This article discusses the distinction between Figure and Form that Deleuze introduces in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. He uses the distinction to articulate the difference between two trajectories in modernist painting: the first focusing on sensation, the second on cerebral abstraction. I argue that the distinction between Form and Figure –– and the disjunction of two types of modernist painting initiated by this distinction –– is not as easy to maintain as might appear at first sight. Mapping the (...) lineages of modernist painting from Paul Céézanne to Georges Braque and Theo van Doesburg, the essay argues that the sensuous forces operative in a painting of the Figure are equally at play in the painting of the Form. Modernist painting might therefore be understood as the continuous collapse between Figure and Form, rather than as their strict separation. (shrink)
This article is a short reaction to the comments of Vergragt (Found Sci, 2012) and Bos (Found Sci, 2012) on my article “Sustainability transition and the nature of technology” (Paredis in Found Sci 16(2–3):195–225, Paredis 2011). I start by situating current transition research in the sustainability debate. The relation between the two is simultaneously specific and vague: specific about processes at work during transitions, vague about the content and direction of the change. I then move on to a discussion of (...) how a better conceptualisation of technology could strengthen the transition framework. I want to thank the two reviewers for their critical remarks, that stimulated me to better explain my position. (shrink)
Applying ideas drawn from contemporary critical theory, this book historicizes psychoanalysis through a new and significant theorization of the Gothic. The central premise is that the nineteenth-century Gothic produced a radical critique of accounts of sublimity and Freudian psychoanalysis. This book makes a major contribution to an understanding of both the nineteenth century and the Gothic discourse which challenged the dominant ideas of that period. Writers explored include Mary Shelley, Edgar Allan Poe, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Bram Stoker.
“Fair and equitable benefit-sharing” is one of the objectives of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In essence, benefit-sharing holds that countries, farmers, and indigenous communities that grant access to their plant genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge should share in the benefits that users derive from these resources. But what exactly is understood by “fair” and “equitable” in this context? Neither term is defined in the international treaties. (...) A complicating factor, furthermore, is that different motivations and perspectives exist with respect to the notion of benefit-sharing itself. This paper looks at six different approaches to benefit-sharing that can be extracted from the current debates on “Access and Benefit-Sharing.” These approaches form the basis of a philosophical reflection in which the different connotations of “fair and equitable” are considered, by analyzing the main principles of justice involved. Finally, the various principles are brought together in order to draw some conclusions as to how a fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism might best be realized. This results in several recommendations for policymakers. (shrink)
This commentary argues that one specific but central concept in Lewis's theory, circular causality, is fundamentally flawed and should be discarded – first, because it does not make theoretical sense, and, second, because it leads to problems in practice, such as confounding the interaction between different systems with the relationship between different levels of analysis of a single system.
O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.
In 1883 Friedrich Nietzsche published parts I and II of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The Prologue contains the famous—or infamous—assertion that “when Zarathustra was alone, he spoke thus to his heart: ‘Could it be possible! This old saint has not yet heard in his forest that God is dead!’”1 Fourteen years later, Bram Stoker, in Dracula, has the mate of the cargo ship, Demeter, write in its log: “we are now off in the North Sea, and only God can guide (...) us in the fog, which seems to move with us; and God seems to have deserted us.”2 Much later in the novel, Jonathan Harker expresses his anxiety over his wife, Mina, in terms of faith but also of drift: “Surely God will not permit the world to be the poorer by the loss of .. (shrink)
Human behavioral ecology (HBE) began as an attempt to explain human economic, reproductive, and social behavior using neodarwinian theory in concert with theory from ecology and economics, and ethnographic methods. HBE has addressed subsistence decision-making, cooperation, life history trade-offs, parental investment, mate choice, and marriage strategies among hunter-gatherers, herders, peasants, and wage earners in rural and urban settings throughout the world. Despite our rich insights into human behavior, HBE has very rarely been used as a tool to help the people (...) with whom we work. This article introduces a special issue of Human Nature which explores the application of HBE to significant world issues through the design and critique of public policy and international development projects. The articles by Tucker, Shenk, Leonetti et al., and Neil were presented at the 104th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in Washington, D.C., in December 2005, in the first organized session of the nascent Evolutionary Anthropology Section (EAS). We conclude this introduction by summarizing some theoretical challenges to applying HBE, and ways in which evolutionary anthropologists can contribute to solving tough world issues. (shrink)
This paper aims to study the role of the social robot Probo in providing assistance to a therapist for robot assisted therapy (RAT) with autistic children. Children with autism have difficulties with social interaction and several studies indicate that they show preference toward interaction with objects, such as computers and robots, rather than with humans. In 1991, Carol Gray developed Social Stories, an intervention tool aimed to increase children's social skills. Social stories are short scenarios written or tailored for autistic (...) individuals to help them understand and behave appropriately in social situations. This study shows that, in specific situations, the social performance of autistic children improves when using the robot Probo, as a medium for social story telling, than when a human reader tells the stories. The robot tells Social Stories to teach ASD children how to react in situations like saying “hello“, saying “thank you“ and “sharing toys“. The robot has the capability of expressing emotions and attention via its facial expressions and its gaze. The paper discusses the use of Probo as an added-value therapeutic tool for social story telling and presents the first experimental results. Keywords: social robot; ASD children; social story; robot assisted therapy. (shrink)
On the 50th anniversary of the Willowbrook experiment's inception, in which Dr. Saul Krugman intentionally infected cognitively disabled children with hepatitis, it is worth reflecting on how our attitude toward research ethics of the past informs our current practices. In examining ethical violations in postwar medicine, we frequently turn to examples that shock and appall, thereby offering concomitant comfort as we measure their safe distance from our own medical context. And yet, which modern medical student has not heard a variation (...) of the phrase "This study would never have passed an ethics committee today" in reference to a classic experiment or a professor's very own work? Even with Nuremburg fresh in the .. (shrink)
In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under the name of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium.’ There, the players’ reference points depend on the (...) beliefs about their opponents’ strategies. The second type, the maximin loss aversion equilibrium, differs from the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in that the reference points are only based on the carriers of the strategies, not on the exact probabilities. In the third type, the safety level loss aversion equilibrium, the reference points depend on the values of the own payoff matrices. Finally, a comparative statics analysis is carried out of all three equilibrium concepts in 2 × 2 bimatrix games. It is established when a player benefits from his opponent falsely believing that he is loss averse. (shrink)
This study explores how distributing the controls of a video game among multiple players affects the sociality and engagement experienced in game play. A video game was developed in which the distribution of game controls among the players could be varied, thereby affecting the abilities of the individual players to control the game. An experiment was set up in which eight groups of three players were asked to play the video game while the distribution of the game controls was increased (...) in three steps. After each playing session, the players’ experiences of sociality and engagement were assessed using questionnaires. The results showed that distributing game control among the players increased the level of experienced sociality and reduced the level of experienced control. The game in which the controls were partly distributed led to the highest levels of experienced engagement, because the game allowed social play while still giving the players a sense of autonomy. The implications for interaction design are discussed. (shrink)
Governments and non-govermental organizations (NGOs) that plan projects to conserve the environment and alleviate poverty often attempt to modify rural livelihoods by halting activities they judge to be destructive or inefficient and encouraging alternatives. Project planners typically do so without understanding how rural people themselves judge the value of their activities. When the alternatives planners recommend do not replace the value of banned activities, alternatives are unlikely to be adopted, and local people will refuse to participate. Human behavioral ecology and (...) behavioral economics may provide useful tools for generating and evaluating hypotheses for how people value economic activities in their portfolios and potential alternatives. This is demonstrated with a case example from southwestern Madagascar, where plans to create a Mikea Forest National Park began with the elimination of slash-and-burn maize agriculture and the encouragement to plant labor-intensive manioc instead. Future park plans could restrict access to wild tuber patches, hunting small game, and fishing. The value of these activities is considered using observational data informed by optimal foraging theory, and experimental data describing people’s time preference and covariation perception. Analyses suggest that manioc is not a suitable replacement for maize for many Mikea because the two crops differ in terms of labor requirements, delay-to-reward, and covariation with rainfall. Park planners should promote wild tuber foraging and stewardship of tuber patches and the anthropogenic landscapes in which they are found. To conserve small game, planners must provide alternative sources of protein and cash. Little effort should be spent protecting lemurs, as they are rarely eaten and never sold. (shrink)
This paper begins with the hypothesis that Mikea, participants in a mixed foraging–fishing–farming–herding economy of southwestern Madagascar, may attempt to reduce interannual variance in food supply caused by unpredictable rainfall by following a simple rule-of-thumb: Practice an even mix of activities that covary positively with rainfall and activities that covary negatively with rainfall. Results from a historical matrix participatory exercise confirm that Mikea perceive that foraging and farming outcomes covary positively or negatively with rainfall. This paper further considers whether Mikea (...) learn about covariation through personal observation and memory recall (individual learning) or through socially transmitted ethnotheory (social learning). Dual inheritance theory models by Boyd and Richerson (1988) predict that individual learning is more effective in spatially and temporally variable environments such as the Mikea Forest. In contrast, the psychological literature suggests that individuals judge covariation poorly when memory of past events is required, unless they share a socially learned theory that a covariation should exist (Nisbett and Ross 1980). Results suggest that Mikea rely heavily on shared ethnotheory when judging covariation, but individuals continually strive to improve their judgment through individual observation. (shrink)
A number of modern logic books give a misrepresentation of Mill's Methods as originally conceived by Mill. In this paper, I point out what I believe is a better presentation of Mill's Methods. This treatment is not only historically more accurate, but it also represents a better conceptual introduction to Mill's Methods in general.
Abstract In an engaging and ingenious paper, Irvine (1993) purports to show how the resolution of Braess? paradox can be applied to Newcomb's problem. To accomplish this end, Irvine forges three links. First, he couples Braess? paradox to the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox. Second, he couples the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox to the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Third, in accord with received literature, he couples the PD to Newcomb's problem itself. Claiming that the linked models are ?structurally identical?, he argues that Braess solves (...) Newcomb's problem. This paper shows that Irvine's linkage depends on structural similarities?rather than identities?between and among the models. The elucidation of functional disanalogies illuminates structural dissimilarities which sever that linkage. I claim that the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox cloaks a fine structure that decouples it from both Braess? paradox and the PD (Marinoff, 1996a). I further assert that the putative reduction of the PD to a Newcomb problem (e.g. Brams, 1975; Lewis, 1979) is seriously flawed. It follows that Braess? paradox does not solve Newcomb's problem via the foregoing and herein sundered chain. I conclude by substantiating a stronger claim, namely that Braess'paradox cannot solve Newcomb's problem at all. (shrink)
The Belief Game is a two-person, nonzero-sum game in which both players can do well [e.g., at (3, 4)] or badly [e.g., at (1,1)] simultaneously. The problem that occurs in the play of this game is that its rational outcome of (2, 3) is not only unappealing to both players, especially God, but also, paradoxically, there is an outcome, (3, 4), preferred by both players that is unattainable. Moreover, because God has a dominant strategy, His omniscience does not remedy the (...) situation, though - less plausibly - if man possessed this quality, and God were aware of it, (3, 4) would be attainable.How reasonable is it to use the device of a simple game to argue that nonrevelation by God, and nonbelief by man, are rational strategies? Like any model of a complex reality, the Belief Game abstracts a great deal from the problem that confronts the thoughtful agnostic asking the most profound of existential questions. Yet, to the degree that belief in God is seen as a personal question, conceptualized in terms of a possible relationship one might have with one's Creator, it seems appropriate to try to model this relationship as a game. The most difficult question to answer, I suppose, is, if God exists, what are His preferences in such a game?I have argued that He would first like to be believed, but at the same time not reveal Himself. These goals, in my opinion, are consistent with the role He assumes in many biblical stories, although this is not to say that the Bible offers the final word on philosophical and theological matters in the modern world. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a logical place from which to start, and the clues it offers on God's preferences seem not contradicted by contemporary events.Of course, the Belief Game supposes that God not only has preferences but makes choices as well. To many people today - myself included - these choices are not apparent. But if He does make them, and in particular chooses not to reveal Himself, I think the Belief Game helps us to understand why nonrevelation is rational. Furthermore, it gives us insight into why, given this choice by God, our own reasons for believing in Him - in a game-theoretic context - may be rendered tenuous. (shrink)
Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate (...) — and carry out this threat in the second stage — if its opponent chose noncooperation in the first stage.Conditions for the existence of different pure-strategy Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are found, and these results are extended to situations in which the players can select mixed strategies (i.e., make probabilistic threats or choices). Although the Conflict Game sheds light on the rational foundations underlying arms races, nuclear deterrence, and other strategic situations, more detailed assumptions are required to tie this generic game to specific conflicts. (shrink)
The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 ? 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other player is forced (...) to stop. Omniscience and its awareness by an opponent may hurt both players, but this problem can always be rectified if the other player is omniscient. This pathology can also be rectified if at least one of the two players is omnipotent, which can override the effects of omniscience. In some games, one player's omnipotence ? versus the other's ? helps him, whereas in other games the outcome induced does not depend on which player is omnipotent. Deducing whether a player is superior (omniscient or omnipotent) from the nature of his game playing alone raises several problems, however, suggesting the difficulty of devising tests for detecting superior ability in games. (shrink)
A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint in (...) the latter case, an extension of the idea of backward induction is used to determine the possible outcomes. The parity problem highlights the lack of robustness of backward induction, but it poses no conflict between foundational principles. On the other hand, two conflicting views of the future underlie the uncertainty problem, depending on whether the number of rounds is bounded (the players invariably shoot from the start) or unbounded (they may all cooperate and never shoot, despite the fact that the truel will end with certainty and therefore be effectively bounded). Some real-life examples, in which destructive behavior sometimes occurred and sometimes did not, are used to illustrate these differences, and some ethical implications of the analysis are discussed. (shrink)
An analysis of several different indices of voting power reveals that the voting power of a member of a weighted voting body may increase, rather than decrease, when new members are added to the original body. Real instances of this phenomenon, called the paradox of new members, are shown to have occurred when new states were added to the U.S. Electoral College and new countries to the European Community Council of Ministers. Conditions for the existence of the paradox, and probabilities (...) of its occurrence in small and moderate-size voting bodies, are given. Efficient algorithms for the calculation of the voting power indices, based on generating functions, are also outlined. (shrink)
In the last few decades game theory has emerged as a powerful tool for examining a broad range of philosophical issues. It is unsurprising, then, that game theory has been taken up as a tool to examine issues in the philosophy of religion. Economist Steven Brams (1982), (1983) and (2007), for example, has given a game theoretic analysis of belief in God, his main argument first published in this journal and then again in both editions of his book, Superior Beings. (...) I have two main aims in this paper, one specific and one general. My specific aim is to show that Brams’ application of game theory to examine belief in God is, in particular, deeply flawed in two respects. My general aim is to show that any game-theoretic model in which a human being and God are players can only succeed at the cost of abandoning the assumption that God is omnibenevolent. (shrink)
This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better (...) outcome for himself by misrepresenting his preference, while his partner can, this player will find that possessing a monopoly of information will not give him any special advantage. In fact, this analysis demonstrates that he may have incentives to share his information selectively with one or another of his opponents should he alone possess complete information at the outset. (shrink)
Divide the Dollar (DD) is a game in which two players independently bid up to 100 cents for a dollar. Each player receives his or her bid if the sum of the bids does not exceed a dollar; otherwise they receive nothing. This game has multiple Nash equilibria, including the egalitarian division of (50, 50), but this division is not compelling except for its symmetry and presumed fairness.This division is easy to induce, however, by punishing — more severely than does (...) DD — deviations from it, but these solutions are not ‘reasonable’. By altering the rules of DD, however, one can induce an egalitarian division (by successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies), but no reasonable payoff scheme produces this division with egalitarian bids of 50.Three alternatives to DD are analyzed. DD1, which rewards lowest bidders first, shows how an egalitarian outcome can be induced with equal but nonegalitarian bids. DD2, which adds a second stage that provides the players with new information yet restricts their choices at the same time, is used to introduce ‘dominance inducibility’. DD3 combines the features of DD1 and DD2, is reasonable (like DD1), makes calculations transparent (like DD2), and induces egalitarian bids as well as the egalitarian outcome. The possible application of the different procedures to a real-world allocation problem (setting of salaries by a team), in which there may be entitlements, is described. (shrink)
This paper analyzes criteria of fair division of a set of indivisible items among people whose revealed preferences are limited to rankings of the items and for whom no side payments are allowed. The criteria include refinements of Pareto optimality and envy-freeness as well as dominance-freeness, evenness of shares, and two criteria based on equally-spaced surrogate utilities, referred to as maxsum and equimax. Maxsum maximizes a measure of aggregate utility or welfare, whereas equimax lexicographically maximizes persons' utilities from smallest to (...) largest. The paper analyzes conflicts among the criteria along with possibilities and pitfalls of achieving fair division in a variety of circumstances. (shrink)
In this paper I present a philosophically-inspired approach to the field of human resource management (HRM). Such an approach demands a certain kind of reader and a certain kind of HR professional: readers and professionals who are less occupied with the application and implementation of new HR technologies and more with the complex impact of HRM technologies and practices on individuality and sociality. I argue that concepts, technologies and practices of HRM are in practice elements in an immanent philosophy, which (...) reproduces and transforms how individuals and organisations can come into being. Two seemingly contradictory, simultaneous tendencies are discussed. First, the practices and technologies of HRM can and have been seen as disciplining, conservative forces, creating egoistic individuals with little or no interest in sharing a common responsibility towards the organisation. Second, a new kind of sociality arises from the openings that practices and technologies are creating, as the social does not so much disappear as take on new forms. I will discuss these different kinds of beings through a case example involving a group performance appraisal system in a major financial institution. I conclude by reflecting on the matter-of-fact spirit in which HR technologies and practices are implemented and the vast power which the ‘Resource Management’ exercises in creating the ‘Human’. (shrink)
Staying power is the ability of a player to hold off choosing a strategy in a two-person game until the other player has selected his, after which the players are assumed to be able to move and countermove sequentially to ensure their best possible outcomes before the process cycles back to the initial outcome and then repeats itself (‘rational termination’). These rules of sequential play induce a determinate, Paretosuperior outcome in all two-person, finite, sequential games in which the preferences of (...) the players are strict.In 57 of the 78 distinct 2 × 2 ordinal games (73 percent), it makes no difference who the (second-moving) player with staying power is, but in the other 21 games the outcome is power-dependent. In all but one of these games, staying power benefits the player who possesses it.If no player has staying power, the outcomes that result from sequential play and rational termination are called terminal; they coincide with staying power outcomes if they are Pareto-superior. Normative implications of the analysis for rationally justifying cooperation in such games as Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, and implementing Pareto-superior outcomes generally, are also discussed. (shrink)
In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak Separability. (...) In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule. (shrink)
The paradox of new members occurs when the addition of one or more new members to a weighted voting body increases, rather than decreases, the voting power of some of the old members. Extending the computational work of Brams and Affuso (1976), the mean size of the paradox and the relative frequency of its occurrence are presented for small and moderate-size weighted voting bodies. Computational results are presented and conclusions are drawn for the two power indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf, (...) three different decision rules, and voting bodies with or without dictator. Although the paradox cannot be dismissed as either contrived or improbable, its mean size in moderatesize voting bodies is sufficiently small to question its practical significance. (shrink)