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  1.  54
    Brendan J. Lalor (1999). Intentionality and Qualia. Synthese 121 (3):249-290.
  2.  5
    Brendan J. Lalor (1997). The Classification of Peirce’s Interpretants. Semiotica 114 (1-2):31-40.
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  3.  10
    Brendan J. Lalor (1998). The Antilogistic Puzzle of Hume's Appendix to the Treatise. Philosophical Inquiry 20 (3-4):22-30.
  4.  14
    Brendan J. Lalor (1997). It is What You Think: Intentional Potency and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.
    In this paper I argue against the worried view that intentional properties might be epiphenomenal. In naturalizing intentionality we ought to reject both the idea that causal powers of intentional states must supervene on local microstructures, and the idea that local supervenience justifies worries about intentional epiphenomenality since our states could counterfactually lack their intentional properties and yet have the same effects. I contend that what's wrong with even the good guys (e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Allen) is that they implicitly (...)
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