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Profile: Brendan O'Sullivan (Stonehill College)
  1. Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer (2012). Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.
    It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect (i.e., the hurtfulness) of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With (...)
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  2. Brendan O'sullivan (2010). Taking Referentialism Seriously: A Response to the Modal Argument. Theoria 76 (1):54-67.
    I argue that an identity theorist can successfully resist a Kripkean modal argument by employing what I call a metaconceptual move. Furthermore, by showing how this move fails to apply straightforwardly to Chalmers' argument, I clarify the nature of the threat presented by Chalmers and how it differs from a Kripkean modal argument.
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  3. Brendan O'Sullivan & Peter Hanks (2008). Conceiving of Pain. Dialogue 47 (02):351-.
    ABSTRACT: In this article we aim to see how far one can get in defending the identity thesis without challenging the inference from conceivability to possibility. Our defence consists of a dilemma for the modal argument. Either "pain" is rigid or it is not. If it is not rigid, then a key premise of the modal argument can be rejected. If it is rigid, the most plausible semantic account treats "pain" as a natural-kind term that refers to its causaI or (...)
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  4. Brendan O'Sullivan (2006). The Euthyphro Argument (9d-11b). Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):657-675.
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