Search results for 'Brownwyn Finnigan' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  4
    Jan Westerhoff, Jay Garfield, Tom Tillemans, Graham Priest, Georges Dreyfus, Sonam Thakchoe, Guy Newland, Mark Siderits, Brownwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2011). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One (...)
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  2. Bronwyn Finnigan (2015). Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-Ethics: Investigating the Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments. Philosophy East and West 65 (3):765-785.
    This paper investigates whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011a) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010-11), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This paper shall contest this claim with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. It shall provide several arguments to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot (...)
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  3.  59
    Bronwyn Finnigan (forthcoming). Buddhist Idealism. In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford
    This article surveys some of the most influential Buddhist arguments in defense of idealism. It begins by clarifying the central theses under dispute and rationally reconstructs arguments from four major Buddhist figures in defense of some or all of these theses. It engages arguments from Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā and Triṃśikā; Dignāga’s matching-failure argument in the Ālambanaparīkṣā; the sahopalambhaniyama inference developed by Dharmakīrti; and Xuanzang’s weird but clever logical argument that intrigued philosophers in China and Japan. It aims to clarify (...)
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  4.  19
    J. Smallwood, J. B. Davies, D. Heim, F. Finnigan, M. Sudberry & Obonsawin M. O'Connor R. (2004). Subjective Experience and the Attentional Lapse: Task Engagement and Disengagement During Sustained Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):657-90.
    Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance and psycho-physiological measures . This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task . The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded (...)
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  5. Bronwyn Finnigan (2014). Examining the Bodhisattva's Brain. Zygon 49 (1):231-241.
    Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular-minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist (...)
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  6. Bronwyn Finnigan (2010-11). Buddhist Meta-Ethics. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (1-2):267-297.
    In this paper I argue for the importance of pursuing Buddhist Meta-Ethics. Most contemporary studies of the nature of Buddhist Ethics proceed in isolation from the highly sophisticated epistemological theories developed within the Buddhist tradition. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that an intimate relationship holds between ethics and epistemology in Buddhism. To show this, I focus on Damien Keown's influential virtue ethical theorisation of Buddhist Ethics and demonstrate the conflicts that arise when it is brought into dialogue (...)
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  7. Bronwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2010). Don't Think! Just Act! In Graham Priest & Damon Young (eds.), Philosophy and the Martial Arts. Open Court
  8. Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.) (2011). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The doctrine of the two truths--a conventional truth and an ultimate truth--is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools and is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. The fundamental ideas are articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd--3rd century CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another, and yet distinct. One of the most (...)
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  9.  4
    Bronwyn Finnigan (2015). Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-Ethics: The Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments. Philosophy East and West 65 (3):765-785.
    In recent decades, several attempts have been made to characterize Buddhism as a systematically unified and consistent normative ethical theory. This has given rise to a growing interest in meta-ethical questions. Meta-ethics can be broadly or narrowly defined. Defined broadly, it is a domain of inquiry concerned with the nature and status of the fundamental or framing presuppositions of normative ethical theories, where this includes the cognitive and epistemic requirements of presupposed conceptions of ethical agency.1 Defined narrowly, it concerns the (...)
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  10.  21
    Jonathan Smallwood, John B. Davies, Derek Heim, Frances Finnigan, Megan Sudberry, Rory O'Connor & Marc Obonsawin (2004). Subjective Experience and the Attentional Lapse: Task Engagement and Disengagement During Sustained Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):657-690.
    Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance and psycho-physiological measures . This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task . The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded disengagement from the (...)
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  11.  27
    Bronwyn Finnigan (2015). Phronēsis in Aristotle: Reconciling Deliberation with Spontaneity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):674-697.
    A standard thesis of contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics and some recent Heideggerian scholarship is that virtuous behavior can be performed immediately and spontaneously without engaging conscious processes of deliberative thought. It is also claimed that phronēsis either enables or is consistent with this possibility. In the Nicomachean Ethics, however, Aristotle identifies phronēsis as the excellence of the calculative part of the intellect, claims that calculation and deliberation are the same and that it is the mark of the phronimos to be (...)
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  12.  32
    Bronwyn Finnigan (2015). Review of Dan Arnold's "Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW] Journal of Religion 95 (1):143-146.
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  13.  82
    Bronwyn Finnigan (2011). How Can a Buddha Come to Act?: The Possibility of a Buddhist Account of Ethical Agency. Philosophy East and West 61 (1):134-160.
    In the past decade or so there has been a surge of monographs on the nature of ‘Buddhist Ethics.’ For the most part, authors are concerned with developing and defending explications of Buddhism as a normative ethical theory with an apparent aim of putting Buddhist thought directly in dialogue with contemporary Western philosophical debates in ethics. Despite disagreement among Buddhist ethicists concerning which contemporary normative ethical theory a Buddhist ethic would most closely resemble (if any), 1 it is arguable that (...)
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  14.  50
    Bronwyn Finnigan (2011). The Possibility of Buddhist Ethical Agency Revisited—A Reply to Jay Garfield and Chad Hansen. Philosophy East and West 61 (1):183-194.
    I begin by warmly thanking Professors Garfield and Hansen for participating in this dialogue. I greatly value the work of both and appreciate having the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with them. Aside from the many important insights I gain from their replies, I believe that both Garfield and Hansen misrepresent my position. In response, I shall clarify the argument contained in my preceding comment, and will consider the objections as they bear on this clarified position.Both Garfield and Hansen (...)
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  15.  31
    Bronwyn Finnigan (2006). The Dialectical Method in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Phronimon 7 (2):1-15.
  16. Bronwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2011). Carnap's Pragmatism and the Two Truths. In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press 181--188.
  17. Bronwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2011). Ethics for Mādhyamikas. In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press 221--31.
     
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  18.  30
    Jay L. Garfield (2011). Hey, Buddha! Don't Think! Just Act!—A Response to Bronwyn Finnigan. Philosophy East and West 61 (1):174-183.
    In the course of a careful and astute discussion of the difficulties facing a Buddhist account of the moral agency of a buddha, Bronwyn Finnigan develops a challenging critique of a proposal I made in a recent article (Garfield 2006). Much of what she says is dead on target, and I have learned much from her comment. But I have serious reservations about both the central thrust of her critique of my own thought and her proposal for a positive (...)
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  19.  30
    Chad Hansen (2011). Washing the Dust From My Mirror: The Deconstruction of Buddhism—a Response to Bronwyn Finnigan. Philosophy East and West 61 (1):160-174.
    I thank Professors Finnigan and Garfield (Jay) and the editors of Philosophy East and West for inviting me to join in this discussion of Chinese Buddhism. I have not taken many opportunities in my career to write about Zen Buddhism and Daoism, although I have been fascinated by their connection. I remember quite clearly a discussion I had with Jay some years back in which I broached the idea that Daoism had contributed important dialectical steps leading to the formulation (...)
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  20. Jay L. Garfield, Hey, Buddha! Don't Think! Just Act! Reply to Finnigan.
    Finnigan, in the course of a careful and astute discussion of the difficulties facing a Buddhist account of the moral agency of a buddha, develops a challenging critique of a proposal I made in Garfield. Much of what she says is dead on target, and I have learned much from her paper. But I have serious reservations about the central thrust both of her critique of my own thought and about her proposal for a positive account of a buddha’s (...)
     
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  21.  22
    Owen Flanagan (2014). Buddhism and the Scientific Image: Reply to Critics. Zygon 49 (1):242-258.
    I provide a précis of The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (), and then respond to three critics, Christian Coseru, Charles Goodman, and Bronwyn Finnigan.
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