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Brian MacPherson [10]Brian Paul MacPherson [1]
  1. Brian MacPherson (2000). Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:125-140.
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of being an (...)
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  2. Brian MacPherson (1999). Three Misrepresentations of Logic. Informal Logic 19 (2).
    Three misrepresentations of informal and formal logic by two feminist writers are discussed. Andrea Nye's criticism that the semantics for formal logic abstracts from context is a misrepresentation of formal logic because Nye ignores the development of intensional logics. Second, Nye's criticism that informaIlogicians ignore the origins of arguments is a misrepresentation of fallacy theory. Prominent writers in the field specifiy numerous cases where the origins of an argument are relevant to its evaluation. Third, Valerie Plumwood's criticism that negation in (...)
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  3. Brian MacPherson (1997). A Challenge to the Kripke/Putnam Distinction Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity. Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):113--128.
    I argue that the account of the epistemic modalities developed by Kripke and Putnam is incomplete since it does not make use of the possible worlds machinery that is indispensable to their analysis of the metaphysical modalities. It would have been simpler and more elegant if they had used the concept of 'possible world' to explain both modalities. Instead, they provide an explication of the epistemic modalities in terms of the vague concepts of conceivability and revisability. I show that logical (...)
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  4. Brian Macpherson (1992). Is It Possible That Belief Isn't Necessary? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1):12-28.
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