Affirming the consequent is a fallacious form of reasoning in formal logic that occurs when the minor premise of a propositional syllogism affirms the consequent of a conditional statement. A conditional statement is an “if‐then” sentence that expresses a link between the antecedent (the part after the “if”) and the consequent (the part after the “then”). A conditional statement does not assert either the antecedent or the consequent. It simply claims that if the antecedent is true, then the consequent is (...) also true. Although affirming the consequent is an invalid argument form and sometimes mistaken for, the valid argument form modus ponens. Modus ponens is a valid argument form in Western philosophy because the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion; however, affirming the consequent is an invalid argument form because the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Descartes' Cogito Augustine's “Si fallor, sum” Argument (If I Am Mistaken, I Exist).

Although philosophy courses are not known for hands-on learning activities in which students use, manipulate, or touch objects with their hands, there are simple hands-on activities that teachers can use to liven up their classrooms and foster active learning. In this paper I describe four activities I developed to attempt to improve student learning: GoldiLocke and the Three Buckets, The Argument From Disagreement Box, The Trolley Problem Reenactment, and The Lego Man of Theseus. I argue that such activities are effective (...) for two main reasons: they are fun; and they involve embodied learning. Finally, I offer some advice for developing hands-on learning activities for philosophy courses and share some of the ideas generated by session participants when I presented this material at the American Association of Philosophy Teachers Twentieth Biennial Workshop/Conference. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'denying the antecedent'. Like affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent is also a fallacious form of reasoning in formal logic. This time the problem occurs when the minor premise of a propositional syllogism denies the antecedent of a conditional statement. Denying the antecedent makes the mistake of assuming that if the antecedent is denied, then the consequent must also be denied. Like modus ponens, modus tollens is a valid (...) argument form because the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion; however, like affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent is an invalid argument form because the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. The invalidity of denying the antecedent is confirmed by a truth table presented in the chapter. (shrink)

In “Descartes’s Theodicy of Error,” Michael J. Latzer argues that the Fourth Meditation has “general significance for the project of theodicy” and offers “asolution to the problem of evil as complete, in its own succinct way, as Leibniz’s is on a grander scale.” I do not think that anyone has accurately understood the complex theodicy offered there, however. Commentators disagree about the argument(s) and have not carefully explained exactly what Descartes says that applies to the problem of evil. The purpose (...) of my paper is three-fold. I (1) explain the theodicy that Descartes offers to explain philosophical error in the Fourth Meditation; (2) argue that although we are justified in understanding this theodicy as concerning the problem of evil, the advice Descartes offers for avoiding philosophical error does not apply to avoiding sin (an example of evil); and (3) argue that the theodicy may actually be no theodicy at all. (shrink)

In “Descartes’s Theodicy of Error,” Michael J. Latzer argues that the Fourth Meditation has “general significance for the project of theodicy” and offers “asolution to the problem of evil as complete, in its own succinct way, as Leibniz’s is on a grander scale.” I do not think that anyone has accurately understood the complex theodicy offered there, however. Commentators disagree about the argument(s) and have not carefully explained exactly what Descartes says that applies to the problem of evil. The purpose (...) of my paper is three-fold. I (1) explain the theodicy that Descartes offers to explain philosophical error in the Fourth Meditation; (2) argue that although we are justified in understanding this theodicy as concerning the problem of evil, the advice Descartes offers for avoiding philosophical error does not apply to avoiding sin (an example of evil); and (3) argue that the theodicy may actually be no theodicy at all. (shrink)