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Bradford Z. Mahon [6]Bradford Mahon [1]
  1. Alena Stasenko, Frank E. Garcea & Bradford Z. Mahon (forthcoming). What Happens to the Motor Theory of Perception When the Motor System is Damaged? Language and Cognition.
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  2. Frank E. Garcea, Mary Dombovy & Bradford Z. Mahon (2013). Preserved Tool Knowledge in the Context of Impaired Action Knowledge: Implications for Models of Semantic Memory. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  3. Bradford Z. Mahon & Alfonso Caramazza (2011). What Drives the Organization of Object Knowledge in the Brain? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):97-103.
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  4. Bradford Z. Mahon & Alfonso Caramazza (2007). The Organization and Representation of Conceptual Knowledge in the Brain: Living Kinds and Artifacts. In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation. Oxford University Press. 157--187.
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  5. Alfonso Caramazza & Bradford Z. Mahon (2003). The Organization of Conceptual Knowledge: The Evidence From Category-Specific Semantic Deficits. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (8):354-361.
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  6. Bradford Z. Mahon (2003). The Genetics of Environment and the Environment of Genotypes. Social Philosophy Today 19:79-87.
    In this paper I discuss one possible extension of Richard Lewontin’s proposal in The Triple Helix. After reviewing the theoretical commitments common to discussions that assume we will be able to compute an organism from its genes, I turn to Lewontin’s arguments that we will never be able to compute phenotype from genotype because the genotype specifies an organism’s phenotype relative to a range of environments. The focus of the discussion in this paper, however, is on what might follow if (...)
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  7. Bradford Mahon & Alfonso Caramazza (2001). The Sensory/Functional Assumption or the Data: Which Do We Keep? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):488-489.
    The HIT model explains the existence of semantic category-specific deficits by assuming that sensory knowledge is crucially important in processing living things, while functional knowledge is crucially important in processing nonliving things – the sensory/functional assumption. Here we argue that the sensory/functional assumption as implemented in HIT is neither theoretically nor empirically grounded and that, in any case, there is neuropsychological evidence which invalidates this assumption, thereby undermining the HIT model as a whole.
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