Search results for 'Brain State' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  28
    Birgitta Dresp & Jean Durup (2009). A Plastic Temporal Brain Code for Conscious State Generation. Neural Plasticity 2009:1-15.
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin (...)
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  2. Richard Brown (2006). What is a Brain State? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.
    Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other (...)
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  3.  2
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2016). The Chief Role of Frontal Operational Module of the Brain Default Mode Network in the Potential Recovery of Consciousness From the Vegetative State: A Preliminary Comparison of Three Case Reports. The Open Neuroimaging Journal 10:41-51.
    It has been argued that complex subjective sense of self is linked to the brain default-mode network (DMN). Recent discovery of heterogeneity between distinct subnets (or operational modules - OMs) of the DMN leads to a reconceptualization of its role for the experiential sense of self. Considering the recent proposition that the frontal DMN OM is responsible for the first-person perspective and the sense of agency, while the posterior DMN OMs are linked to the continuity of ‘I’ experience (including (...)
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  4.  39
    Michael N. Marsh (2010). Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences: Brain-State Phenomena or Glimpses of Immortality? OUP Oxford.
    Discrediting 'mystical' or 'psychical' interpretations of out-of-body and near-death experiences, Michael Marsh demonstrates how these phenomena are explicable in terms of brain neurophysiology and its neuropathological disturbances, and discusses the theological and philosophical implications of his hypotheses.
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  5.  1
    J. S. Price (1985). Depression: From Psychology to Brain State. By Paul Gilbert. (Lawrence Erlbaum, London, 1984.) $19.95. [REVIEW] Journal of Biosocial Science 17 (4):506-507.
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  6.  30
    Jaak Panksepp, Thomas Fuchs, Victor Garcia & Adam Lesiak (2007). Does Any Aspect of Mind Survive Brain Damage That Typically Leads to a Persistent Vegetative State? Ethical Considerations. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2 (1):32-.
    Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive (...)
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  7.  67
    Fabien Perrin, Caroline Schnakers, Manuel Schabus, Christian Degueldre, Serge Goldman, Serge Brédart, Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville, Maurice Lamy, Gustave Moonen, André Luxen, Pierre Maquet & Steven Laureys (2006). Brain Response to One's Own Name in Vegetative State, Minimally Conscious State, and Locked-in Syndrome. Archives of Neurology 63 (4):562-569.
  8. Melanie Boly, Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville & Philippe Peigneux (2004). Auditory Processing in Severely Brain Injured Patients: Differences Between the Minimally Conscious State and the Persistent Vegetative State. Archives of Neurology 61 (2):233-238.
  9.  6
    Dietrich Lehmann & Martha Koukkou (2000). All Brain Work – Including Recall – is State-Dependent. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):964-965.
    The continuous ongoing mentation is experienced as dreams in some functional states. Mentation occurs with high speed, is driven by individual memory, and uses state-dependent processing strategies, context material, storage options, and retrieval access. Retrieval deserves more attention. Multiple state-shifts owing to individual meaning as extracted also during sleep concatenate dream narratives and define access to segments for awake recall. [Hobson et al.; Nielson; Solms].
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  10.  6
    Scott Vrecko (2010). Birth of a Brain Disease: Science, the State and Addiction Neuropolitics. History of the Human Sciences 23 (4):52-67.
    This article critically interrogates contemporary forms of addiction medicine that are portrayed by policy-makers as providing a ‘rational’ or politically neutral approach to dealing with drug use and related social problems. In particular, it examines the historical origins of the biological facts that are today understood to provide a foundation for contemporary understandings of addiction as a ‘disease of the brain’. Drawing upon classic and contemporary work on ‘styles of thought’, it documents how, in the period between the mid-1960s (...)
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  11.  5
    C. I. J. M. Stuart, Y. Takahashi & H. Umezawa (1979). Mixed-System Brain Dynamics: Neural Memory as a Macroscopic Ordered State. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 9 (3-4):301-327.
    The paper reviews the current situation regarding a new theory of brain dynamics put forward by the authors in an earlier publication. Motivation for the theory is discussed in terms of two issues: the long-standing problem of accounting for the stability and nonlocal properties of memory, and the experimental and theoretical evidence against the classical theory of brain action. It is shown that the new theory provides an explanation and a conceptually unifying framework for phenomena of brain (...)
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  12.  12
    L. R. Talbot & H. A. Whitaker (1994). Brain-Injured Persons in an Altered State of Consciousness: Measures and Intervention Strategies. Brain Injury 8:689-99.
  13.  5
    Claude Gottesmann (2000). Each Distinct Type of Mental State is Supported by Specific Brain Functions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):941-943.
    Reflective waking mentation is supported by cortical activating and inhibitory processes. The thought-like mental content of slow wave sleep appears with lower levels of both kinds of influence. During REM sleep, the equation: activation + disinhibition + dopamine may explain the often psychotic-like mode of psychological functioning. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman].
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  14.  57
    Steven Laureys, Adrian M. Owen & Nicholas D. Schiff (2004). Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, and Related Disorders. Lancet Neurology 3:537-546.
  15.  13
    Juha Silvanto, Neil Muggleton & Vincent Walsh (2008). State-Dependency in Brain Stimulation Studies of Perception and Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (12):447-454.
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  16.  27
    Georg Northoff (2012). Immanuel Kant's Mind and the Brain's Resting State. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (7):356-359.
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  17.  27
    Randal A. Koene (2012). Fundamentals of Whole Brain Emulation: State, Transition and Update Representations. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):5-21.
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  18.  4
    Tony Writings (1990). Could I Conceive Being a Brain in a Vat? JOHN D. COLLIER This Article Accepts the Premises of Putnam's Notorious Argument That We Could Not Be a Brain in a Vat, and Argues That Even This Allows a Robust (Although Relativistic) Form of Realism. The Strategy is to Distin-Guish Between Our Ability to State a Theory and Our Ability to Conceive The. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2).
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  19.  12
    Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Modeling the Minimally Conscious State: Measurements of Brain Function and Therapeutic Possibilities. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier
  20.  1
    Herbert G. Grubel (1976). Reflections on the Present State of the Brain Drain and a Suggested Remedy. Minerva 14 (2):209-224.
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  21. Steven Laureys, Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville & M. Ferring (2003). Differences in Brain Metabolism Between Patients in Coma, Vegetative State, Minimally Conscious State and Locked-in Syndrome. European Journal of Neurology 10.
  22.  65
    Martha J. Farah (2008). Neuroethics and the Problem of Other Minds: Implications of Neuroscience for the Moral Status of Brain-Damaged Patients and Nonhuman Animals. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 1 (1):9-18.
    Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being’s capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior (...)
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  23.  24
    Jon B. Eisenberg (2008). Schiavo on the Cutting Edge: Functional Brain Imaging and its Impact on Surrogate End-of-Life Decision-Making. Neuroethics 1 (2):75-83.
    The article addresses the potential impact of functional brain imaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron-emission tomography) on surrogate end-of-life decision-making in light of varying state-law definitions of consciousness, some of which define awareness behaviorally and others functionally. The article concludes that, in light of admonitions by neuroscientists that functional brain imaging cannot yet replace behavioral evaluation to determine the existence of consciousness, state legislatures, courts and drafters of written advance healthcare directives should consider treating behavior, (...)
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  24.  14
    Joseph L. Verheijde, Mohamed Y. Rady & Joan L. McGregor (2009). Brain Death, States of Impaired Consciousness, and Physician-Assisted Death for End-of-Life Organ Donation and Transplantation. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):409-421.
    In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism, minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. Brain (...)
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  25.  39
    Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni, Antonino Sant'Angelo, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). Emerging From an Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: Brain Plasticity has to Cross a Threshold Level. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 37 (10):2721-2736.
    Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS, previously known as vegetative state) occurs after patients survive a severe brain injury. Patients suffering from UWS have lost awareness of themselves and of the external environment and do not retain any trace of their subjective experience. Current data demonstrate that neuronal functions subtending consciousness are not completely reset in UWS; however, they are reduced below the threshold required to experience consciousness. The critical factor that determines whether patients will recover consciousness is the distance (...)
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  26.  81
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). Prognostic Value of Resting-State EEG Structure in Disentangling Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A Preliminary Study. Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair 27 (4):345-354.
    Background: Patients in a vegetative state pose problems in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. Currently, no prognostic markers predict the chance of recovery, which has serious consequences, especially in end-of-life decision-making. -/- Objective: We aimed to assess an objective measurement of prognosis using advanced electroencephalography (EEG). -/- Methods: EEG data (19 channels) were collected in 14 patients who were diagnosed to be persistently vegetative based on repeated clinical evaluations at 3 months following brain damage. EEG structure parameters (amplitude, duration (...)
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  27.  45
    Walter Glannon (2008). Neurostimulation and the Minimally Conscious State. Bioethics 22 (6):337–345.
    Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical functions is an innovative and promising technique for treating patients with severe brain injury that has resulted in a minimally conscious state (MCS). The technique may involve electrical stimulation of the central thalamus, which has extensive projections to the cerebral cortex. Yet it is unclear whether an improvement in neurological functions would result in a net benefit for these patients. Quality-of-life measurements would be necessary to determine whether any benefit of neurostimulation outweighed (...)
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  28.  1
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2016). Long-Term (Six Years) Clinical Outcome Discrimination of Patients in the Vegetative State Could Be Achieved Based on the Operational Architectonics EEG Analysis: A Pilot Feasibility Study. The Open Neuroimaging Journal 10:69-79.
    Electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings are increasingly used to evaluate patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) or assess their prognosis outcome in the short-term perspective. However, there is a lack of information concerning the effectiveness of EEG in classifying long-term (many years) outcome in chronic DOC patients. Here we tested whether EEG operational architectonics parameters (geared towards consciousness phenomenon detection rather than neurophysiological processes) could be useful for distinguishing a very long-term (6 years) clinical outcome of DOC patients whose EEGs were registered (...)
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  29.  6
    Charles Weijer, Andrew Peterson, Fiona Webster, Mackenzie Graham, Damian Cruse, Davinia Fernández-Espejo, Teneille Gofton, Laura E. Gonzalez-Lara, Andrea Lazosky, Lorina Naci, Loretta Norton, Kathy Speechley, Bryan Young & Adrian M. Owen (2014). Ethics of Neuroimaging After Serious Brain Injury. BMC Medical Ethics 15 (1):41.
    Patient outcome after serious brain injury is highly variable. Following a period of coma, some patients recover while others progress into a vegetative state (unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) or minimally conscious state. In both cases, assessment is difficult and misdiagnosis may be as high as 43%. Recent advances in neuroimaging suggest a solution. Both functional magnetic resonance imaging and electroencephalography have been used to detect residual cognitive function in vegetative and minimally conscious patients. Neuroimaging may improve diagnosis and (...)
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  30.  91
    Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Are Beliefs Brain States? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. CSLI Publications (Stanford)
    During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that beliefs, if there are any, (...)
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  31.  5
    Grant R. Gillett (1988). Consciousness and Brain Function. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):325-39.
    Abstract The language of consciousness and that of brain function seem vastly different and incommensurable ways of approaching human mental life. If we look at what we mean by consciousness we find that it has a great deal to do with the sensitivity and responsiveness shown by a subject toward things that happen. Philosophically, we can understnd ascriptions of consciousness best by looking at the conditions which make it true for thinkers who share the concept to say that one (...)
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  32. Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
  33. Natika Newton (1986). Churchland on Direct Introspection of Brain States. Analysis 46 (March):97-102.
  34.  67
    Robert van Gulick (1994). Are Beliefs Brain States? And If They Are What Might That Explain? Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):205-15.
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  35.  23
    Stephen Williams (1978). Pains, Brain States and Scientific Identities. Mind 87 (January):77-92.
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  36. Louise M. Antony (2001). Brain States with Attitude. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli
     
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  37. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Brain States, Causal Explanation, and the Attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications
  38.  5
    Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Neuroscience and Whitehead I: Neuro-Ecological Model of Brain. Axiomathes:1-34.
    Neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain and its various neuro-sensory and neuro-cognitive functions. However, despite all progress, the model of the brain as well as its ontological characterization remain unclear. The aim in this first paper is the discussion of an empirically plausible model of the brain with the subsequent claim of a neuro-ecological model. Whitehead claimed that he inversed or reversed the Kantian notion of the subject by putting it back into the ecological (...)
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  39.  37
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2011). Persistent Operational Synchrony Within Brain Default-Mode Network and Self-Processing Operations in Healthy Subjects. Brain and Cognition 75 (2):79-90.
    Based on the theoretical analysis of self-consciousness concepts, we hypothesized that the spatio-temporal pattern of functional connectivity within the default-mode network (DMN) should persist unchanged across a variety of different cognitive tasks or acts, thus being task-unrelated. This supposition is in contrast with current understanding that DMN activated when the subjects are resting and deactivated during any attention-demanding cognitive tasks. To test our proposal, we used, in retrospect, the results from our two early studies ([Fingelkurts, 1998] and [Fingelkurts et al., (...)
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  40.  73
    Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.
    Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in (...)
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  41. Paul M. Churchland (1984). Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press.
    The Mind-Body Problem Questions: What is the mind? What is its connection to the body? Most basic division of answers: Dualist and Materialist (or Physicalist) responses.
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  42. John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle 's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though (...)
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  43.  73
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2001). Operational Architectonics of the Human Brain Biopotential Field: Toward Solving the Mind-Brain Problem. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.
    The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological (...)
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  44.  60
    David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
  45. Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Is Depressive Rumination Rational? In T. W. Hung & T. J. Lane (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Elsevier
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  46.  64
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, (...)
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  47.  52
    Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting (...)
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  48.  72
    Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational (...)
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  49.  24
    Ullin T. Place (1989). Thirty Five Years On--Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process? In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi 19-31.
    The writer's 1956 contention that "the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is ... a reasonable scientific hypothesis" is contrasted with Davidson's a priori argument in 'Mental events' for the identity of propositional attitude tokens with some unspecified and imspecifiable brain state tokens. Davidson's argument is rejected primarily on the grounds that he has failed to establish his claim that there are and can be no psycho-physical bridge laws. The case forthe empirical nature of (...)
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  50.  23
    Herbert G. Bohnert (1974). The Logico-Linguistic Mind-Brain Problem and a Proposed Step Towards its Solution. Philosophy of Science 41 (March):1-14.
    This paper argues that if a person's beliefs are idealized as a set of sentences then the device of Ramsey sentences provides a treatment, of the mind-brain problem, that has at least four noteworthy characteristics. First, sentences asserting correlations between one's own brain state and one's own "private" experiences are, on such treatment, reconstrued as neither causal, coreferential, nor as meaning postulates, but as clauses in an overall hypothesis whose only nonlogical constants have "private" meanings. Second, sentences (...)
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