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  1. Bradley Franks (2014). The Roles of Evolution in the Social Sciences: Is Biology Ballistic? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (3):288-305.
    This paper discusses some widespread but often not fully articulated views concerning the possible roles of biology and evolution in the social sciences. Such views cluster around a set of intuitions that suggest that evolution's role is “ballistic”: it constitutes a starting point for mind that has been, and is, superseded by the role of culture and social construction. An implication is that evolved and the socially constructed aspects of mind are separable and independent, with the latter being the primary (...)
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  2. Bradley Franks (2005). The Role of "the Environment" in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):59-82.
    Evolutionary psychology is widely understood as involving an integration of evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology, in which the former promises to revolutionise the latter. In this paper, I suggest some reasons to doubt that the assumptions of evolutionary theory and of cognitive psychology are as directly compatible as is widely assumed. These reasons relate to three different problems of specifying adaptive functions as the basis for characterising cognitive mechanisms: the disjunction problem, the grain problem and the environment problem. Each of (...)
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  3. Nick Braisby, Richard Cooper & Bradley Franks (1998). Why the Dynamical Hypothesis Cannot Qualify as a Law of Qualitative Structure. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):630-631.
    Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as a novel law of qualitative structure to compete with Newell and Simon's (1976) physical symbol systems hypothesis. Unlike Newell and Simon's hypothesis, the dynamical hypothesis fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition. Furthermore, imprecision in the statement of the dynamical hypothesis renders it unfalsifiable.
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  4. Nick Braisby & Bradley Franks (1998). A Creationist Myth: Pragmatic Combination Not Feature Creation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):19-20.
    Schyns et al. argue that flexibility in categorisation implies “feature creation.” We argue that this notion is flawed, that flexibility can be explained by combinations over fixed feature sets, and that feature creation would in any case fail to explain categorisation. We suggest that flexibility in categorisation is due to pragmatic factors influencing feature combination, rendering feature creation unnecessary.
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  5. Bradley Franks & Nick Braisby (1998). What is the Point? Concepts, Description, and Rigid Designation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-70.
    Millikan's nondescriptionist approach applies an account of meaning to concepts in terms of designation. The essentialism that provides the principal grounds for rigid designation, however, receives no empirical support from concepts. Whatever the grounding, this view not only faces the problems of rigid designation in theories of meaning, it also calls for a role for pragmatics more consonant with descriptionist theories of concepts.
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  6. Nick Braisby & Bradley Franks (1997). Semantics Versus Pragmatics in Colour Categorization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):181-182.
    We argue that the confusing pattern of evidence concerning colour categorization reported by Saunders & van Brakel is unsurprising. On a perspectival view, categorization may follow semantic or pragmatic attributes. Colour lacks clear semantic attributes; as a result categorization is necessarily pragmatic and context-sensitive. This view of colour categorization helps explain the developmental delay in colour naming.
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  7. Nick Braisby, Bradley Franks & James Hampton (1996). Essentialism, Word Use, and Concepts. Cognition 59 (3):247-274.
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  8. Bradley Franks (1995). On Explanation in Cognitive Science: Competence, Idealization, and the Failure of the Classical Cascade. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):475-502.
    underpinning of the cognitive sciences. I argue, however, that it often fails to provide adequate explanations, in particular in conjunction with competence theories. This failure originates in the idealizations in competence descriptions, which either ?block? the cascade, or produce a successful cascade which fails to explain cognition.
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  9. Bradley Franks (1995). Sense Generation: A “Quasi‐Classical” Approach to Concepts and Concept Combination. Cognitive Science 19 (4):441-505.
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  10. Nick Braisby, Bradley Franks & James Hampton (1994). On the Psychological Basis for Rigid Designation. In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum. 56--65.
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  11. Richard Cooper & Bradley Franks (1993). Interruptibility as a Constraint on Hybrid Systems. Minds and Machines 3 (1):73-96.
    It is widely mooted that a plausible computational cognitive model should involve both symbolic and connectionist components. However, sound principles for combining these components within a hybrid system are currently lacking; the design of such systems is oftenad hoc. In an attempt to ameliorate this we provide a framework of types of hybrid systems and constraints therein, within which to explore the issues. In particular, we suggest the use of system independent constraints, whose source lies in general considerations about cognitive (...)
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  12. Nick Braisby, Bradley Franks & Terry Myers (1992). Partiality and Coherence in Concept Combination. In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer. 179--207.
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  13. Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The (...)
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