ABSTRACT Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment is a creative, careful, and mostly convincing study of the predictive accuracy of political experts. My only major complaints are that Tetlock (1) understates the predictive accuracy of experts, and (2) does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his work as a vindication of the wisdom of the average citizen. Experts have much to learn from Tetlock's epistemological audit, but there is still ample evidence that, compared to laymen, experts are very good.

In the 1920s, Austrian‐school economists began to argue that in a fully socialized economy, free of competitively generated prices, central planners would have no way to calculate which methods of production would be the most economical. They claimed that this “economic calculation problem” showed that socialism is “impossible.” Although many believe that the Austrian position was later vindicated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Austrian school's own methodology disallows such a conclusion. And historical evidence suggests that poor incentives—not (...) lack of economic calculation—were the main source of the economic defects of “really existing socialism.”. (shrink)

This symposium’s objections to my book fall into two main categories: philosophical and empirical. The philosophical objections are largely sophistical. If we took them seriously, they would invalidate far more than my book: We would also have to give up social science and common sense. The empirical objections, in contrast, are often thoughtful and important. The most notable: Kiewiet and Mattozzi’s vigorous defense of the American public’s free‐trade credentials, and Wittman’s doubts about the magnitude of the belief gap between economists (...) and the public. But Kiewiet and Mattozzi put too much weight on a single survey question; and the belief gap between economists and the public is much larger than the belief gap between the American public’s far left and far right. (shrink)

I heartily accept the motto, - "That government is best which governs least;" and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which I also believe, - "That government is best which governs not at all;" and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have.

JEL Classifications: L13, K42, L15 Keywords: anarcho-capitalism, networks, collusion Abstract: There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and their skeptical of the viability of voluntary collusion. (Cowen 1992; Cowen and Sutter 1999) Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the "free market in defense services" favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing (...) and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians' joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are more theoretically defensible than Cowen and Sutter (1999) indicate. (shrink)

Abstract This has been an unusually productive exchange. My critics largely accept my main theoretical claims about economic calculation and socialism. They have also started to do what advocates of the Misesian view should have been doing for decades: offer empirical evidence that that the calculation problem is serious. While I continue to believe that incentive problems explain most of the failures of socialism, I am slightly less confident than I was before. Fortunately, there are many unexploited sources of information (...) to help resolve the issue. (shrink)

Must the state handle the adjudication of disputes? Researchers of different perspectives, from heterodox scholars of law who advocate legal pluralism to libertarian economists who advocate the privatization of law, have increasingly questioned the idea that the state is, or should be, the only source of law. Both groups point out that government law has problems and that non-state alternatives exist. This Article discusses some problems with the public judicial system and several for-profit alternatives. Public courts lack both incentives to (...) embrace customer orientation and pricing mechanisms, plus they face problems associated with the bureaucratic provision of services. When parties are able to choose their tribunals, in contrast, those tribunals must provide service to customers and be mindful about conserving resources. Competition between arbitrators also can allow for experimentation and the provision of customized services rather than a centrally planned, one-size-fits-all system. Contracts with arbitration clauses can easily stipulate the choice of tribunal, and we argue that if government courts simply refused to overrule binding arbitration agreements, de facto privatization could easily take place. This Article discusses how the private adjudication of disputes could enable the market to internalize externalities and provide services that customers desire. (shrink)