The altruistic emotions of pity and compassion are discussed in the context of Aristotle's treatment of the former in the Rhetoric, and Nussbaum's reconstruction of that treatment in a recent account of the latter. Aristotle's account of pity does not represent it as a virtue, the context of the Rhetoric rather rendering his account one of a peculiarly self-centred emotion. Nussbaum's reconstruction builds on the cognitive ingredients of Aristotle's account, and attempts to place the emotion of compassion more squarely in (...) the moral sphere. It is argued that Nussbaum's reconstruction nevertheless falls short of capturing the altruism which is central to the virtue of compassion, and which therefore explains its role as a ‘basic social emotion’. (shrink)

As is the case with most pre‐modern philosophers of India, very little historical information is available about Bhartṛ‐hari. There are many interesting legends, some turned into extensive plays and poems, current about him. However, it is impossible to determine on their basis even whether there was only one philosopher called Bhartṛ‐hari. The appellation “philosopher” could unquestionably be applied to the author or authors of at least two Sanskrit works that are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛ‐hari.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;A form of metaphysical inquiry is in this thesis both illustrated in detail and defended against the charge of issuing in statements which lack cognitive content. 'Categorial description' concerns the fundamental features of our conceptual scheme: the categories described are those of substance, accident, cause, space and time. ;Following Aristotle's distinction between primary and secondary substances, these two notions are addressed as equivalent to those individual or particular things and their kinds. (...) A particular thing is characterised as not being capable of occuring in the predicate position in a proposition; and as having criteria or principles of individuation and reidentification. Accidents or properties can appear in the predicate position and do not have criteria of identity. ;Secondary substances, or natural kinds, being a species of property, also fail to have criteria for individuation and reidentification. It follows that the recently revived Aristotelian essentialism, as exhibited in particular in the work of Kripke, fails to correctly characterise the category of natural kinds: in that theory, natural kinds have essential properties which enable individuation and reidentification across possible worlds. ;Efficient causation is described, against the background of the Locke-Hume dispute, as involving the concept of necessary connection between cause and effect. Rejecting the theory of Harre and Madden on causal powers, an approach by Mackie is defended whereby this connection is a reflection of our counterfactual thinking. The possible worlds essentialist approach of Lewis to counterfactuals is rejected too, as inadequate. ;Space and time, spatial and temporal relations, and places and moments in time are approached in terms of the other categories of particular and property. The obscurity of fit between these categories is identified as responsible for many philosophical puzzles concerning space and time: for example, McTaggart's 'proof' of the unreality of time; and the recent debate on the possibility of multiple times and multiple spaces. ;In the final chapter, the logical commitments of categorial description concerning conceptual relativism and the nature of reality in itself are explored. It is argued that, since categories are in large part responsible for the kinds of acts there are, a description of our categories is a description of reality itself. Since our categories do not involve the machinery of possible worlds offered by contemporary essentialist theories, those theories fail to describe reality. (shrink)

The _Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy_ is a unique one-volume reference work which makes a broad range of richly varied philosophical, ethical and theological traditions accessible to a wide audience. The _Companion_ is divided into six sections covering the main traditions within Asian thought: Persian; Indian; Buddhist; Chinese; Japanese; and Islamic philosophy. Each section contains a collection of chapters which provide comprehensive coverage of the origins of the tradition, its approaches to, for example, logic and languages, and to questions of (...) morals and society. The chapters also contain useful histories of the lives of the key influential thinkers, as well as a thorough analysis of the current trends. (shrink)

The _Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy_ is a unique one-volume reference work which makes a broad range of richly varied philosophical, ethical and theological traditions accessible to a wide audience. The _Companion_ is divided into six sections covering the main traditions within Asian thought: Persian; Indian; Buddhist; Chinese; Japanese; and Islamic philosophy. Each section contains a collection of chapters which provide comprehensive coverage of the origins of the tradition, its approaches to, for example, logic and languages, and to questions of (...) morals and society. The chapters also contain useful histories of the lives of the key influential thinkers, as well as a thorough analysis of the current trends. (shrink)

Brian Carr; IX*—Knowledge and its Risks, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 115–128, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

Brian Carr; IX*—Knowledge and its Risks, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 115–128, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

This collection arises from the First Conference of the recently formed European Society for Asian Philosophy.

One of Śaṅkara's most fundamental claims is that nirguṇa brahman, 'unqualified reality', is the origin of the world of experience. A serious challenge is posed by the Sāṅkhyan philosophers in terms of a principle of material causation, that the properties manifested in the effect are inherited from the material cause. Since nirguṇa brahman and the experienced world are so different, the principle implies that the former cannot be the material cause of the latter. Versions of the principle in relation to (...) alternative kinds of candidates for the role of material cause are discussed, considering the particular cases which motivate both Śaṅkara's and the Sāṅkhyans' metaphysics alike. Śaṅkara seems forced to accept an implausible version of the principle by his own analysis of material causation. (shrink)