Search results for 'Brain Processes' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  31
    John Heil (1970). Sensations, Experiences, and Brain Processes. Philosophy 45 (July):221-6.
    In his defence of the identity theory, Professor Smart has attempted to show that reports of mental states are strictly topic-neutral. If this were the case then it would follow that there is nothing logically wrong with the claim that the mind is the brain or that mental states are really nothing but brain states. Some phillosophers have argued that a fundamental objection to any form of materialism is that the latter makes an obvious logical blunder in identifying (...)
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  2. J. J. C. Smart (1961). Further Remarks on Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review 70 (July):406-407.
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  3. Jerome A. Shaffer (1961). Could Mental States Be Brain Processes? Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
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  4.  48
    M. C. Bradley (1963). Sensations, Brain-Processes, and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):385-93.
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  5.  44
    Robert C. Coburn (1963). Shaffer on the Identity of Mental States and Brain Processes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (February):89-92.
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  6.  22
    Joseph Margolis (1965). Brain Processes and Sensations. Theoria 31 (2):133-38.
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  7. J. J. C. Smart (1962). Brain Processes and Incorrigibility - a Reply to Professor Baier. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):68-70.
  8.  16
    Bruce L. Brown, Dawson W. Hedges & Edwin E. Gantt (2008). Brain Processes and Holistic Isomorphism: Moving Toward a Humanistic Neuroscience. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):356-374.
    A common quest among theoretical psychologists is the transformation of psychology to accommodate human agency and meaning. Several strong experimental methods are used in cognitive neuroscience but are based almost entirely upon a mechanistic ontology. A step toward rapprochement is proposed using precise and powerful experimental methods that are holistic, individualized, and compatible with an agentive ontology. Such methods must be applicable to all aspects of human experience, the subjective and agentive aspects, as well as the behavioural and the neurophysiological (...)
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  9.  20
    Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.
    This note brings together three phenomena leading to a tendency toward reductionism in cognitive psychology. They are the reification of cognitive processes into an entity called mind; the identification of the mind with the brain; and the congruence by analogy of the brain with the digital computer. Also indicated is the need to continue studying the effects upon behavior of variables other than brain function. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  10.  6
    Mark H. Bickhard (2015). Toward a Model of Functional Brain Processes I: Central Nervous System Functional Micro-Architecture. Axiomathes 25 (3):217-238.
    Standard semantic information processing models—information in; information processed; information out —lend themselves to standard models of the functioning of the brain in terms, e.g., of threshold-switch neurons connected via classical synapses. That is, in terms of sophisticated descendants of McCulloch and Pitts models. I argue that both the cognition and the brain sides of this framework are incorrect: cognition and thought are not constituted as forms of semantic information processing, and the brain does not function in terms (...)
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  11.  21
    Ralph D. Ellis (2000). Efferent Brain Processes and the Enactive Approach to Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):40-50.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey argues persuasively that consciousness results from active and efferent rather than passive and afferent functions. These arguments contribute to the mounting recent evidence that consciousness is inseparable from the motivated action planning of creatures that in some sense are organismic and agent-like rather than passively mechanical and reactive in the way that digital computers are. Newton calls this new approach the ‘action theory of understanding'; Varela et al. dubbed it the ‘enactive’ view of consciousness. It was (...)
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  12. Thomas W. Polger (2011). Are Sensations Still Brain Processes? Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
    Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes.” It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and (...)
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  13. J. J. C. Smart (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
    SUPPOSE that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-image which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting?l One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellowy orange patch of light On the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that (...)
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  14. Hans Flohr (1995). Sensations and Brain Processes. Behavioral Brain Research 71:157-61.
    A hypothesis on the physiological conditions of consciousness is presented. It is assumed that the occurrence of states of consciousness causally depends on the formation of complex representational structures. Cortical neural networks that exhibit a high representational activity develop higher-order, self-referential representations as a result of self-organizing processes. The occurrence of such states is identical with the appearance of states of consciousness. The underlying physiological processes can be identified. It is assumed that neural assemblies instantiate mental representations; hence (...)
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  15. Gerd Sommerhoff (2000). Understanding Consciousness: Its Function and Brain Processes. Sage Publications.
    “This is surely the ultimate expression of the top-down approach to consciousness, written with Sommerhoff's characteristic clarity and precision. It says far more than other books four times the size of this admirably concise volume. This book is destined to become a pillar of the subject.” —Rodney Cotterill, Technical University of Denmark The problem of consciousness has been described as a mystery about which we are still in a terrible muddle and in Understanding Consciousness: Its Function and Brain (...), the author attempts to unravel this mystery by offering a clarification of the main concepts related to consciousness, and positing a comprehensive biological explanation. Consequently, this book will be ideal for a wide-range of upper level undergraduate and postgraduate courses. The author interprets consciousness as a property that can be possessed by many creatures lacking a language faculty and comprises all of the following: awareness of the surrounding world; awareness of the self as an entity; and awareness of such things as thoughts and feelings. He argues that a biological approach can achieve both the necessary conceptual clarifications and a joint explanation of these divisions of awareness in terms of just two accurately defined concepts of 'internal representation' and two empirically supported assumptions about the functional architecture of a specific set of brain processes. Despite this striking simplicity, his model covers these divisions of awareness both as objective faculties of the brain and as subjective experience. These conclusions are applied to a broad range of fundamental questions, including the biological rationale of subjective experience and where consciousness resides in the neural networks. (shrink)
     
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  16.  13
    Mark H. Bickhard (2015). Toward a Model of Functional Brain Processes II: Central Nervous System Functional Macro-Architecture. Axiomathes 25 (4):377-407.
    The first paper in this pair developed a model of the nature of representation and cognition, and argued for a model of the micro-functioning of the brain on the basis of that model. In this sequel paper, starting with part III, this model is extended to address macro-functioning in the CNS. In part IV, I offer a discussion of an approach to brain functioning that has some similarities with, as well as differences from, the model presented here: sometimes (...)
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  17.  19
    M. Jung-Beeman (2005). Bilateral Brain Processes for Comprehending Natural Language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (11):512-518.
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  18. John T. Stevenson (1960). Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to J.J.C. Smart. Philosophical Review 69 (October):505-10.
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  19.  73
    J. J. C. Smart (1960). Sensations and Brain Processes: A Rejoinder to Dr Pitcher and Mr Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (December):252-54.
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  20.  31
    George Pitcher (1960). Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (August):150-7.
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  21.  9
    W. D. Joske (1960). Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):157-60.
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  22.  3
    Leonard J. Clapp (1997). Senses, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Criticism of the Property Dualism Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148.
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  23.  7
    Benjamin Libet (1991). Conscious Functions and Brain Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):685-686.
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  24.  11
    Roger Sperry (1978). Mentalist Monism: Consciousness as a Causal Emergent of Brain Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):365.
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  25.  4
    G. J. Dalenoort (1995). Is Attention an Appropriate Concept for Explaining Brain Processes? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):341.
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  26.  9
    Harald Schupp, Bruce Cuthbert, Margaret Bradley, Charles Hillman, Alfons Hamm & Peter Lang (2004). Brain Processes in Emotional Perception: Motivated Attention. Cognition and Emotion 18 (5):593-611.
  27. Hans Flohr (1990). Brain Processes and Phenomenal Consciousness: A New and Specific Hypothesis. Theory and Psychology 1:245-62.
    A hypothesis on the physiological conditions for the occurrence of phenomenal states is presented. It is suggested that the presence of phenomenal states depends on the rate at which neural assemblies are formed. Unconsciousness and various disturbances of phenomenal consciousness occur if the assembly formation rate is below a certain threshold level; if this level is surpassed, phenomenal states necessarily result. A critical production rate of neural assemblies is the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of phenomenal states.
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  28.  94
    Hans Flohr (1992). Qualia and Brain Processes. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter
  29. D. L. Gunner (1967). Professor Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes'. In C. P. Presley (ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind. University of Queensland Press 1--20.
     
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  30.  14
    James B. Ashbrook (1992). Making Sense of Soul and Sabbath Brain Processes and Making of Meaning. Zygon 27 (1):31-49.
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  31.  7
    H. Hecaen & G. Lanteri-Laura (1975). On the Current Problem Concerning the Localization of Brain Processes: A Critical Review. Diogenes 23 (91):16-31.
  32.  4
    V. Part (2011). The Development and Underlying Brain Processes of Pathological Altruism. In Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Guruprasad Madhavan & David Sloan Wilson (eds.), Pathological Altruism. Oxford University Press 319.
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  33.  11
    Leonard Clapp (1998). Senses, Sensations and Brain Processes. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148.
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  34.  3
    Jonathan Cole (2003). Review of “Understanding Consciousness: Its Function and Brain Processes” by Gerd Sommerhoff. [REVIEW] Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 11 (2):394-404.
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  35.  2
    Alberto Emiliani (1990). The Order of Thought. Wittgenstein on Artificial Intelligence and Brain-Processes. Daimon: Revista de Filosofia 2:125-138.
  36.  5
    R. E. Ewin (1968). Actions, Brain-Processes, and Determinism. Mind 77 (307):417-419.
  37. Friedemann Pulvermüller (2009). Brain Processes of Word Recognition as Revealed by Neurophysiological Imaging. In Gareth Gaskell (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Psycholinguistics. OUP Oxford
     
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  38. J. J. C. Smart (1962). Brain Processes and Incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70.
  39. William R. Uttal (2001). The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. MIT Press.
  40.  19
    Philip Goff (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias: Durham: Acumen, 2011, Pp. 256,£ 17.99 (Paperback). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):1-3.
    (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 617-620. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.788529.
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  41.  15
    Joachim Keppler (2013). A New Perspective on the Functioning of the Brain and the Mechanisms Behind Conscious Processes. Frontiers in Psychology, Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 4 (Article 242):1-6.
    An essential prerequisite for the development of a theory of consciousness is the clarification of the fundamental mechanisms underlying conscious processes. In this article I present an approach that sheds new light on these mechanisms. This approach builds on stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a promising theoretical framework that provides a deeper understanding of quantum systems and reveals the origin of quantum phenomena. I outline the most important concepts and findings of SED and interpret the neurophysiological body of evidence in the (...)
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  42. Jon Driver, Patrick Haggard & Tim Shallice (2008). Lntroduction: Mental Processes in the Human Brain. In Jon Driver, Patrick Haggard & Tim Shallice (eds.), Mental Processes in the Human Brain. OUP Oxford 1.
     
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  43.  7
    Jon Driver, Patrick Haggard & Tim Shallice (eds.) (2008). Mental Processes in the Human Brain. OUP Oxford.
    Mental Processes in the Human Brain provides an integrative overview of the rapid advances and future challenges in understanding the neurobiological basis of mental processes that are characteristically human. With chapters from leading figures in the brain sciences, it will be essential for all those in the cognitive and brain sciences.
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  44. Dimitris Platchias (2010). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain. Routledge.
    How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials become like the feeling of pain in one's experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain. However, although we know that experience arises from a physical basis, we don't have a good explanation of why and how it so arises. The problem of how physical (...) give rise to experience is called the 'hard problem' of consciousness and it is the contemporary manifestation of the mind-body problem. This book explains the key concepts that surround the issue as well as the nature of the hard problem and the several approaches to it. It gives a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon incorporating its main metaphysical and epistemic aspects, as well as recent empirical findings, such as the phenomenon of blindsight, change blindness, visual-form agnosia and optic ataraxia, mirror recognition in other primates, split-brain cases and synaesthesia. (shrink)
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  45. Dimitris Platchias (2014). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain. Routledge.
    How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials become like the feeling of pain in one's experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain. However, although we know that experience arises from a physical basis, we don't have a good explanation of why and how it so arises. The problem of how physical (...) give rise to experience is called the 'hard problem' of consciousness and it is the contemporary manifestation of the mind-body problem. This book explains the key concepts that surround the issue as well as the nature of the hard problem and the several approaches to it. It gives a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon incorporating its main metaphysical and epistemic aspects, as well as recent empirical findings, such as the phenomenon of blindsight, change blindness, visual-form agnosia and optic ataraxia, mirror recognition in other primates, split-brain cases and synaesthesia. (shrink)
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  46.  14
    M. H. Johnson & Y. Munakata (2005). Processes of Change in Brain and Cognitive Development. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):152-158.
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  47.  28
    Friedrich Beck & John C. Eccles (2003). Quantum Processes in the Brain: A Scientific Basis of Consciousness. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins 49--141.
  48. Jan Fawcett (2007). Psychodynamics, Brain Function, Unconscious Processes, and Appreciation. Psychiatric Annals 37 (4):221.
     
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  49.  11
    Tobias Brosch & David Sander (2013). Comment: The Appraising Brain: Towards a Neuro-Cognitive Model of Appraisal Processes in Emotion. Emotion Review 5 (2):163-168.
    Appraisal theories have described elaborate mechanisms underlying the elicitation of emotion at the psychological-cognitive level, but typically do not integrate neuroscientific concepts and findings. At the same time, theoretical developments in appraisal theory have been pretty much ignored by researchers studying the neuroscience of emotion. We feel that a stronger integration of these two literatures would be highly profitable for both sides. Here we outline a blueprint of the “appraising brain.” To this end, we review neuroimaging research investigating the (...)
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  50. William R. Uttal (2002). Précis of the New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 3 (2):221-228.
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