Search results for 'Blame' (try it on Scholar)

935 found
Order:
  1. Daniel Zwerdling & What'S. To Blame (forthcoming). 248 Part Three: Business and Employees. Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  89
    D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2013). The Contours of Blame. In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press 3-26.
    This is the first chapter to our edited collection of essays on the nature and ethics of blame. In this chapter we introduce the reader to contemporary discussions about blame and its relationship to other issues (e.g. free will and moral responsibility), and we situate the essays in this volume with respect to those discussions.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  3. Thomas Scanlon (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    The illusory appeal of double effect -- The significance of intent -- Means and ends -- Blame.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   106 citations  
  4.  30
    Leonhard Menges (forthcoming). The Emotion Account of Blame. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Matthew Talbert (2012). Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.
    I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  6.  41
    Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard (2016). Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral “Ought” Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an Empirical Refutation of “Ought” Implies “Can”. Cognition 150:20-25.
    Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Pamela Hieronymi (2004). The Force and Fairness of Blame. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
    In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  8. Howard Simmons, Sher on Blame.
    My subject is the theory of blame recently propounded by George Sher in his book, In Praise of Blame. I argue that although Sher has succeeded in capturing a number of genuine features of the concept of blame, there is an important element that he has omitted, which is the fact that necessarily, when A blames B for something and expresses this to B, A will realise that B is likely to find this unpleasant. The inclusion of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  24
    Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Character and Blame in Hume and Beyond. In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford University Press
    Are we really to blame only for actions that manifest our character, as Hume claims? In this paper, I explore Hume's reasoning and the nature of blame in general. I suggest that insofar as blame comes in a relational variety as well as the more familiar reactive one, there may be something to be said for linking blame with character flaws after all.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  11.  36
    D. Justin Coates (forthcoming). The Epistemic Norm of Blame. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable belief, and second, that the epistemic norm of implicatures is relevantly similar to the norm of assertion. I defend these claims, and I conclude by briefly suggesting how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
    Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or 'psychopathic,' agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  13. Matthew Talbert (2013). Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1. Oxford University Press
    I argue against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and I argue against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view I defend, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  31
    Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller (2015). Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  17
    Michael McKenna (2016). Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):243-263.
    In this paper, I defend my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to three critics: Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas. Driver raises questions about my account of private blame. Shoemaker finds problems with my account of quality of will. And Vargas questions the conversational nature of my account.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  91
    Paul McNamara (2011). Praise, Blame, Obligation, and DWE: Toward a Framework for the Classical Conception of Supererogation and Kin. Journal of Applied Logic 9:153–170.
    Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integrated with a fairly rich system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated ("normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to being able to model and explore fundamental questions in ethical theory about the connection between (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  48
    Douglas Husak (2011). Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):199-218.
    Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  18.  62
    Michelle Ciurria (2013). Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame. Philosophia 41 (1):179-193.
    In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19.  58
    D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
    Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully understanding) the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20.  18
    James R. Beebe (forthcoming). Do Bad People Know More? Interactions Between Attributions of Knowledge and Blame. Synthese:1-25.
    A central topic in experimental epistemology has been the ways that non-epistemic evaluations of an agent’s actions can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. Several scholars have found that the positive or negative valence of an action can influence attributions of knowledge to the agent. These evaluative effects on knowledge attributions are commonly seen as performance errors, failing to reflect individuals’ genuine conceptual competence with knows. In the present article, I report the results of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  26
    D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini, Blame. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In this entry we provide a critical review of recent work on the nature and ethics of blame, including issues of moral standing.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  85
    John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2010). Blame and Avoidability: A Reply to Otsuka. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):43 - 51.
    In a fascinating recent article, Michael Otsuka seeks to bypass the debates about the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by presenting and defending a different, but related, principle, which he calls the “Principle of Avoidable Blame.” According to this principle, one is blameworthy for performing an act only if one could instead have behaved in an entirely blameless manner. Otsuka claims that although Frankfurt-cases do undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, they do not undermine the Principle of Avoidable Blame. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  23.  10
    Maura Priest (2016). Blame After Forgiveness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):619-633.
    When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  77
    Richard Sorabji (1980). Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. University of Chicago Press.
    A discussion of Aristotle’s thought on determinism and culpability, Necessity, Cause, and Blame also reveals Richard Sorabji’s own philosophical commitments. He makes the original argument here that Aristotle separates the notions of necessity and cause, rejecting both the idea that all events are necessarily determined as well as the idea that a non-necessitated event must also be non-caused. In support of this argument, Sorabji engages in a wide-ranging discussion of explanation, time, free will, essence, and purpose in nature. He (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  25.  84
    Michelle Mason (2011). Blame: Taking It Seriously. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):473-481.
    Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  38
    Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. David Sobel (2007). Subjectivism and Blame. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  3
    Marion Smiley (2016). Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):85-101.
    This article has three parts. The first argues that excuses such as "I didn't know" and "I couldn't help myself" are not, as we are frequently led to believe, vehicles for discovering whether or not an individual's will was free. Instead, they are self-narratives that we produce for the purpose of avoiding blame. The second part explores the particular notion of non-responsibility that governs these self-narratives. The third articulates the role that our judgments of fairness play in decisions to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Angela M. Smith (2008). Character, Blameworthiness, and Blame: Comments on George Sher's in Praise of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):31 - 39.
    In his recent book, In Praise of Blame, George Sher argues (among other things) that a bad act can reflect negatively on a person if that act results in an appropriate way from that person's "character," and defends a novel "two-tiered" account of what it is to blame someone. In these brief comments, I raise some questions and doubts about each of these aspects of his rich and thought-provoking account.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30.  42
    Andreas Leonhard Menges (2014). How Not to Defend Moral Blame. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-7.
    At first sight, moral blame is an unpleasant thing. No one likes being blamed and few people like experiencing the negative emotions associated with blaming others. Therefore, some suggest a radical reform of our everyday moral life: We should replace our tendency to blame wrongdoers with a tendency to criticize them in a less harmful and more productive way. The blameless fight for the good by Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi may exemplify this alternative. Many philosophers, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  58
    Neal A. Tognazzini (2013). Blameworthiness and the Affective Account of Blame. Philosophia 41 (4):1299-1312.
    One of the most influential accounts of blame—the affective account—takes its cue from P.F. Strawson’s discussion of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone, on this account, is to target her with resentment, indignation, or (in the case of self-blame) guilt. Given the connection between these emotions and the demand for regard that is arguably central to morality, the affective account is quite plausible. Recently, however, George Sher has argued that the affective account of blame, as understood (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  8
    Julia Driver (2016). Private Blame. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):215-220.
    This paper explores a problem for Michael McKenna’s conversation model of moral responsibility that views blame as characteristically part of a conversational exchange. The problem for this model on which this paper focuses is the problem of private blame. Sometimes when we blame we do so without any intention to engage in a communicative exchange. It is argued that McKenna’s model cannot adequately account for private blame.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  11
    Gerald K. Harrison (2004). The Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3 (1):37-46.
    Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  9
    Youngjae Lee (2013). Military Veterans, Culpability, and Blame. Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):285-307.
    Recently in Porter v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court, citing “a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service,” held that a defense lawyer’s failure to present his client’s military service record as mitigating evidence during his sentencing for two murders amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The purpose of this Article is to assess, from the just deserts perspective, the grounds to believe that veterans who commit crimes are to be blamed less by the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  11
    Daniel N. Robinson (2003). Summary of Praise and Blame. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):2-7.
    A summary of the major arguments of PRAISE AND BLAME, both critical and constructive, is offered. The overarching objectives of the book are set forth, making clear the radical form of moral realism defended. Additional material is presented to justify the attention paid to historical vs. contemporary alternatives to moral realism, the latter found to be at once indebted to the former but often less developed. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  2
    Gerard V. Bradley (2003). Praise and Blame and Robinson. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):8-21.
    Daniel Robinson suggests that much of the civil and criminal law "serves as the institutionalized form of praise and blame". Indeed it does. Pulling at this thread of Robinson's tapestry leads the reader straightaway to a host of truths about how law and morality not only intersect, but work together in harmony. "[L]aw", Robinson says, is a "vivid expression of deeper and impenetrably complex moral theories". This essay explores several of these harmonies, but focuses on two. One is that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  10
    Audrey L. Anton (2015). Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame. Lexington Books.
    Through critical examination of three main contemporary approaches to describing moral responsibility, this book illustrates why philosophers must take into account the relationship between retrospective moral responsibility and desert of praise or blame. The author advances the moral attitude account, whereby desert of praise and blame depends on the agent’s moral attitudes in response to moral reasons, and retrospective moral responsibility results from expressions of those attitudes in overt behavior.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Amy L. McKiernan (2016). Standing Conditions and Blame. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):145-151.
    In “The Standing to Blame: A Critique” (2013), Macalester Bell challenges theories that claim that ‘standing’ plays a central role in blaming practices. These standard accounts posit that it is not enough for the target of blame to be blameworthy; the blamer also must have the proper standing to blame the wrongdoer. Bell identifies and criticizes four different standing conditions, (1) the Business Condition, (2) the Contemporary Condition, (3) the Nonhypocricy Condition, and (4) the Noncomplicity Condition. According (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Michael Otsuka (1998). Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame. Ethics 108 (4):685-701.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  40.  21
    Justin Caouette (2015). Robust Alternatives, Blame, and the Tax Evasion Case. Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):27-32.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  8
    Mairi Levitt & Neil Manson (2007). My Genes Made Me Do It? The Implications of Behavioural Genetics for Responsibility and Blame. Health Care Analysis 15 (1):33-40.
    The idea of individual responsibility for action is central to our conception of what it is to be a person. Behavioural genetic research may seem to call into question the idea of individual responsibility with possible implications for the criminal justice system. These implications will depend on the understandings of the various agencies and professional groups involved in responding to violent and anti-social behaviour, and, the result of negotiations between them over resulting practice. The paper considers two kinds of approaches (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42.  22
    Marion Smiley (2014). Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):85-101.
    “I didn’t know what I was doing”. “I was totally out of control.” Since we accept and reject such excuses all the time in practice—and frequently do so with great confidence—we might be expected to have grasped what it means for a volitional excuse to be valid in general and to have developed a well thought out set of criteria for judging the validity of such excuses in practice. But, as it turns out, we have not done either of these (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  32
    Paul McNamara (2000). Toward a Framework for Agency, Inevitability, Praise and Blame. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):135-159.
    There is little work of a systematic nature in ethical theory or deontic logic on aretaic notions such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, despite their centrality to common-sense morality. Without more work, there is little hope of filling the even larger gap of attempting to develop frameworks integrating such aretaic concepts with deontic concepts of common-sense morality, such as what is obligatory, permissible, impermissible, or supererogatory. It is also clear in the case of aretaic concepts that agency is central to such (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44.  49
    Oisín Deery (2007). Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame. Res Publica 13 (3):209-230.
    In this paper, I argue that 'moral responsibility' refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  6
    Alessandra Gorini, Massimo Miglioretti & Gabriella Pravettoni (2012). A New Perspective on Blame Culture: An Experimental Study. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (3):671-675.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Angela Smith (2013). Moral Blame and Moral Protest. In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  47. George Sher (2005). In Praise of Blame. OUP Usa.
    Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book's most important conclusion is that blame is inseperable from morality itself - that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  48.  84
    A. P. Butenko (1990). Is Karl Marx to Blame for "Barracks Socialism"? Russian Studies in Philosophy 29 (2):32-47.
    The more urgently our social thought turns to past history, and the more resolutely it analyzes the distortions that have taken place, the more urgently appears the question: How could all these things happen, who is to blame for a distorted socialism becoming a reality in our country?
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Miranda Fricker (2016). What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation. Noûs 50 (1):165-183.
    When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. J. J. C. Smart (1963). Free Will, Praise and Blame. Mind 70 (279):291-306.
    In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
1 — 50 / 935