Search results for 'Bodily-Awareness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John Schwenkler (2013). The Objects of Bodily Awareness. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
    Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of his or her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than (...)
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  2.  14
    Ignacio Ávila (forthcoming). Is Bodily Awareness a Form of Perception? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    In this paper I address the question of whether bodily awareness is a form of perceptual awareness or not. I discuss José Luis Bermúdez’s and Shaun Gallagher’s proposals about this issue and find them unsatisfactory. Then I suggest an alternative view and offer some reasons for it.
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  3. Kristin Zeiler (2010). A Phenomenological Analysis of Bodily Self-Awareness in the Experience of Pain and Pleasure: On Dys-Appearance and Eu-Appearance. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):333-342.
    The aim of this article is to explore nuances within the field of bodily self-awareness. My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject. I build on the phenomenologist Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily dis-appearance and dys-appearance. In bodily dis-appearance, I am only prereflectively aware of my body. My body is not a thematic object of my experience. Bodily dys-appearance takes place when the body appears (...)
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  4. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  5.  92
    Barbara Montero (2010). Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement? Inquiry 53 (2):105 – 122.
    It is widely thought that focusing on highly skilled movements while performing them hinders their execution. Once you have developed the ability to tee off in golf, play an arpeggio on the piano, or perform a pirouette in ballet, attention to what your body is doing is thought to lead to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis. Here I re-examine this view and argue that it lacks support when taken as a general thesis. Although bodily awareness may often interfere (...)
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  6.  56
    José Luis Bermúdez (2015). Bodily Ownership, Bodily Awareness and Knowledge Without Observation. Analysis 75 (1):37-45.
    In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion (...)
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  7.  40
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2014). A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness. Mind 123 (492):00-00.
    One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, and balance). It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to (...)
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  8.  73
    Ignacio Ávila (2014). Evans on Bodily Awareness and Perceptual Self‐Location. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):269-287.
    In Chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference Evans implicitly outlines a view to the effect that bodily awareness plays no role in perceptual self-location or in the specification of our perceptual perspective of the world. In this paper I discuss this story and offer an alternative proposal. Then I explore some consequences of this account for our understanding of the elusiveness of the self in perceptual experience.
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  9.  6
    Louise Richardson (2015). IX—Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):147-165.
    Bodily awareness is a kind of perceptual awareness of the body that we do not usually count as a sense. I argue that that there is an overlooked agential difference between bodily awareness and perception in the five familiar senses: a difference in what is involved in perceptual activity in sight, hearing, touch taste and smell on the one hand, and bodily awareness on the other.
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  10. Joel Smith (2006). Bodily Awareness, Imagination, and the Self. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):49-68.
    Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in way in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), (...)
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  11.  67
    Michael G. F. Martin (1995). Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 267–289.
  12. Berm (2005). The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press
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  13.  82
    Craig D. Murray & Michael S. Gordon (2001). Changes in Bodily Awareness Induced by Immersive Virtual Reality. CyberPsychology and Behavior 4 (3):365-371.
  14. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
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  15.  9
    Maria Legerstee (1998). Mental and Bodily Awareness in Infancy: Consciousness of Self-Existence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):5-6.
    In this article, I will draw on my own work and related publications to present some intuitions and hypotheses about the nature of the self and the mechanisms that lead to the development of consciousness or self awareness in human infants during the first 6 months of life. My main purpose is to show that the origins of a concept of self include the physical and the mental selves. I believe that it is essential when trying to understand what a (...)
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  16.  49
    José Luis Bermúdez & I. V. Objections (2011). Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press
  17. José Luis Bermúdez (2005). The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press
     
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  18. Cheryl K. Chen (2011). Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-38.
    Abstract: Some first person statements, such as ‘I am in pain’, are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine whether some physical (...)
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  19. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Bodily Self-Awareness and Object Perception. Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 7 (1):53--68.
    Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. _Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary_ _Studies_, 7 (1) - in press.
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  20. Jonathan Cole, Natalie Depraz & Shaun Gallagher, Unity and Disunity in Bodily Awareness: Phenomenology and Neuroscience. Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness Workshop.
  21.  8
    Hong Yu Wong (2015). On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):790-812.
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  22. Naoyuki Shiono (2001). Bodily Awareness and Its Subject. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):65-80.
     
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  23. Maria Legerstee (1999). Mental and Bodily Awareness in Infancy. In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Models of the Self. Imprint Academic 213--230.
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  24.  1
    E. K. Ledermann (2008). Conscience and Bodily Awareness: Disagreements with Merleau-Ponty. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 13:286-295.
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  25.  2
    Hugo Rodríguez Vergara (2010). Bodily Awareness: A Phenomenological-Cognitive Approach. Ideas Y Valores 59 (142):25-47.
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  26.  20
    Vivien Ainley, Lara Maister, Jana Brokfeld, Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris (2013). More of Myself: Manipulating Interoceptive Awareness by Heightened Attention to Bodily and Narrative Aspects of the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1231-1238.
    Psychology distinguishes between a bodily and a narrative self. Within neuroscience, models of the bodily self are based on exteroceptive sensorimotor processes or on the integration of interoceptive sensations. Recent research has revealed interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing of self-related information, for example that mirror self-observation can improve interoceptive awareness. Using heartbeat perception, we measured the effect on interoceptive awareness of two experimental manipulations, designed to heighten attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self. Participants gazed at a (...)
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  27.  29
    C. Valenzuela-Moguillansky (2013). Pain and Body Awareness. An Exploration of the Bodily Experience of Persons Suffering From Fibromyalgia. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):339-350.
    Context: Despite the fact that pain and body awareness are by definition subjective experiences, most studies assessing these phenomena and the relationship between them have done so from a “third-person” perspective, meaning that they have used methods whose aim is to try to objectify the phenomena under study. Problem: This article assesses the question of what is the impact of a widespread chronic pain condition in the bodily experience of persons suffering from fibromyalgia. Method: I used an interview methodology stemming (...)
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  28.  31
    Nicholas P. Holmes & Charles Spence (2006). Beyond the Body Schema: Visual, Prosthetic, and Technological Contributions to Bodily Perception and Awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press 15-64.
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  29.  65
    Berm (2001). Bodily Self-Awareness and the Will: Reply to Power. Minds and Machines 11 (1):139-142.
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  30.  42
    Peter Reynaert (2006). What is It Like to Be Embodied, Naturalizing Bodily Self-Awareness? In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Volume Lxxxix: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos, Book Two. Dordrecht: Springer
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  31. M. F. Matthews Scheier & Carver K. A. (1983). Focus of Attention and Awareness of Bodily States. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press
  32.  7
    Matias Baltazar, Nesrine Hazem, Emma Vilarem, Virginie Beaucousin, Jean-Luc Picq & Laurence Conty (2014). Eye Contact Elicits Bodily Self-Awareness in Human Adults. Cognition 133 (1):120-127.
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  33.  4
    José Luis Bermúdez (2001). Bodily Self-Awareness and the Will: Reply to Power. Minds and Machines 11 (1):139-142.
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  34. Aaron Henry & Evan Thompson (2011). Witnessing From Here: Self-Awareness From a Bodily Versus Embodied Perspective. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. OUP Oxford
     
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  35.  11
    James M. Dow (forthcoming). Just Doing What I Do: On the Awareness of Fluent Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    Hubert Dreyfus has argued that cases of absorbed bodily coping show that there is no room for self-awareness in flow experiences of experts. In this paper, I argue against Dreyfus’ maxim of vanishing self-awareness by suggesting that awareness of agency is present in expert bodily action. First, I discuss the phenomenon of absorbed bodily coping by discussing flow experiences involved in expert bodily action: merging into the flow; immersion in the flow; emergence out of flow. I argue against the claim (...)
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  36. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (forthcoming). Getting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way. Emotion Review.
    We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...)
     
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  37.  79
    Thor Grunbaum (2008). The Body in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261.
    This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying (...)
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  38.  69
    Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Touch. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
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  39.  12
    Robert Hopkins (2011). Re-Imagining, Re-Viewing and Re-Touching. In Fiona McPherson (ed.), The senses: classic and contemporary philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press, Usa 261.
    One strategy for working out how to individuate the senses is to pursue that task in tandem with that of individuating the sensory imaginings. We can tackle both, at least for the spatial senses of sight and touch, if we appeal to the idea that, while both modes represent their objects perspectivally, different forms of perspective are involved in each. This cannot, however, exhaust the differences between tactual and visual. Tactual experience is tied to bodily awareness as visual is not. (...)
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  40. Alain Morin (2004). A Neurocognitive and Socioecological Model of Self-Awareness. Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.
    In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment foster self–world (...)
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  41. Stephen Langfur (2013). The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
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  42.  2
    S. Devriese, W. Winters, I. van Diest & O. van den Bergh (2004). Contingency Awareness in a Symptom Learning Paradigm: Necessary but Not Sufficient? Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):439-452.
    In previous studies, we found that bodily symptoms can be learned in a differential conditioning paradigm, using odors as conditioned stimuli and CO2-enriched air as unconditioned stimulus . However, this only occurred when the odor CS had a negative valence , and tended to be more pronounced in persons scoring high for Negative Affectivity . This paper considers the necessity and/or sufficiency of awareness of the CS–US contingency in three studies using this paradigm. The relation between contingency awareness and the (...)
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  43. David LaBerge (2000). Clarifying the Triangular Circuit Theory of Attention and its Relations to Awareness Replies to Seven Commentaries. Psyche 6 (6).
    Replies are given to the commentaries of the seven cognitive science experts. Additional circuit diagrams clarify thalamic operations in attention and basal ganglia operations by which motivation affects attention. Selection-by-suppression and negative priming are accounted for within frontal control areas. Confusions between the terms awareness and consciousness persist, owing to the powerful habit of using awareness as a synonym for consciousness. Leaving consciousness as an umbrella term to denote many loosely-defined aspects of experience, the term awareness denotes the aspect of (...)
     
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  44. John Louis Schwenkler (2009). Space and Self-Awareness. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    How should we think about the role of visual spatial awareness in perception and perceptual knowledge? A common view, which finds a characteristic expression in Kant but has an intellectual heritage reaching back farther than that, is that an account of spatial awareness is fundamental to a theory of experience because spatiality is the defining characteristic of “outer sense”, of our perceptual awareness of how things are in the parts of the world that surround us. A natural counterpart to this (...)
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  45.  54
    Lucy O'Brien (2007). Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford University Press.
    * Fascinating topic in the philosophy of mind and action * Changes the focus of, and gives fresh momentum to, current discussions of self-identification and self-reference * Rigorous discussion of rival views Lucy OBrien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of (...)
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  46.  53
    Gunnar Breivik (2008). Bodily Movement - the Fundamental Dimensions. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (3):337 – 352.
    Bodily movement has become an interesting topic in recent philosophy, both in analytic and phenomenological versions. Philosophy from Descartes to Kant defined the human being as a mental subject in a material body. This mechanistic attitude toward the body still lingers on in many studies of motor learning and control. The article shows how alternative philosophical views can give a better understanding of bodily movement. The article starts with Heidegger's contribution to overcoming the subject-object dichotomy and his new understanding of (...)
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  47. Elizabeth A. Behnke (2009). Bodily Protentionality. Husserl Studies 25 (3):185-217.
    This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the “body” and of “protentionality” is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of (...)
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  48. F. de Vignemont (2013). The Mark of Bodily Ownership. Analysis 73 (4):643-651.
    I am aware that this hand is my own. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than judgements? On the deflationary view recently defended by Martin and Bermúdez in their works, the sense of bodily ownership has no counterpart at the experiential level. Here I present a series of cases that the deflationary account cannot easily accommodate, including belief-independent illusions of ownership and experiences of disownership despite the presence of bodily (...)
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  49. Bernhard Waldenfels (2004). Bodily Experience Between Selfhood and Otherness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):235-248.
    In opposition to traditional forms of dualism and monism, the author holds that our bodily self includes certain aspects of otherness. This is shown concerning the phenomenological issues of intentionality, of self-awareness and of intersubjectivity, by emphasizing the dimension of pathos. We are affected by what happens to us before being able to respond to it by acts or actions. Every sense, myself and others are born out of pathos. The original alienness of our own body, including neurological processes, creates (...)
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  50.  79
    Christopher Peacocke (2006). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
    This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a (...)
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