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Brian MacPherson [11]Brian Paul MacPherson [1]
  1.  10
    Brian Macpherson (2016). Overcoming Instructor‐Originated Math Anxiety in Philosophy Students: A Consideration of Proven Techniques for Students Taking Formal Logic. Metaphilosophy 47 (1):122-146.
    Every university student has his or her nemesis. Biology and social science students anticipate with great apprehension their required statistics course, while many philosophy students live in fear of formal logic. Math anxiety is the common thread uniting all of them. This article argues that since formal logic is an algebra requiring similar kinds of symbol-manipulation skills needed to succeed in a basic mathematics course, then if logic students have math anxiety, this can impede their progress. Further, it argues that (...)
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  2.  7
    Brian MacPherson (1999). Three Misrepresentations of Logic. Informal Logic 19 (2).
    Three misrepresentations of informal and formal logic by two feminist writers are discussed. Andrea Nye's criticism that the semantics for formal logic abstracts from context is a misrepresentation of formal logic because Nye ignores the development of intensional logics. Second, Nye's criticism that informaIlogicians ignore the origins of arguments is a misrepresentation of fallacy theory. Prominent writers in the field specifiy numerous cases where the origins of an argument are relevant to its evaluation. Third, Valerie Plumwood's criticism that negation in (...)
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  3.  9
    Brian MacPherson (2000). Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:125-140.
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of being an (...)
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  4.  4
    Brian Macpherson (1992). Is It Possible That Belief Isn't Necessary? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1):12-28.
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