177 found
Order:
  1.  93
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner (2013). The Evil of Death and the Lucretian Symmetry: A Reply to Feldman. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):783-789.
    In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death’s badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death’s badness. Here we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  2.  19
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony L. Brueckner (2014). Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson. Journal of Ethics 18 (1):1-9.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  3. Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
    Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  4.  17
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner (2014). Accommodating Counterfactual Attitudes: A Further Reply to Johansson. Journal of Ethics 18 (1):19-21.
    Here we respond to Johansson’s main worry, as laid out in his, “Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner.” We show how our principle BF*(dd*) can be adjusted to address this concern compatibly with our fundamental approach to responding to Lucretius.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  5. Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  6.  55
    Anthony Brueckner & Alex Bundy (2012). On “Epistemic Permissiveness”. Synthese 188 (2):165-177.
    In "Epistemic Permissiveness", Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one's total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ~P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White's arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  7. Anthony Brueckner (1994). The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
    Much has been written about epistemological skepticism in the last ten or so years, but there remain some unanswered questions concerning the structure of what has become the canonical Cartesian skeptical argument. In this paper, I would like to take a closer look at this structure in order to determine just which epistemic principles are required by the argument.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  8. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  9.  83
    Anthony Brueckner (2008). Retooling the Consequence Argument. Analysis 68 (297):10–13.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  10. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Contextualism, SSI and the Factivity Problem. Analysis 69 (3):431-438.
    There is an apparent problem stemming from the factivity of knowledge that seems to afflict both contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism . 1 In this article, we will first explain how the problem arises for each theory, and then we will propose a uniform resolution.1. The factivity problem for contextualismLet K t stands for X knows _ at t. Let h stand for S has hands. According to contextualism, ‘K t’ is true as uttered in some ordinary conversational contexts. Let O (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  11. Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  12. Anthony Brueckner (2013). Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13. Anthony Brueckner (2004). Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge. Analysis 64 (4):333–335.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  14. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Thinking Animals and Epistemology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15.  50
    Anthony Brueckner (2011). ∼K∼Sk. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):74-89.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  16. Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1986). Why is Death Bad? Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  17.  16
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner (2014). The Mirror-Image Argument: An Additional Reply to Johansson. Journal of Ethics 18 (4):325-330.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves an inappropriate conflation of the time from which the relevant asymmetry emerges and the time of the badness of death.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  19. Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
  20. Anthony Brueckner (1996). Modest Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):265-280.
    Kantian transcendental arguments are aimed at uncovering the necessary conditions for the possibility of thought and experience. If such arguments are to have any force against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world, then it would seem that the conditions the transcendental argument uncovers must be non-psychological in nature, and their special status must be knowable a priori. In "Transcendental Arguments", Barry Stroud raised the question whether there are any such conditions., He answered that it was very doubtful that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Transmission for Knowledge Not Established. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):193-195.
    In "Nozick on Scepticism", Graeme Forbes attempts to establish a Transmission Principle for knowledge which has been challenged by a number of anti-sceptical philosophers (such as Nozick). This principle (or something like it) seems to be required by Cartesian sceptical arguments, so if it could be refuted, this would apparently rid us of such scepticism. I do not believe that Nozick or anyone else has refuted the principle, yet I will argue that Forbes has certainly failed to establish it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  50
    A. L. Brueckner (2000). Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.
  23.  83
    A. Brueckner & C. T. Buford (2013). Against Psychological Sequentialism. Analysis 73 (1):96-101.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Anthony Brueckner (2008). The Simulation Argument Again. Analysis 68 (299):224–226.
  25.  81
    Anthony Brueckner (2011). Idealism and Scepticism. Theoria 77 (4):368-371.
    It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. A. Brueckner (2011). Debasing scepticism. Analysis 71 (2):295-297.
    In this paper, I will clarify Jonathan Schaffer's; debasing scepticism, highlighting its logical structure. 1 In many current discussions of scepticism, its scope is limited to propositions about the external world which, if known at all, are known a posteriori. The standard sceptical set-up goes as follows. The sceptic specifies a sceptical hypothesis, or counterpossibility, that is incompatible with the external-world propositions that I claim to know. The hypothesis – e.g. that I am a brain in a vat – is (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Anthony Brueckner (1983). Transcendental Arguments I. Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
    A Kantian transcendental argument is an argument which purports to show that the existence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. Both the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism satisfy this characterization. But we have seen that even a successful Kantian transcendental argument would be somewhat disappointing. Even though such an argument would refute the extreme Cartesian skepticism about the very existence of physical objects, it would not certify any (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Anthony Brueckner (1995). Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):199-201.
  29. A. Brueckner (2012). Against an Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (4):745-746.
    A novel (and surprising) argument against justification internalism. Analysis 72: 239–43, Sanford Goldberg uses the New Evil Demon thought experiment in an attempt to argue as in the foregoing title. I respond by maintaining that his argument fails when aimed at a prominent version of internalism, viz. evidentialism.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  51
    A. Brueckner & C. T. Buford (2010). Reply to Baumann on Factivity and Contextualism. Analysis 70 (3):486-489.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31. Anthony Brueckner (2006). Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 66 (291):264–266.
  32. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
  33.  74
    Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  34. Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  35. Anthony Brueckner (1989). Another Failed Transcendental Argument. Noûs 23 (4):525-530.
  36. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  88
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
  38.  68
    Anthony Brueckner (2005). Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):315–318.
    Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39. Anthony Brueckner (2002). Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing. Analysis 62 (275):197–202.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  40. Anthony Brueckner (1992). If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat. Mind 101 (401):123-128.
    Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41.  95
    Anthony Brueckner (1999). Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Analysis 59 (1):59–62.
  42.  86
    Anthony Brueckner (2009). More on Justification and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 69 (3):497-499.
    In his , Williams offered a solution to Moore's paradox that centred on the concept of justification. Consider the omissive Moore-paradoxical sentence: p and I do not believe that p.Williams appealed to the principle Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p.Suppose that I am justified in believing . Then I am justified in believing its first conjunct. By I am justified in believing that I believe that p. Since I am also (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43.  77
    Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1993). The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth. Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  44. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  45. Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  46. Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism. Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
  47. Anthony Brueckner (2001). BonJour's a Priori Justification of Induction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1):1–10.
  48.  96
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2002). Anti-Individualism and Analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.
  49.  15
    Christopher T. Buford & Anthony Brueckner (2015). Effective Skeptical Arguments. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):55-60.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 55 - 60 Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  94
    Anthony Brueckner (2003). What Missed Clues Cases Show. Analysis 63 (4):303–305.
1 — 50 / 177