Ayers). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge? My central claim is that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experiences contribute to our understanding of the most basic beliefs about particular things in the mind-independent world around us reveals how such experiences provide peculiarly fundamental reasons for such beliefs. There are, I claim, epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experiences lies in their essential (...)
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  21. Bill Brewer (2001). Prkis of Perception and Reason'1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):405-416.
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  22. Bill Brewer (2001). Precis of Perception and Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):405-416.
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  23. Bill Brewer (2001). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):449-464.
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  24. Bill Brewer (2001). Review: Précis of Perception and Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):405 - 416.
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  25. Bill Brewer (2000). Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts. In Christopher Peacocke & Paul A. Boghossian (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxfordo. 415.
    I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called.
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  26. Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Bill Brewer presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. He argues that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. This fresh approach to epistemology turns away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and works instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area.
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  27. Bill Brewer (1998). Experience and Reason in Perception. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 203-227.
    The question I am interested in is this. What exactly is the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of knowledge on the basis of perception? The problem here, as I see it, is to solve simultaneously for the nature of this experience, and its role in acquiring and sustaining the relevant beliefs, in such a away as to vindicate what I regard as an undeniable datum, that perception is a basic source of knowledge about the mind- independent world, in (...)
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  28. Bill Brewer (1998). Levels of Explanation and the Individuation of Events: A Difficulty for the Token Identity Theory. Acta Analytica 20 (20):7-24.
    We make how a person acts intelligible by revealing it as rational in the light of what she perceives, thinks, wants and so on. For example, we might explain that she reached out and picked up a glass because she was thirsty and saw that it contained water. In doing this, we are giving a causal explanation of her behaviour in terms of her antecedent beliefs, desires and other attitudes. Her wanting a drink and realizing that the glass contained one (...)
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  29. Bill Brewer (1997). Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):41-55.
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  30. Bill Brewer (1996). Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):259-275.
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  31. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: Mit Press. 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  32. Bill Brewer (1995). Compulsion by Reason (Mental Causation II). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:237-53.
     
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  33. Bill Brewer (1995). Learning From Experience: A Commentary on Baddeley and Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):181-193.
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  34. Bill Brewer (1995). Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (69):237-253.
    The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens - she intentionally φ’s - the occurrence of which we explain by citing a relevant belief or desire. In the present context, I simply take for granted the following two conditions on the appropriateness of this explanation. First, the agent φ’s _because_ she believes/desires what we say she does, where this is expressive of a _causal_ dependence.1 Second, her believing/desiring this gives her a _reason_ for (...)
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  35. Bill Brewer (1995). Mental Causation, II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (69):237-253.
     
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  36. Bill Brewer (1994). Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  37. Bill Brewer (1994). Thoughts About Objects, Places and Times. In Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  38. Janette Atkinson, Edoardo Bisiach, Oliver Braddick, Bill Brewer, Michele Brouchon, Peter Bryant, George Butterworth, John Campbell, Bill Child & Lynn A. Cooper (1993). Workshop Participants. In Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen A. McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.), Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Blackwell. 400.
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  39. Bill Brewer (1993). Introduction: Action. In Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  40. Bill Brewer (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  41. Bill Brewer (1993). The Integration of Spatial Vision and Action. In Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  42. Bill Brewer & Julian Pears (1993). Introduction: Frames of Reference'. In Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen A. McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.), Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Blackwell.
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  43. Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen A. McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.) (1993). Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Blackwell.
    Spatial Representation presents original, specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers on a fascinating set of topics at the intersection of these two disciplines. They address such questions as these: Do the extraordinary navigational abilities of birds mean that these birds have the same kind of grip on the idea of a spatial world as we do? Is there a difference between the way sighted and blind subjects represent the world 'out there'? Does the study of brain-injured subjects, such (...)
     
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  44. Bill Brewer (1992). Self-Location and Agency. Mind 101 (401):17-34.
    We perceive things in the external world as spatially located both with respect to each other and to ourselves, such that they are in principle accessible from where we seem to be. I hear the door bang behind me; I feel the pen on the desk over to my right; and I see you walking beneath the line of pictures, from left to right in front of me. By displaying these spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception (...)
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  45. Bill Brewer (1992). Unilateral Neglect and the Objectivity of Spatial Representation. Mind and Language 7 (3):222-39.
    Patients may show a more-or-less complete deviation of the head and eyes towards the right (ipsilesional) side [that is, to the same side of egocentric space as the brain lesion responsible for their disorder]. If addressed by the examiner from the left (contralesional) side [the opposite side to their lesion], patients with severe extrapersonal neglect may fail to respond or may look for the speaker in the right side of the room, turning head and eyes more and more to the (...)
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