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Brian Loar [39]Brian F. Loar [1]
  1.  6
    Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
    Is linguistic meaning to be accounted for independently of the states of mind of language users, or can it only be explained in terms of them? If the latter, what account of the mental states in question avoids circularity? In this book Brian Loar offers a subtle and comprehensive theory which both preserves the natural priority of the mind in explanations of meaning, and gives an independent characterisation of its features. It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often (...)
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  2.  28
    Brian Loar (1997). Phenomenal States (Second Version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, Eds). In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press
  3. Brian Loar (1990). Phenomenal States. Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
  4. Brian Loar (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press 229--258.
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  5.  97
    Brian Loar (1997). Phenomenal States II. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The MIT Press
  6. Brian Loar (1988). Social Content and Psychological Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press
     
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  7.  35
    Brian Loar (1999). Review: David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465 - 472.
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  8.  31
    Brian Loar (2004). Phenomenal States (Revised Version). In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. The MIT Press 219.
  9. Brian Loar (1976). The Semantics of Singular Terms. Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.
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  10. Brian Loar (2003). Qualia, Properties, Modality. Philosophical Issues 1 (1):113-29.
  11.  58
    Brian Loar (1987). Subjective Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.
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  12.  33
    Brian Loar (1999). David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465-472.
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  13. Brian Loar (2003). Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
  14. Brian Loar (1996). Comments on John Campbell, Molyneux's Question. Philosophical Issues 7:319-324.
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  15.  97
    Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
  16.  82
    Brian Loar (1995). Reference From the First Person Perspective. Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.
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  17.  38
    Brian Loar (1987). Names in Thought. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):169 - 185.
  18.  54
    Brian Loar (1972). Reference and Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62.
    Frege and quine notwithstanding, Some singular terms in belief contexts have normal reference but do not admit truth-Preserving substitution of co-Referential terms. The conditions of a sentence's being true of a sequence of referents may be partially determined by its singular terms; substitution may change those conditions, While preserving genuine reference. On one reading, 'n believes that f is g' is true iff n believes of the f that it is the f and is g.
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  19.  18
    Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual Role and Truth-Conditions: Comments on Harman's Paper: "Conceptual Role Semantics". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):272-283.
  20. Brian Loar (2007). 13 Thinking About Qualia. In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. 451.
     
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  21. Brian Loar (1980). Ramsey's Theory of Belief and Truth. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press 49--69.
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  22. Brian Loar (1991). Can We Explain Intentionality? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell
     
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  23.  39
    Brian Loar (1999). Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us? In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center 99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when they (...)
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  24.  46
    Brian Loar (1998). Is There a Good Epistemological Argument Against Concept-Externalism. Philosophical Issues 9:213-217.
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  25.  24
    Brian Loar (1980). Names and Descriptions: A Reply to Michael Devitt. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):85 - 89.
  26.  27
    Brian Loar (1999). Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when they (...)
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  27.  49
    Brian Loar (1993). Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties? Philosophical Issues 4:74-92.
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  28.  30
    Brian Loar (1994). Self-Interpretation and the Constitution of Reference. Philosophical Perspectives 8:51-74.
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  29.  35
    Brian Loar (1984). The Varities of Reference. Philosophical Books 25 (1):46-51.
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  30.  40
    Brian Loar (1982). Must Beliefs Be Sentences? Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643.
    Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the (...)
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  31.  5
    Brian Loar (1993). Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58.
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  32.  4
    Brian F. Loar (1980). Syntax, Functional Semantics, and Referential Semantics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):89.
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  33.  6
    Brian Loar (1982). Reply to Fodor and Harman. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:662 - 666.
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  34. Brian Loar (1992). Elimination Versus Nonreductive Physicalism. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press
     
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  35. Brian Loar (2006). Language, Thought, and Meaning. In Michael Devitt (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing
     
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  36. Brian Loar (1972). Sentence Meaning.
     
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  37. Brian Loar (1987). Truth Beyond All Verification. In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff 81--116.
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  38. Brian Loar (1988). Two Kinds of Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press 121--139.
     
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  39. Brian Loar (1999). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Philosophy Documentation Center.
     
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  40. Alf Ross & Brian Loar (1968). Directives and Norms [Manuscript by Brian Loar]. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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