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  1.  50
    Selmer Bringsjord (1992). What Robots Can and Can't Be. Kluwer.
    This book argues that (1) AI will continue to produce machines with the capacity to pass stronger and stronger versions of the Turing Test but that (2) the "Person Building Project" (the attempt by AI and Cognitive Science to build a machine which is a person) will inevitably fail. The defense of (2) rests in large part on a refutation of the proposition that persons are automata -- a refutation involving an array of issues, from free will to Godel to (...)
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  2.  53
    Selmer Bringsjord (2010). Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
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  3. Selmer Bringsjord, P. Bello & David A. Ferrucci (2001). Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test. Minds and Machines 11 (1):3-27.
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  4.  6
    Selmer Bringsjord & Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu (2012). Given the Web, What is Intelligence, Really? Metaphilosophy 43 (4):464-479.
    This article argues that existing systems on the Web cannot approach human-level intelligence, as envisioned by Descartes, without being able to achieve genuine problem solving on unseen problems. The article argues that this entails committing to a strong intensional logic. In addition to revising extant arguments in favor of intensional systems, it presents a novel mathematical argument to show why extensional systems can never hope to capture the inherent complexity of natural language. The argument makes its case by focusing on (...)
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  5. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.
    Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  6.  36
    Selmer Bringsjord (2007). Ethical Robots: The Future Can Heed Us. [REVIEW] AI and Society 22 (4):539-550.
    Bill Joy’s deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyone—and many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...)
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  7.  92
    Selmer Bringsjord (1985). Are There Set Theoretic Possible Worlds? Analysis 45 (1):64 -.
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  8. Selmer Bringsjord (2000). Animals, Zombanimals, and the Total Turing Test: The Essence of Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Logic Language and Information 9 (4):397-418.
    Alan Turing devised his famous test (TT) through a slight modificationof the parlor game in which a judge tries to ascertain the gender of twopeople who are only linguistically accessible. Stevan Harnad hasintroduced the Total TT, in which the judge can look at thecontestants in an attempt to determine which is a robot and which aperson. But what if we confront the judge with an animal, and arobot striving to pass for one, and then challenge him to peg which iswhich? (...)
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  9. Selmer Bringsjord (1994). Searle on the Brink. Psyche 1 (5).
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
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  10.  53
    Selmer Bringsjord (2007). Offer: One Billion Dollars for a Conscious Robot; If You're Honest, You Must Decline. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):28-43.
    You are offered one billion dollars to 'simply' produce a proof-of-concept robot that has phenomenal consciousness -- in fact, you can receive a deliciously large portion of the money up front, by simply starting a three-year work plan in good faith. Should you take the money and commence? No. I explain why this refusal is in order, now and into the foreseeable future.
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  11.  5
    Selmer Bringsjord, Entrepreneurial IT in the Age of Smart Machines.
    Don’t Bury Your Head in the Sand! • Some say: “AI is dead.” (Or: “AI is dying.”) • This is due to either self-deception or what Turing — the grandfather of computer sci-.
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  12. Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (2002). Why Did Evolution Engineer Consciousness? In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins
  13. Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (2003). Real Robots and the Missing Thought-Experiment in the Chinese Room Dialectic. In John Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press 144--166.
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  14.  28
    Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord (2007). Computers, Justification, and Mathematical Knowledge. Minds and Machines 17 (2):185-202.
    The original proof of the four-color theorem by Appel and Haken sparked a controversy when Tymoczko used it to argue that the justification provided by unsurveyable proofs carried out by computers cannot be a priori. It also created a lingering impression to the effect that such proofs depend heavily for their soundness on large amounts of computation-intensive custom-built software. Contra Tymoczko, we argue that the justification provided by certain computerized mathematical proofs is not fundamentally different from that provided by surveyable (...)
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  15.  20
    Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
    Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  16.  77
    Selmer Bringsjord (1995). In Defense of Impenetrable Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):348-351.
    Moody is right that the doctrine of conscious inessentialism is false. Unfortunately, his zombie-based argument against , once made sufficiently clear to evaluate, is revealed as nothing but legerdemain. The fact is -- though Moody has convinced himself otherwise -- certain zombies are impenetrable: that they are zombies, and not conscious beings like us, is something beyond the capacity of humans to divine.
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  17.  21
    Selmer Bringsjord (1998). Is Gödelian Model-Based Deductive Reasoning Computational? Philosophica 61.
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  18. Selmer Bringsjord & Michael John Zenzen (2003). Superminds People Harness Hypercomputation, and More. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
  19.  4
    Selmer Bringsjord (1989). In Defense of Copying. Public Affairs Quarterly 3 (1):1-9.
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  20.  91
    Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (1998). Why Did Evolution Engineer Consciousness? In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins
  21.  24
    Selmer Bringsjord & Michael Zenzen (2002). Toward a Formal Philosophy of Hypercomputation. Minds and Machines 12 (2):241-258.
    Does what guides a pastry chef stand on par, from the standpoint of contemporary computer science, with what guides a supercomputer? Did Betty Crocker, when telling us how to bake a cake, provide an effective procedure, in the sense of `effective' used in computer science? According to Cleland, the answer in both cases is ``Yes''. One consequence of Cleland's affirmative answer is supposed to be that hypercomputation is, to use her phrase, ``theoretically viable''. Unfortunately, though we applaud Cleland's ``gadfly philosophizing'' (...)
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  22.  53
    Selmer Bringsjord (1994). Computation, Among Other Things, is Beneath Us. Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88.
    What''s computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the Strong sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition (...)
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  23.  87
    Selmer Bringsjord (1998). Cognition is Not Computation: The Argument From Irreversibility. Synthese 113 (2):285-320.
    The dominant scientific and philosophical view of the mind – according to which, put starkly, cognition is computation – is refuted herein, via specification and defense of the following new argument: Computation is reversible; cognition isn't; ergo, cognition isn't computation. After presenting a sustained dialectic arising from this defense, we conclude with a brief preview of the view we would put in place of the cognition-is-computation doctrine.
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  24.  3
    Selmer Bringsjord, E. Bringsjord & R. Noel (1998). In Defense of Logical Minds. In M. A. Gernsbacher & S. J. Derry (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 173--178.
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  25. Selmer Bringsjord & Konstantine Arkoudas (2006). On the Provability, Veracity, and AI-Relevance of the Church-Turing Thesis. In A. Olszewski, J. Wole'nski & R. Janusz (eds.), Church's Thesis After Seventy Years. Ontos Verlag 68-118.
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  26.  21
    Selmer Bringsjord (2001). Are We Evolved Computers?: A Critical Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):227 – 243.
    Steven Pinker's How the mind works (HTMW) marks in my opinion an historic point in the history of humankind's attempt to understand itself. Socrates delivered his "know thyself" imperative rather long ago, and now, finally, in this behemoth of a book, published at the dawn of a new millennium, Pinker steps up to have psychology tell us what we are: computers crafted by evolution - end of story; mystery solved; and the poor philosophers, having never managed to obey Socrates' command, (...)
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  27.  2
    Selmer Bringsjord & John Licato (2015). By Disanalogy, Cyberwarfare Is Utterly New. Philosophy and Technology 28 (3):339-358.
    We provide an underlying theory of argument by disanalogy, in order to employ it to show that cyberwarfare is fundamentally new. Once this general case is made, the battle is won: we are well on our way to establishing our main thesis: that Just War Theory itself must be modernized. Augustine and Aquinas had a stunningly long run, but today’s world, based as it is on digital information and increasingly intelligent information-processing, points the way to a beast so big and (...)
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  28.  67
    Selmer Bringsjord (2004). On Building Robot Persons: Response to Zlatev. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 14 (3):381-385.
    Zlatev offers surprisingly weak reasoning in support of his view that robots with the right kind of developmental histories can have meaning. We ought nonetheless to praise Zlatev for an impressionistic account of how attending to the psychology of human development can help us build robots that appear to have intentionality.
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  29.  35
    Selmer Bringsjord, In Defense of the Unprovability of the Church-Turing Thesis.
    One of us has previously argued that the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), contra Elliot Mendelson, is not provable, and is — light of the mind’s capacity for effortless hypercomputation — moreover false (e.g., [13]). But a new, more serious challenge has appeared on the scene: an attempt by Smith [28] to prove CTT. His case is a clever “squeezing argument” that makes crucial use of Kolmogorov-Uspenskii (KU) machines. The plan for the present paper is as follows. After covering some necessary preliminaries (...)
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  30.  45
    Selmer Bringsjord, The Impact of Computing on Epistemology: Knowing Gödel's Mind Through Computation.
    I know that those of you who know my mind know that I think I know that we can't know Gödel's mind through computation: ``The Impact : Failing to Know " If computationalism is false, observant philosophers willing to get their hands dirty should be able to find tell-tale signs today: automated theorem proving tomorrow (Eastern APA): robots as zombanimals But let's start with little 'ol me, and literary, not mathematical, creativity: Selmer (samples) vs. Brutus1 (samples again).
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  31.  17
    Selmer Bringsjord, Clarke Caporale & Ron Noel (2000). Animals, Zombanimals, and the Total Turing Test. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):397-418.
    Alan Turing devised his famous test (TT) through a slight modificationof the parlor game in which a judge tries to ascertain the gender of twopeople who are only linguistically accessible. Stevan Harnad hasintroduced the Total TT, in which the judge can look at thecontestants in an attempt to determine which is a robot and which aperson. But what if we confront the judge with an animal, and arobot striving to pass for one, and then challenge him to peg which (...)
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  32.  20
    Selmer Bringsjord (1989). Grim on Logic and Omniscience. Analysis 49 (4):186 - 189.
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  33.  28
    Selmer Bringsjord (1991). Is the Connectionist-Logicist Debate One of Ai's Wonderful Red Herrings? Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 3:319-49.
  34.  30
    Selmer Bringsjord (1988). Tracing Superman Again: A Reply to Clark. Analysis 48 (1):52-54.
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  35.  13
    Selmer Bringsjord (2012). Belief in the Singularity is Logically Brittle. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (7):14.
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  36.  34
    Selmer Bringsjord, Computationalism is Dead; Now What?
    In this paper I place Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conceptionof mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view..
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  37.  30
    Selmer Bringsjord & Alexander Bringsjord (2012). Kluge: The Haphazard Construction of the Human Mind. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):301-305.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-5, Ahead of Print.
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  38.  49
    Selmer Bringsjord, People Are Infinitary Symbol Systems: No Sensorimotor Capacity Necessary.
    Stevan Harnad and I seem to be thinking about many of the same issues. Sometimes we agree, sometimes we don't; but I always find his reasoning refreshing, his positions sensible, and the problems with which he's concerned to be of central importance to cognitive science. His "Grounding Symbols in the Analog World with Neural Nets" (= GS) is no exception. And GS not only exemplifies Harnad's virtues, it also provides a springboard for diving into Harnad- Bringsjord terrain.
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  39.  47
    Selmer Bringsjord & H. Xiao (2000). A Refutation of Penrose's New Godelian Case Against the Computational Conception of Mind. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12.
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  40.  4
    Selmer Bringsjord (1997). Consciousness by the Lights of Logic and Commonsense. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):144-146.
    I urge return by the lights of logic and commonsense to a dialectical tabula rasa – according to which: (1) consciousness, in the ordinary pre-analytic sense of the term, is identified with P-consciousness, and “A-consciousness” is supplanted by suitably configured terms from its Blockian definition; (2) the supposedly fallacious Searlean argument for the view that a function of P-consciousness is to allow flexible and creative cognition is enthymematic and, when charitably specified, quite formidable.
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  41.  37
    Selmer Bringsjord, A Refutation of Penrose's Godelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence.
    Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the G\"{o}delian attack he articulated in his {\em The Emperor's New Mind}, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious G\"{o}delian case, expressed in and 3 of his {\em Shadows of the Mind}. The core argument in these chapters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is (...)
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  42.  4
    S. Aguzzoli, V. Akman, A. D. C. Bennett, P. Blackburn, S. Bringsjord, C. Caporale, A. Ciabattoni, B. J. Copeland, S. Demri & D. Dubois (2000). Index of Authors of Volume 9. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9 (519):519.
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  43.  20
    Selmer Bringsjord (1989). Christianity and Pacifism. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):88-94.
    In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, James Kellenberger argues that the “ethics of love” aspect of Christianity entails pacifism, In response, I present an argument designed to show that Christian doctrine entails the falsity of pacifism, I go on to show, however, that the spirit of Kellenberger’s point may survive, for perhaps Christ’s teaching regarding “mental sin” prohibits the war-related activity known as nuclear deterrence.
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  44.  35
    Selmer Bringsjord (1994). Could, How Could We Tell If, and Should - Androids Have Inner Lives? In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press
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  45.  6
    Selmer Bringsjord, Joshua Taylor, Bram van Heuveln, Konstantine Arkoudas, Micah Clark & Ralph Wojtowicz (2011). Piagetian Roboethics Via Category Theory Moving Beyond Mere Formal Operations to Engineer Robots Whose Decisions Are Guaranteed to Be Ethically Correct. In M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press
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  46.  6
    Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord (2008). Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task. In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer 17--29.
  47.  23
    Selmer Bringsjord & David A. Ferrucci (1998). Logic and Artificial Intelligence: Divorced, Still Married, Separated ...? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (2):273-308.
    Though it''s difficult to agree on the exact date of their union, logic and artificial intelligence (AI) were married by the late 1950s, and, at least during their honeymoon, were happily united. What connubial permutation do logic and AI find themselves in now? Are they still (happily) married? Are they divorced? Or are they only separated, both still keeping alive the promise of a future in which the old magic is rekindled? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions (...)
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  48.  28
    Selmer Bringsjord, The Irrationality of the Free Software Movement.
    Approximately 48 hours ago, knowing that I would, Lord willing, be stand- ing here on this podium two days hence, I tapped http://www.fsf.org into Safari in order to begin learning at least something about the Free Software Movement (FSM). My online education has been augmented by many propo- nents of FSM in attendance at this conference, including Richard Stallman. What I have learned is that this movement is populated by a lot of seem- ingly well-intentioned people who are, at least (...)
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  49.  12
    Paul Bello & Selmer Bringsjord (2013). On How to Build a Moral Machine. Topoi 32 (2):251-266.
    Herein we make a plea to machine ethicists for the inclusion of constraints on their theories consistent with empirical data on human moral cognition. As philosophers, we clearly lack widely accepted solutions to issues regarding the existence of free will, the nature of persons and firm conditions on moral agency/patienthood; all of which are indispensable concepts to be deployed by any machine able to make moral judgments. No agreement seems forthcoming on these matters, and we don’t hold out hope for (...)
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  50.  27
    Selmer Bringsjord, Explaining Phi Without Dennett's Exotica: Good Ol' Computation Suffices.
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