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Profile: Bryce Huebner (Georgetown University)
  1. Bryce Huebner (forthcoming). Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition? Topoi:1-14.
    Recent behavioral experiments, along with imaging experiments and neuropsychological studies appear to support the hypothesis that emotions play a causal or constitutive role in moral judgment. Those who resist this hypothesis tend to suggest that affective mechanisms are better suited to play a modulatory role in moral cognition. But I argue that claims about the role of emotion in moral cognition frame the debate in ways that divert attention away from other plausible hypotheses. I suggest that the available data may (...)
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  2. Eric Winsberg, Bryce Huebner & Rebecca Kukla (forthcoming). Accountability and Values in Radically Collaborative Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
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  3. Bryce Huebner (2014). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. OUP USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
     
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  4. Bryce Huebner (2013). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):315 - 318.
  5. Bryce Huebner (2012). List , Christian , and Pettit , Philip . Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 240. $45.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (3):608-612.
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  6. Bryce Huebner (2012). Reflection, Reflex, and Folk Intuitions. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):651-653.
  7. Bryce Huebner (2012). Surprisal and Valuation in the Predictive Brain. Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 3:415.
    Surprisal and Valuation in the Predictive Brain.
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  8. Bryce Huebner & Andy Blitzer (2012). Tool Use as Situated Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):245-62.
    Vaesen disregards a plausible alternative to his position, and so fails to offer a compelling argument for unique cognitive mechanisms. We suggest an ecological alternative, according to which divergent relationships between organism and environment, not exotic neuroanatomy, are responsible for unique cognitive capacities. This approach is pertinent to claims about primate cognition; and on this basis, we argue that Vaesen's inference from unique skills to unique mechanisms is unwarranted.
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  9. Bryce Huebner & Marcus Hedhal (2012). Collective Values. In Brian Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy and the social sciences. Sage publications.
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  10. Bryce Huebner (2011). Critiquing Empirical Moral Psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):50-83.
    Thought experimental methods play a central role in empirical moral psychology. Against the increasingly common interpretation of recent experimental data, I argue that such methods cannot demonstrate that moral intuitions are produced by reflexive computations that are implicit, fast, and largely automatic. I demonstrate, in contrast, that evaluating thought experiments occurs at a near-glacial pace relative to the speed at which reflexive information processing occurs in a human brain. So, these methods allow for more reflective and deliberative processing than has (...)
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  11. Bryce Huebner (2011). Genuinely Collective Emotions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
    It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.
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  12. Bryce Huebner (2011). Minimal Minds. In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics.
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  13. Bryce Huebner & Marc D. Hauser (2011). Moral Judgments About Altruistic Self-Sacrifice: When Philosophical and Folk Intuitions Clash. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):73-94.
    Altruistic self-sacrifice is rare, supererogatory, and not to be expected of any rational agent; but, the possibility of giving up one's life for the common good has played an important role in moral theorizing. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) has argued in a recent paper that intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice suggest that something has gone wrong in philosophical debates over the trolley problem. We begin by showing that her arguments face a series of significant philosophical objections; however, our project (...)
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  14. Bryce Huebner, Marc D. Hauser & Phillip Pettit (2011). How the Source, Inevitability and Means of Bringing About Harm Interact in Folk-Moral Judgments. Mind and Language 26 (2):210-233.
    Means-based harms are frequently seen as forbidden, even when they lead to a greater good. But, are there mitigating factors? Results from five experiments show that judgments about means-based harms are modulated by: 1) Pareto considerations (was the harmed person made worse off?), 2) the directness of physical contact, and 3) the source of the threat (e.g. mechanical, human, or natural). Pareto harms are more permissible than non-Pareto harms, Pareto harms requiring direct physical contact are less permissible than those that (...)
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  15. Susan Dwyer, Bryce Huebner & Marc D. Hauser (2010). The Linguistic Analogy: Motivations, Results, and Speculations. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):486-510.
    Inspired by the success of generative linguistics and transformational grammar, proponents of the linguistic analogy (LA) in moral psychology hypothesize that careful attention to folk-moral judgments is likely to reveal a small set of implicit rules and structures responsible for the ubiquitous and apparently unbounded capacity for making moral judgments. As a theoretical hypothesis, LA thus requires a rich description of the computational structures that underlie mature moral judgments, an account of the acquisition and development of these structures, and an (...)
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  16. Bryce Huebner (2010). Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.
    It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions (...)
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  17. Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno & Hagop Sarkissian (2010). What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):225-243.
    Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather (...)
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  18. Bryce Huebner, James Lee & Marc D. Hauser (2010). The Moral-Conventional Distinction in Mature Moral Competence. Journal of Cognition and Culture 10 (1/2):1-26.
    Developmental psychologists have long argued that the capacity to distinguish moral and conventional transgressions develops across cultures and emerges early in life. Children reliably treat moral transgressions as more wrong, more punishable, independent of structures of authority, and universally applicable. However, previous studies have not yet examined the role of these features in mature moral cognition. Using a battery of adult-appropriate cases (including vehicular and sexual assault, reckless behavior, and violations of etiquette and social contracts) we demonstrate that these features (...)
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  19. Bryce Huebner (2009). Review of John Deigh, Emotions, Values, and the Law. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
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  20. Bryce Huebner (2009). Troubles with Stereotypes for Spinozan Minds. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92.
    Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious. (...)
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  21. Bryce Huebner & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). Banishing “I” and “We” From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148-149.
    Carruthers offers a promising model for how know the propositional contents of own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.
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  22. Bryce Huebner, Susan Dwyer & Marc D. Hauser (2009). The Role of Emotion in Moral Psychology. Trends in Cognitive Science 13 (1):1-6.
    Recent work in the cognitive and neurobiological sciences indicates an important relationship between emotion and moral judgment. Based on this evidence, several researchers have argued that emotions are the source of our intuitive moral judgments. However, despite the richness of the correlational data between emotion and morality, we argue that the current neurological, behavioral, developmental and evolutionary evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgments. We suggest instead, that the source of moral judgments lies in (...)
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  23. Bryce Huebner (2008). Do You See What We See? An Investigation of an Argument Against Collective Representation. Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):91 – 112.
    Collectivities (states, club, unions, teams, etc.) are often fruitfully spoken of as though they possessed representational capacities. Despite this fact, many philosophers reject the possibility that collectivities might be thought of as genuinely representational. This paper addresses the most promising objection to the possibility of collective representation, the claim that there is no explanatory value to positing collective representations above and beyond the representational states of the individuals that compose a particular collectivity. I claim that this argument either proves too (...)
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  24. Bryce Huebner, Janette Dinishak, James A. Marcum & Jelle De Schrijver (2008). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):843 – 858.
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