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Profile: Boaz Miller (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan)
  1.  85
    Boaz Miller (forthcoming). Lackey, Jennifer, Ed. Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, ‎‎2014, Pp. 253.‎. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  2. Boaz Miller & Isaac Record (forthcoming). Responsible Epistemic Technologies: A Social-Epistemological Analysis of Autocompleted Web Search. New Media and Society.
    Information providing and gathering increasingly involve technologies like search ‎engines, which actively shape their epistemic surroundings. Yet, a satisfying account ‎of the epistemic responsibilities associated with them does not exist. We analyze ‎automatically generated search suggestions from the perspective of social ‎epistemology to illustrate how epistemic responsibilities associated with a ‎technology can be derived and assigned. Drawing on our previously developed ‎theoretical framework that connects responsible epistemic behavior to ‎practicability, we address two questions: first, given the different technological ‎possibilities available (...)
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  3. Isaac Record & Boaz Miller (forthcoming). Taking iPhone Seriously: Epistemic Technologies and the Extended Mind. In Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup‎, Orestis Palermos & J. Adam Carter‎ (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    David Chalmers thinks his iPhone exemplifies the extended mind thesis by meeting the criteria ‎that he and Andy Clark established in their well-known 1998 paper. Andy Clark agrees. We take ‎this proposal seriously, evaluating the case of the GPS-enabled smartphone as a potential mind ‎extender. We argue that the “trust and glue” criteria enumerated by Clark and Chalmers are ‎incompatible with both the epistemic responsibilities that accompany everyday activities and the ‎practices of trust that enable users to discharge them. Prospects (...)
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  4. Boaz Miller & Isaac Record (2013). Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies. Episteme 10 (02):117 - 134.
    People increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered Internet ‎sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing ‎subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users’ reliance on ‎Internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about ‎the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns ‎within standard theories of knowledge and justification. (...)
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  5. Boaz Miller (2013). When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement. Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
    Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among (...)
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  6. Boaz Miller (2016). What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese 193 (3):991-1006.
    According to Ian Hacking’s Entity Realism, unobservable entities that scientists carefully manipulate to study other phenomena are real. Although Hacking presents his case in an intuitive, attractive, and persuasive way, his argument remains elusive. I present five possible readings of Hacking’s argument: a no-miracle argument, an indispensability argument, a transcendental argument, a Vichian argument, and a non-argument. I elucidate Hacking’s argument according to each reading, and review their strengths, their weaknesses, and their compatibility with each other.
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  7. Boaz Miller (2015). Why Knowledge is the Property of a Community and Possibly None of its Members. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):417-441.
    Mainstream analytic epistemology regards knowledge as the property of individuals, rather ‎than groups. Drawing on insights from the reality of knowledge production and dissemination ‎in the sciences, I argue, from within the analytic framework, that this view is wrong. I defend ‎the thesis of ‘knowledge-level justification communalism’, which states that at least some ‎knowledge, typically knowledge obtained from expert testimony, is the property of a ‎community and possibly none of its individual members, in that only the community or some ‎members (...)
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  8. Boaz Miller (2014). Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
    Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each (...)
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  9. Boaz Miller (2014). Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:69-80.
    It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of values is distinct (...)
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  10.  17
    Boaz Miller (2016). Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts: Lessons From the Bendectin Litigation. Foundations of Science 21 (1):15-33.
    A consensus in a scientific community is often used as a resource for making informed public-policy decisions and deciding between rival expert testimonies in legal trials. This paper contains a social-epistemic analysis of the high-profile Bendectin drug controversy, which was decided in the courtroom inter alia by deference to a scientific consensus about the safety of Bendectin. Drawing on my previously developed account of knowledge-based consensus, I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, hence courts’ deference (...)
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  11.  52
    Boaz Miller (2015). “Trust Me—I’M a Public Intellectual”: Margaret Atwood’s and David Suzuki’s Social Epistemologies of Climate Science. In Michael Keren & Richard Hawkins‎ (eds.), Speaking Power to Truth: Digital Discourse and the Public Intellectual. Athabasca University Press‎ 113-128.
    Margaret Atwood and David Suzuki are two of the most prominent Canadian public ‎intellectuals ‎involved in the global warming debate. They both argue that anthropogenic global ‎warming is ‎occurring, warn against its grave consequences, and urge governments and the ‎public to take ‎immediate, decisive, extensive, and profound measures to prevent it. They differ, ‎however, in the ‎reasons and evidence they provide in support of their position. While Suzuki ‎stresses the scientific ‎evidence in favour of the global warming theory and the (...)
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  12. Boaz Miller (2012). The Rationality Principle Idealized. Social Epistemology 26 (1):3-30.
    According to Popper's rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. I propose a new interpretation of the rationality principle as consisting of an idealization and two abstractions. Based on this new interpretation, I critically discuss the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it as an integral part of all social scientific models. I argue that as an idealization, the rationality principle may play an important role in the social sciences, but it also has (...)
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  13.  2
    Boaz Miller (forthcoming). Essays in Collective Epistemology, Edited by Jennifer Lackey. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  14.  25
    Boaz Miller (2009). What Does It Mean That PRIMES is in P: Popularization and Distortion Revisited. Social Studies of Science 39 (2):257-288.
    In August 2002, three Indian computer scientists published a paper, ‘PRIMES is in P’, online. It presents a ‘deterministic algorithm’ which determines in ‘polynomial time’ if a given number is a prime number. The story was quickly picked up by the general press, and by this means spread through the scientific community of complexity theorists, where it was hailed as a major theoretical breakthrough. This is although scientists regarded the media reports as vulgar popularizations. When the paper was published in (...)
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  15.  5
    Boaz Miller (2007). Scientific Expertise: Epistemological Worries, Political Dilemmas (Focused Discussion Editor's Introduction). Spontaneous Generations 1 (1):13.
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  16.  4
    Boaz Miller (2007). What Trust in Science? Review of the Trust in Science Workshop. Spontaneous Generations 1 (1):132.
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  17.  4
    Boaz Miller (2011). REVIEW: Lee McIntyre. Dark Ages: The Case for a Science of Human Behavior. [REVIEW] Spontaneous Generations 5 (1):85-87.
    The social sciences today, Lee McIntyre argues, are in the same state in which the natural sciences were in the Dark Ages. In the same way that religion inhibited the progress of science and the growth of knowledge in the Dark Ages, so is political correctness inhibiting progress in the social sciences and the growth of knowledge today. This is why, so he argues, the social sciences do not follow the scientific method like the natural sciences do, and are hence (...)
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  18. Boaz Miller, Social Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.