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Brian P. Mclaughlin [86]Brian Paul Mclaughlin [1]
  1. Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. Mclaughlin (1999). There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
  2. Patricia S. Churchland, Terrence J. Sejnowksi & Brian P. McLaughlin (1996). The Computational Brain. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):137.
     
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  3. Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin (1990). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  4.  53
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1995). Varieties of Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press 16--59.
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  5. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization. Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
    Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including (...)
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  6. Brian P. McLaughlin (2001). In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Horgan and Tienson. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press
  7.  78
    Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2006). True Colours. Analysis 66 (292):335-340.
    (Tye 2006) presents us with the following scenario: John and Jane are both stan- dard human visual perceivers (according to the Ishihara test or the Farnsworth test, for example) viewing the same surface of Munsell chip 527 in standard conditions of visual observation. The surface of the chip looks “true blue” to John (i.e., it looks blue not tinged with any other colour to John), and blue tinged with green to Jane.1 Tye then in effect poses a multiple choice question.
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  8. Brian P. McLaughlin (2010). Consciousness, Type Physicalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.
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  9. Brian P. McLaughlin (1997). Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):209-30.
  10.  25
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.) (1988). Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
    00 Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as ...
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  11. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  12. Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 97-154.
     
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  13.  66
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
  14. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter
     
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  15.  62
    Vann McGee & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). The Lessons of the Many. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):129-151.
  16.  84
    Vann Mcgee & Brian P. Mclaughlin (2004). Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson. Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (1):123-136.
  17. Brian P. McLaughlin (1989). Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
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  18.  15
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 431--444.
  19. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2012). Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):206-214.
  20.  29
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Review of Sydney Shoemaker, Physical Realization. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
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  21. Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response to Block's Harder Problem. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.
    widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that we are phenomenally consciousness, and that there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated in nonphenomenal terms . 1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject.
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  22.  98
    Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). The Truth About 'the Truth About True Blue'. Analysis 67 (294):162–166.
    It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...)
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  23.  10
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2016). Hill on Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):851-860.
    I argue that it is at least open to a proponent of type materialism for phenomenal consciousness to accept Hill’s representational theory of experiential awareness of perceptual qualia.
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  24.  98
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Systematicity Redux. Synthese 170 (2):251 - 274.
    One of the main challenges that Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (Cognition 28:3–71, 1988) posed for any connectionist theory of cognitive architecture is to explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a Language of Thought (LOT) architecture. The systematicity challenge presents a dilemma: if connectionism cannot explain the systematicity of thought, then it fails to offer an adequate theory of cognitive architecture; and if it explains the systematicity of thought by implementing a LOT architecture, then it fails to offer an (...)
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  25.  60
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1993). The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls. Philosophical Studies 71 (2):163-190.
  26. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    [Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true.
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  27. Brian P. McLaughlin (2010). The Representational Vs. The Relational View of Visual Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):239-262.
    In Reference and Consciousness, John Campbell attempts to a make a case that what he calls of visual experience, a view that he champions, is superior to what he calls . I argue that his attempt fails. In section 1, I spell out the two views. In section 2, I outline Campbell's case that the Relational View is superior to the Representational View and offer a diagnosis of where Campbell goes wrong. In section 3, I examine the case in detail (...)
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  28.  38
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
  29. Ernest Lepore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. B. Blackwell.
  30. Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.) (2007). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Pub..
  31.  32
    Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
    We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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  32. Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events. Blackwell.
  33.  97
    Tim Crane & Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Introduction. Synthese 170 (2):211-215.
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  34.  42
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):93-118.
    [Brian P. McLaughlin] In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the (...)
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  35.  20
    Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.) (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Basil Blackwell.
  36. Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge. In C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press 285--320.
  37.  87
    David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism: II--David Owens, Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):119-142.
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS]The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of (...)
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  38.  30
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1993). On Punctate Content and on Conceptual Role. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):653-660.
  39.  36
    Brian P. Mclaughlin (1984). Perception, Causation, and Supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):569-592.
    While a necessary condition for perceiving a physical object is that the object cause the perceiver to undergo a sense experience, this condition is not sufficient. causal theorists attempt to provide a sufficient condition by placing constraints on the way the object causes the perceiver's experience. i argue that this is not possible since the relationship between a perceiver's experience and an object in virtue of which the perceiver perceives the object does not supervene on any of the ways in (...)
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  40.  24
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2012). On Justifying Neurobiologicalism for Consciousness. In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press 207.
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  41. Brian P. McLaughlin & Ronald J. Planer (2014). The Contributions of U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart to the Identity Theory of Consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Bloomsbury Academic 103-128.
  42.  30
    Brian P. McLaughlin & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1995). Dennett's Logical Behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):189-258.
  43.  7
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1988). Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press 36.
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  44.  24
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Colors and Color Spaces. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center 83-89.
    Sensory qualities are objective properties; indeed, on the evidence, they are physical properties. However, what makes a physical property the sensory quality it is is its relationship to sensory experiences of perceivers. For instance, the redness of a surface is a physical property of the surface; what makes that physical property surface red is the fact that it disposes surfaces to look red to appropriate visual perceivers in appropriate viewing circumstances. What it is like for something to look red—that is, (...)
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  45.  49
    Brian P. McLaughlin & F. Warfield (1994). The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined. Synthese 101 (3):365-400.
    There is currently a debate over whether cognitive architecture is classical or connectionist in nature. One finds the following three comparisons between classical architecture and connectionist architecture made in the pro-connectionist literature in this debate: (1) connectionist architecture is neurally plausible and classical architecture is not; (2) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model pattern recognition capacities than is classical architecture; and (3) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model the acquisition of pattern recognition capacities by learning than (...)
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  46.  20
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). The Lessons of the Many. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):129-151.
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  47.  17
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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  48. Brian P. McLaughlin (1985). Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell
     
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  49.  24
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1983). Response: Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement):71-91.
    In this paper, I examine, from a metaphysical point of view, a recent notable attempt by Jaegwon Kim to explain how macro-events are dependent on micro-events and how causal transactions between macro-events are dependent on causal transactions between micro-events.
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  50.  33
    Brian P. McLaughlin (1983). Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):71-91.
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