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  1. Brian Kierland, Grounding Past Truths: Overcoming the Challenge.
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  2. Brian Kierland & Philip Swenson (2013). Ability-Based Objections to No-Best-World Arguments. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):669-683.
    In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call (...)
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  3. Brian Kierland (2011). Necessity and Color Incompatibility. Disputatio 4 (31):235 - 237.
    A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility � e.g., �Nothing is both red and green all over� � are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.
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  4. Brian Kierland, Bradley Monton & Samuel Ruhmkorff (2008). Avoiding Certain Frustration, Reflection, and the Cable Guy Paradox. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):317 - 333.
    We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration (ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our general thesis is that principles (...)
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  5. Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2007). Presentism and the Objection From Being-Supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497.
    In this paper, we show that presentism?the view that the way things are is the way things presently are?is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different (...)
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  6. Justin D'Arms, Robert Francesscotti, I. Haji, Susan Hurley, Leonard Kahn, Brian Kierland, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, Douglas Portmore, Betsy Postow & Bernard Rollin (2006). Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics: August 2005–July 2006. Journal of Ethics 10:507.
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  7. Brian Kierland (2006). Cooperation, 'Ought Morally', and Principles of Moral Harmony. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):381 - 407.
    There is a theory that one ought morally to do the best one can, when ‘best’ is suitably interpreted. There are also some examples in which, although every agent involved does the best she can, the group composed of them does not. Some philosophers think that these examples show the theory to be wrong. In particular, they think that such examples motivate a view which incorporates a requirement of cooperativeness in a particular way, though they disagree as to the (...)
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  8. Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2006). How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (January):16-38.
    Physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument that, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott’s argument, but we defend the crucial insight: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration.
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  9. Bradley Monton & Brian Kierland (2006). How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):16 - 38.
    The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration.
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  10. Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
    One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss and self-locating beliefs (where a self-locating belief of a temporal part of (...)
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  11. Bradley Monton & Brian Kierland (2001). Supererogatory Superluminality. Synthese 127 (3):347 - 357.
    We argue that any superluminal theory Tis empirically equivalent to a non-superluminaltheory T , with thefollowing constraints onT : T preservesthe spacetime intervals between events as entailedby T, T is naturalistic (as longas T is), and all the events which have causesaccording to T also have causes according toT. Tim Maudlin (1996) definesstandard interpretations of quantum mechanicsas interpretations `according to which there wasa unique set of outcomes in Aspect's laboratory,which outcomes occurred at spacelike separation, andMaudlin claims that standard interpretations must (...)
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