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  1.  20
    Brian Skyrms (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. OUP Oxford.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  2. Brian Skyrms (2006). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
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  3.  26
    Brian Skyrms (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. Skyrms eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand the social contract. The book is (...)
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  4.  11
    Brian Skyrms (1980). Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws. Yale University Press.
  5. Brian Skyrms (1990). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Harvard University Press.
     
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  6.  20
    Brian Skyrms, Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle & and Stanislav Volkov, Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.
    We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...)
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  7.  34
    Brian Skyrms (2008). Signals. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.
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  8.  5
    Brian Skyrms (1988). Pragmatics and Empiricism. Philosophical Review 97 (1):118-121.
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  9.  36
    Brian Skyrms, A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.
    This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected on April 27, 1999.
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  10. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) (2009). The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge University Press.
    In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, (...)
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  11. Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms (1999). Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):588-598.
  12. Brian Skyrms (1980). Higher Order Degrees of Belief. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press 109--137.
     
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  13.  32
    Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Self-Assembling Games. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv043.
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signalling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
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  14.  49
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  15.  16
    Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Learning to Transfer Information. Studia Logica.
  16.  31
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2013). Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games. Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19.
    We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with (...)
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  17. Brian Skyrms (1975). Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. Dickenson Pub. Co..
  18.  60
    Brian Skyrms (1982). Causal Decision Theory. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):695-711.
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  19. Cristina Bicchieri & Brian Skyrms (1996). Rationality and Coordination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
     
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  20. Brian Skyrms (1994). Sex and Justice. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):305-320.
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  21.  61
    Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams (...)
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  22.  28
    Brian Skyrms (2000). Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  23.  8
    Brian Skyrms & Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust. In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press 265.
  24.  27
    Brian Skyrms (1987). Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.
    The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by "probability kinematics" on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status.
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  25. Brian Skyrms (1966). Nomological Necessity and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 33 (3):230-249.
    Some of the concerns which motivate attempts to provide a philosophical reduction of nomological necessity are briefly introduced in I. In II, Hempel's treatment of the paradoxes is contrasted with a position which holds that nomological necessity is a pragmatic dimension of laws of nature, and that this pragmatic dimension is of such a type that it prevents laws of nature from contraposing. Such a position is, however, untenable unless (i) the sense of 'pragmatics' at issue is specified, and the (...)
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  26. Brian Skyrms (1992). Coherence, Probability and Induction. Philosophical Issues 2:215-226.
  27. Brian Skyrms (1981). Tractarian Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):199 - 206.
  28.  60
    Brian Skyrms (1994). Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be (...)
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  29. Brian Skyrms (1967). The Explication of "X Knows That P". Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.
  30.  11
    Brian Skyrms (1966). Choice and Chance. Belmont, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
  31.  9
    Brian Skyrms (2012). Learning to Signal with Probe and Adjust. Episteme 9 (2):139-150.
    Research Articles Brian Skyrms, Episteme, FirstView Article.
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  32.  57
    Brian Skyrms, Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers.
    To coordinate action, information must be transmitted, processed, and utilized to make decisions. Transmission of information requires the existence of a signaling system in which the signals that are exchanged are coordinated with the appropriate content. Signaling systems in nature range from quorum signaling in bacteria [Schauder and Bassler, Kaiser ], through the dance of the bees [Dyer and Seeley ], birdcalls [Hailman, Ficken, and Ficken, Gyger, Marler and Pickert, Evans, Evans, and Marler, Charrier and Sturdy ], and alarm calls (...)
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  33.  25
    Brian Skyrms (1999). Reply to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):243-254.
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  34.  6
    Brian Skyrms (1981). Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351.
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  35. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
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  36. Gabriele Taylor, Brian Mcguinness, Sir Michael Dummett, Patrick Suppes, Brian Skyrms & Stathis Psillos (2006). Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Springer Netherlands.
     
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  37.  12
    Brian Skyrms (1987). Updating, Supposing, and Maxent. Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.
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  38.  46
    Brian Skyrms (2010). The Flow of Information in Signaling Games. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
    Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
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  39.  22
    Brian Skyrms (2008). Presidential Address: Signals. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.
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  40.  24
    Brian Skyrms (1985). Maximum Entropy Inference as a Special Case of Conditionalization. Synthese 63 (1):55 - 74.
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  41.  51
    Brian Skyrms (2002). Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):407-428.
    Pre‐play signals that cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre‐play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals. Signals change stability properties of equilibria in the base game, create new polymorphic equilibria, and change the basins (...)
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  42.  76
    Brian Skyrms (2006). Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968.
    The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields the (...)
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  43.  64
    Brian Skyrms (2008). Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract. Synthese 160 (1):21 - 25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
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  44.  26
    Brian Skyrms (1996). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.
    Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.
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  45.  96
    Brian Skyrms (1976). Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 30 (5):323 - 332.
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  46.  24
    Brian Skyrms (1993). A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments? Philosophy of Science 60 (2):320-328.
    Maher (1992b) advances an objection to dynamic Dutch-book arguments, partly inspired by the discussion in Levi (1987; in particular by Levi's case 2, p. 204). Informally, the objection is that the decision maker will "see the dutch book coming" and consequently refuse to bet, thus escaping the Dutch book. Maher makes this explicit by modeling the decision maker's choices as a sequential decision problem. On this basis he claims that there is a mistake in dynamic coherence arguments. There is really (...)
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  47. Brian Skyrms (2012). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand (...)
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  48. Brian Skyrms (2012). From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity, Coherence, and Induction. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays on the nature of quantity, probability, coherence, and induction. The first part explores the nature of quantity and includes essays on tractarian nominalism, combinatorial possibility, and coherence. Part Two proceeds to examine coherent updating of degrees of belief in various learning situations. Finally, in Part Three, Skyrms develops an account of aspects of inductive reasoning, which proceeds from specific problems to general considerations. These essays span the breadth of Skyrms's illustrious career and (...)
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  49. Brian Skyrms (2012). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
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  50.  14
    Brian Skyrms (2005). Dynamics of Conformist Bias. The Monist 88 (2):260-269.
    We compare replicator dynamics for some simple games with and without the addition of conformist bias. The addition of conformist bias can create equilibria, it can change the stability properties of existing equilibria, it may leave the equilibrium structure intact but change the relative size of basins of attraction, or it may do nothing at all. Examples of each of the foregoing are given.
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