Search results for 'Blame' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daniel Zwerdling & What'S. To Blame (forthcoming). 248 Part Three: Business and Employees. Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics.score: 30.0
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  2. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.score: 24.0
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom (...)
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  3. Thomas Scanlon (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.score: 24.0
    The illusory appeal of double effect -- The significance of intent -- Means and ends -- Blame.
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  4. Pamela Hieronymi (2004). The Force and Fairness of Blame. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.score: 24.0
    In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that (...)
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  5. Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or 'psychopathic,' agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents (...)
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  6. Angela M. Smith (2008). Character, Blameworthiness, and Blame: Comments on George Sher's in Praise of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):31 - 39.score: 24.0
    In his recent book, In Praise of Blame, George Sher argues (among other things) that a bad act can reflect negatively on a person if that act results in an appropriate way from that person's "character," and defends a novel "two-tiered" account of what it is to blame someone. In these brief comments, I raise some questions and doubts about each of these aspects of his rich and thought-provoking account.
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  7. Howard Simmons, Sher on Blame.score: 24.0
    My subject is the theory of blame recently propounded by George Sher in his book, In Praise of Blame. I argue that although Sher has succeeded in capturing a number of genuine features of the concept of blame, there is an important element that he has omitted, which is the fact that necessarily, when A blames B for something and expresses this to B, A will realise that B is likely to find this unpleasant. The inclusion of (...)
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  8. Matthew Talbert (2012). Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.score: 24.0
    I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A (...)
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  9. Michelle Mason (2011). Blame: Taking It Seriously. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):473-481.score: 24.0
    Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because (...)
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  10. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2010). Blame and Avoidability: A Reply to Otsuka. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 14 (1):43 - 51.score: 24.0
    In a fascinating recent article, Michael Otsuka seeks to bypass the debates about the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by presenting and defending a different, but related, principle, which he calls the “Principle of Avoidable Blame.” According to this principle, one is blameworthy for performing an act only if one could instead have behaved in an entirely blameless manner. Otsuka claims that although Frankfurt-cases do undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, they do not undermine the Principle of Avoidable Blame. (...)
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  11. Douglas Husak (2011). Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):199-218.score: 24.0
    Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited (...)
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  12. Matthew Talbert (2013). Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    I argue against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and I argue against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view I defend, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that (...)
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  13. Michelle Ciurria (2013). Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame. Philosophia 41 (1):179-193.score: 24.0
    In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also (...)
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  14. David Sobel (2007). Subjectivism and Blame. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.score: 24.0
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
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  15. Neal A. Tognazzini (2013). Blameworthiness and the Affective Account of Blame. Philosophia 41 (4):1299-1312.score: 24.0
    One of the most influential accounts of blame—the affective account—takes its cue from P.F. Strawson’s discussion of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone, on this account, is to target her with resentment, indignation, or (in the case of self-blame) guilt. Given the connection between these emotions and the demand for regard that is arguably central to morality, the affective account is quite plausible. Recently, however, George Sher has argued that the affective account of blame, as understood (...)
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  16. Paul McNamara (2011). Praise, Blame, Obligation, and DWE: Toward a Framework for the Classical Conception of Supererogation and Kin. Journal of Applied Logic 9:153–170.score: 24.0
    Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integrated with a fairly rich system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated ("normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to being able to model and explore fundamental questions in ethical theory about the connection between (...)
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  17. Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.score: 24.0
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s (...)
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  18. Richard Sorabji (1980/2006). Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. University of Chicago Press.score: 24.0
    A discussion of Aristotle’s thought on determinism and culpability, Necessity, Cause, and Blame also reveals Richard Sorabji’s own philosophical commitments. He makes the original argument here that Aristotle separates the notions of necessity and cause, rejecting both the idea that all events are necessarily determined as well as the idea that a non-necessitated event must also be non-caused. In support of this argument, Sorabji engages in a wide-ranging discussion of explanation, time, free will, essence, and purpose in nature. He (...)
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  19. Gerald K. Harrison (2004). The Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3 (1):37-46.score: 24.0
    Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such (...)
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  20. Youngjae Lee (2013). Military Veterans, Culpability, and Blame. Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):285-307.score: 24.0
    Recently in Porter v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court, citing “a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service,” held that a defense lawyer’s failure to present his client’s military service record as mitigating evidence during his sentencing for two murders amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The purpose of this Article is to assess, from the just deserts perspective, the grounds to believe that veterans who commit crimes are to be blamed less by the (...)
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  21. Oisín Deery (2007). Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame. Res Publica 13 (3):209-230.score: 22.0
    In this paper, I argue that 'moral responsibility' refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that (...)
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  22. Michael Otsuka (1998). Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame. Ethics 108 (4):685-701.score: 21.0
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  23. Paul McNamara (2000). Toward a Framework for Agency, Inevitability, Praise and Blame. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):135-159.score: 21.0
    There is little work of a systematic nature in ethical theory or deontic logic on aretaic notions such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, despite their centrality to common-sense morality. Without more work, there is little hope of filling the even larger gap of attempting to develop frameworks integrating such aretaic concepts with deontic concepts of common-sense morality, such as what is obligatory, permissible, impermissible, or supererogatory. It is also clear in the case of aretaic concepts that agency is central to such (...)
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  24. Daniel N. Robinson (2003). Summary of Praise and Blame. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):2-7.score: 21.0
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  25. Marion Smiley (forthcoming). Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.score: 21.0
    “I didn’t know what I was doing”. “I was totally out of control.” Since we accept and reject such excuses all the time in practice—and frequently do so with great confidence—we might be expected to have grasped what it means for a volitional excuse to be valid in general and to have developed a well thought out set of criteria for judging the validity of such excuses in practice. But, as it turns out, we have not done either of these (...)
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  26. Alessandra Gorini, Massimo Miglioretti & Gabriella Pravettoni (2012). A New Perspective on Blame Culture: An Experimental Study. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (3):671-675.score: 21.0
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  27. Gerard V. Bradley (2003). Praise and Blame and Robinson. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):8-21.score: 21.0
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  28. Mairi Levitt & Neil Manson (2007). My Genes Made Me Do It? The Implications of Behavioural Genetics for Responsibility and Blame. Health Care Analysis 15 (1):33-40.score: 21.0
    The idea of individual responsibility for action is central to our conception of what it is to be a person. Behavioural genetic research may seem to call into question the idea of individual responsibility with possible implications for the criminal justice system. These implications will depend on the understandings of the various agencies and professional groups involved in responding to violent and anti-social behaviour, and, the result of negotiations between them over resulting practice. The paper considers two kinds of approaches (...)
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  29. J. J. C. Smart (1963). Free Will, Praise and Blame. Mind 70 (279):291-306.score: 18.0
    In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in (...)
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  30. Miranda Fricker (2010). The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177.score: 18.0
    Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain ‘fantasy’). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, (...)
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  31. Espen Gamlund (2011). Forgiveness Without Blame. In Christel Fricke (ed.), The Ethics of Forgiveness. Routledge.score: 18.0
    It is widely recognised in moral philosophy that there is only something to forgive in cases of unexcused and unjustified wrongdoing. I will call this the standard view. According to this view, forgiveness presupposes that the person to be forgiven has done something that warrants blame and resentment. This standard view has not prompted much discussion in the literature on forgiveness. Most writers on forgiveness seem to accept that it only makes sense to speak of forgiveness in those cases (...)
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  32. Frank Hindriks (2008). Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.score: 18.0
    Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First, people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action (...)
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  33. R. A. Duff (2010). Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial. Ratio 23 (2):123-140.score: 18.0
    I begin by discussing the ways in which a would-be blamer's own prior conduct towards the person he seeks to blame can undermine his standing to blame her (to call her to account for her wrongdoing). This provides the basis for an examination of a particular kind of 'bar to trial' in the criminal law – of ways in which a state or a polity's right to put a defendant on trial can be undermined by the prior misconduct (...)
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  34. John Skorupski (2010). Moral Obligation, Blame, and Self-Governance. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):158-180.score: 18.0
    This paper shows how moral concepts are definable in terms of reasons for the blame sentiment. It then shows how, given that definition, the categoricity of moral obligation follows from some plausible principles about reasons for blame. The nature of moral agency is further considered in this light. In particular, in what sense is it self-governing agency? Self-governing actors must be at least self-determining: that is, they must be able to think about what reasons they have, in order (...)
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  35. Garrath Williams, Praise and Blame. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 18.0
    Joel Feinberg observed that ‘moral responsibility… is a subject about which we are all confused.’ (1970: 37) Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more evident than in our understandings of praise and blame. This entry will contrast three influential philosophical accounts of our everyday practices of praise and blame, in terms of how they might be justified. On the one hand, a broadly Kantian approach sees responsibility for actions as relying on forms of self control that point back to (...)
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  36. Gregory Mellema (2001). Praise, Blame, and the Ought Implies Can Principle. Philosophia 28 (1-4):425-436.score: 18.0
    Recently David Widerker argued that from the widely accepted ought implies can principle one can deduce the controversial and much discussed principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Actually, he argues that this result is true only of the part of PAP which deals with moral blame. Because there are acts of supererogation, he maintains that it does not apply to the part which deals with moral praise. What Widerker says about supererogation seems true, and I develop and expand upon this (...)
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  37. Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Review: Sher's Defense of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):19-30.score: 18.0
    In his In Praise of Blame, George Sher aims to provide an analysis and defense of blame. In fact, he aims to provide an analysis that will itself yield a defense by allowing him to argue that morality and blame "stand or fall together." He thus opposes anyone who recommends jettisoning blame while preserving (the rest of) morality. In this comment, I examine Sher's defense of blame. Though I am much in sympathy with Sher's strategy (...)
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  38. Pamela Hieronymi (2007). Rational Capacity as a Condition on Blame. Philosophical Books 48 (2):109–123.score: 18.0
    In "Rational Capacities" Michael Smith outlines the sense of capacity he believes to be required before blame is appropriate. I question whether this sense of capacity is required. In so doing, I consider different ways in which blame might be conditioned.
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  39. Miranda Fricker (2014). What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation. Noûs 48 (3).score: 18.0
    When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an (...)
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  40. D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.score: 18.0
    Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully understanding) the (...)
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  41. Barbara Houston (1992). In Praise of Blame. Hypatia 7 (4):128 - 147.score: 18.0
    Recent writers in feminist ethics have been concerned to find ways to reclaim and augment women's moral agency. This essay considers Sarah Hoagland's intriguing suggestion that we renounce moral praise and blame and pursue what she calls an "ethic of intelligibility." I argue that the eschewal of moral blame would not help but rather hinder our efforts to increase our sense of moral agency. It would, I claim, further intensify our demoralization.
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  42. Garrath Williams (2003). Blame and Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):427-445.score: 18.0
    This paper looks at judgments of guilt in the face of alleged wrong-doing, be it in public or in private discourse. Its concern is not the truth of such judgments, although the complexity and contestability of such claims will be stressed. The topic, instead, is what sort of activities we are engaged in, when we make our judgments on others' conduct. To examine judging as an activity it focuses on a series of problems that can occur when we blame (...)
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  43. Nicholaos Jones (2013). Don't Blame the Idealizations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44 (1):85-100.score: 18.0
    Idealizing conditions are scapegoats for scientific hypotheses, too often blamed for falsehood better attributed to less obvious sources. But while the tendency to blame idealizations is common among both philosophers of science and scientists themselves, the blame is misplaced. Attention to the nature of idealizing conditions, the content of idealized hypotheses, and scientists’ attitudes toward those hypotheses shows that idealizing conditions are blameless when hypotheses misrepresent. These conditions help to determine the content of idealized hypotheses, and they do (...)
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  44. Richard L. Archer & Shirley Matile Ogletree (2011). Interpersonal Judgments: Moral Responsibility and Blame. Ethics and Behavior 21 (1):35-48.score: 18.0
    A deterministic perspective, believing choices are a function of hereditary and environmental factors, could theoretically impact perceived moral responsibility and lead to decreased blame in judging others. However, little consistent support has been found relating individual differences in deterministic attitudes to blame/tolerance for others. Perhaps, though, providing information regarding past background hardships affecting an individual's current lifestyle could potentially mediate harsh moralistic judgments of that individual. In the two studies reported here, we further explored the relation of free (...)
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  45. Neil Levy (2013). Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.score: 18.0
    The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper (...)
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  46. John Skorupski (2005). Blame, Respect and Recognition: A Reply to Theo Van Willigenburg. Utilitas 17 (3):333-347.score: 18.0
    In an article in Utilitas Theo van Willigenburg has argued that moral valuation is distinguished from other forms of valuation by the Kantian concept of respect. He criticizes, from that standpoint, an account I put forward, which builds on the connections between moral wrongdoing, blame and withdrawal of recognition. I examine the difference between these two approaches and defend my own.
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  47. Benjamin Hale (2007). Culpability and Blame After Pregnancy Loss. Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (1):24-27.score: 18.0
    The problem of feeling guilty about a pregnancy loss is suggested to be primarily a moral matter and not a medical or psychological one. Two standard approaches to women who blame themselves for a loss are first introduced, characterised as either psychologistic or deterministic. Both these approaches are shown to underdetermine the autonomy of the mother by depending on the notion that the mother is not culpable for the loss if she "could not have acted otherwise". The inability to (...)
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  48. D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.) (2013). Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    One mark of interpersonal relationships is a tendency to blame. But what precise evaluations and responses constitute blame? Is it most centrally a judgment, or is it an emotion, or something else? Does blame express a demand, or embody a protest, or does it simply mark an impaired relationship? What accounts for its force or sting, and how similar is it to punishment? -/- The essays in this volume explore answers to these (and other) questions about the (...)
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  49. Hanna Pickard (2013). Irrational Blame. Analysis 73 (4):613-626.score: 18.0
    I clarify some ambiguities in blame-talk and argue that blame's potential for irrationality and propensity to sting vitiates accounts of blame that identify it with consciously accessible, personal-level judgements or beliefs. Drawing on the cognitive psychology of emotion and appraisal theory, I develop an account of blame that accommodates these features. I suggest that blame consists in a range of hostile, negative first-order emotions, towards which the blamer has a specific, accompanying second-order attitude, namely, a (...)
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  50. Mehmet Gurdal, Joshua B. Miller & Aldo Rustichini, Why Blame?score: 18.0
    We provide experimental evidence that subjects blame others based on events they are not responsible for. In our experiment an agent chooses between a lottery and a safe asset; payment from the chosen option goes to a principal who then decides how much to allocate between the agent and a third party. We observe widespread blame: regardless of their choice, agents are blamed by principals for the outcome of the lottery, an event they are not responsible for. We (...)
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