Search results for 'By Crawford L. Elder' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Crawford L. Elder (2011). Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. Cambridge University Press.score: 577.5
    Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts (...)
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  2. George Elder (1990). Reviews the bookBuddhist Insight: Essays by Alex Wayman,'Edited by George R. Elder. Philosophy East and West 40 (2):254-256.score: 435.0
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  3. Crawford L. Elder (2009). Real Essentialism • by David S. Oderberg. Analysis 69 (2):376-378.score: 375.0
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  4. Crawford L. Elder (2001). The Problem of Harmonizing Laws. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):25 - 41.score: 315.0
    More laws obtain in the world,it appears, than just those of microphysics –e.g. laws of genetics, perceptual psychology,economics. This paper assumes there indeedare laws in the special sciences, and notjust scrambled versions of microphysical laws. Yet the objects which obey them are composedwholly of microparticles. How can themicroparticles in such an object lawfully domore than what is required of them by the lawsof microphysics? Are there additional laws formicroparticles – which seems to violate closureof microphysics – or is the ``more'' (...)
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  5. Crawford L. Elder (2008). Against Universal Mereological Composition. Dialectica 62 (4):433-454.score: 315.0
    This paper opposes universal mereological composition (UMC). Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is (...)
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  6. Crawford L. Elder (2011). The Alleged Supervenience of Everything on Microphysics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):87-95.score: 315.0
    Here is a view at least much like Lewis’s “Humean supervenience,” and in any case highly influential—in that some endorse it, and many more worry that it is true. All truths about the world are fixed by the pattern of instantiation, by individual points in space-time, of the “perfectly natural properties” posited by end-of-inquiry physics. In part, this view denies independent variability: the world could not have been different from how it actually is, in the ways depicted by common sense (...)
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  7. Crawford L. Elder (1998). What Sensory Signals Are About. Analysis 58 (4):273-276.score: 315.0
    In ‘Of Sensory Systems and the “Aboutness” of Mental States’, Kathleen Akins (1996) argues against what she calls ‘the traditional view’ about sensory systems, according to which they are detectors of features in the environment outside the organism. As an antidote, she considers the case of thermoreception, a system whose sensors send signals about how things stand with themselves and their immediate dermal surround (a ‘narcissistic’ sensory system); and she closes by suggesting that the signals from many sensory systems may (...)
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  8. Crawford L. Elder (1998). Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):317-331.score: 315.0
    Common sense believes in objects which, if real, routinely lose component parts or particles. Statues get chipped, people undergo haircuts and amputations, and ships have planks replaced. Sometimes philosophers argue that in addition to these objects, there are others which could not possibly lose any of their parts or particles, nor have new ones added to them--objects which could not possibly have been bigger or smaller, at any time, than how they actually were.1 (Sometimes the restriction on size is argued (...)
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  9. Crawford L. Elder (2005). Undercutting the Idea of Carving Reality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):41-59.score: 315.0
    It is widely supposed that, in Hilary Putnam’s phrase, there are no “ready-made objects” (Putnam 1982; cf. Putnam 1981, Ch. 3). Instead the objects we consider real are partly of our own making: we carve them out of the world (or out of experience). The usual reason for supposing this lies in the claim that there are available to us alternative ways of “dividing reality” into objects (to quote the title of Hirsch 1993), ways which would afford us every bit (...)
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  10. Crawford L. Elder (1999). Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition. Philosophical Quarterly 49 (200):332-43.score: 315.0
    A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...)
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  11. Crawford L. Elder (2006). Conventionalism and Realism‐Imitating Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1-15.score: 315.0
    Historically, opponents of realism have managed to slip beneath a key objection which realists raise against them. The opponents say that some element of the world is constructed by our cognitive practices; realists retort that the element would have existed unaltered, had our practices differed; the opponents sometimes agree, contending that we construct in just such a way as to render the counterfactual true. The contemporary instalment of this debate starts with conventionalism about modality, which holds that the borders of (...)
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  12. Crawford L. Elder (2001). Materialism and the Mediated Causation of Behavior. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):165-75.score: 315.0
    Are judgements and wishes reallybrain events (or brain states) which will be affirmedby a completed scientific account of how humanbehavior is caused? Materialists, other thaneliminativists, say Yes. But brain events do notcause muscle contractions, hence bodily movements,directly. They do so, if at all, by triggeringintermediate causes, viz. firings in motor nerves. Soit is crucial, this paper argues, whether they arecharacterized as biological events –performances of naturally-selected-for operations – orinstead as complex microphysical events. ``Acauses B, B causes C, so A causes (...)
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  13. Crawford L. Elder (1999). Ontology and Realism About Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):292 – 302.score: 315.0
    To be a realist about modality, need one claim that more exists than just the various objects and properties that populate the world—e.g. worlds other than the actual one, or maximal consistent sets of propositions? Or does the existence of objects and properties by itself involve the obtaining of necessities (and possibilities) in re? The latter position is now unpopular but not unfamiliar. Aristotle held that objects have essences, and hence necessarily have certain properties. Recently it has been argued that (...)
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  14. Crawford L. Elder (2013). On the Reality and Causal Efficacy of Familiar Objects. Philosophia 41 (3):737-749.score: 315.0
    What caused the event we report by saying “the window shattered”? Was it the baseball, which crashed into the window? Causal exclusionists say: many, many microparticles collectively caused that event—microparticles located where common sense supposes the baseball was. Unitary large objects such as baseballs cause nothing; indeed, by Alexander’s dictum, there are no such objects. This paper argues that the false claim about causal efficacy is instead the one that attributes it to the many microparticles. Causation obtains just where there (...)
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  15. Crawford L. Elder (2007). On the Phenomenon of "Dog-Wise Arrangement". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132–155.score: 315.0
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
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  16. Crawford L. Elder (2008). Biological Species Are Natural Kinds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):339-362.score: 315.0
    This paper argues that typical biological species are natural kinds, on a familiar realist understanding of natural kinds—classes of individuals across which certain properties cluster together, in virtue of the causal workings of the world. But the clustering is far from exceptionless. Virtually no properties, or property-combinations, characterize every last member of a typical species—unless they can also appear outside the species. This motivates some to hold that what ties together the members of a species is the ability to interbreed, (...)
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  17. Crawford L. Elder (2007). On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132-155.score: 315.0
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
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  18. Crawford L. Elder (2000). Physicalism and the Falacy of Composition. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):332-343.score: 315.0
    A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...)
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  19. Crawford L. Elder (2001). Can Contrariety Be Reduced to Contradiction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-4.score: 315.0
    Can an ontology which treats properties as really out there in the world be combined vvith the view that necessity is not out there? What about the necessity by which redness excludes greenness, or weighing 8 kg excludes weighing 6 kg? Armstrong, who combines property realism with logical atomism, argues that such exclusions reflect just the trivial necessity that a whole cannot be any of its proper parts. Buthis argument fails for colors themselves and for other cases of contrary properties. (...)
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  20. Crawford L. Elder (1994). Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):649-667.score: 285.0
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  21. Crawford L. Elder, Mental Causation, Invariance, and Teleofunctional Content.score: 285.0
  22. Crawford L. Elder (2001). Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.score: 285.0
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  23. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Destruction, Alteration, Simples and World Stuff. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):24–38.score: 285.0
    When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unravelled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be reduced to mere alteration of something else, we (...)
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  24. Crawford L. Elder (1995). A Different Kind of Natural Kind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):516 – 531.score: 285.0
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  25. Crawford L. Elder (2007). Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.score: 285.0
    We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, (...)
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  26. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Alexander's Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects. Topoi 22 (2):163-171.score: 285.0
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  27. Crawford L. Elder (2000). Familiar Objects and the Sorites of Decomposition. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):79 - 89.score: 285.0
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  28. Crawford L. Elder (2004). Review: From an Ontological Point of View. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):757-760.score: 285.0
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  29. Crawford L. Elder (1998). What Versus How in Naturally Selected Representations. Mind 107 (426):349-363.score: 285.0
    Empty judgements appear to be about something, and inaccurate judgements to report something. Naturalism tries to explain these appearances without positing non-real objects or states of affairs. Biological naturalism explains that the false and the empty are tokens which fail to perform the function proper to their biological type. But if truth is a biological 'supposed to', we should expect designs that achieve it only often enough. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide (...)
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  30. Crawford L. Elder (1996). Content and the Subtle Extensionality of " -Explains...". Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):320-32.score: 285.0
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  31. Crawford L. Elder (1996). Realism and Determinable Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):149-159.score: 285.0
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  32. Crawford L. Elder (1996). On the Reality of Medium-Sized Objects. Philosophical Studies 83 (2):191 - 211.score: 285.0
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  33. Crawford L. Elder (1979). Hegel's Teleology and the Relation Between Mind and Brain. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):27-45.score: 285.0
    This paper argues that there can be, For each individual mental state, Some identifiable neural "embodiment" only if the brain operates in accord with a hegelian teleological model. "embodiments" are neural configurations which do, Or would, Produce all the behaviors connected with the mental state. The argument hinges on how these behaviors are described: if under predicates of neurophysics only, Then only under wildly disjunctive predicates, Which cannot be projected for any candidate configuration; if under "teleological" predicates, Then under predicates (...)
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  34. Crawford L. Elder (1986). Why the Attacks on the Way the World is Entail There is a Way the World Is. Philosophia 16 (2):191-202.score: 285.0
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  35. Crawford L. Elder (1990). Goodman's “New Riddle” — a Realist's Reprise. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):115 - 135.score: 285.0
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  36. Crawford L. Elder (1992). An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):317-336.score: 285.0
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  37. Crawford L. Elder (1980). Kant and the Unity of Experience. Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):299-307.score: 285.0
  38. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Modality and Anti-Metaphysics Stephen K. McLeod Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001, Viii + 186 Pp., $69.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 42 (01):177-.score: 285.0
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  39. Crawford L. Elder (1987). Notes and News. Philosophia 17 (3):391-391.score: 285.0
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  40. Crawford L. Elder (1989). Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):425-444.score: 285.0
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  41. Crawford L. Elder (2013). Millikan, Realism, and Sameness. In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. John Wiley & Sons. 155--175.score: 285.0
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  42. Crawford L. Elder (1986). Anthropology and the Interpretation of Moral Beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):287-306.score: 285.0
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  43. Crawford L. Elder (2001). Contrariety and the Individuation of Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3):249 - 260.score: 285.0
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  44. Crawford L. Elder (1987). Moral Realism: Its Aetiology and a Consequent Dilemma. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):33 - 45.score: 285.0
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  45. Crawford L. Elder (1984). Neither Correspondence nor Consensus. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):9-31.score: 285.0
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  46. Crawford L. Elder (1997). Natural Kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):239-241.score: 285.0
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  47. Crawford L. Elder (1988). On the Determinacy of Reference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):481-497.score: 285.0
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  48. Crawford L. Elder (1994). Proper Functions Defended. Analysis 54 (3):167 - 171.score: 285.0
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  49. Crawford L. Elder (1991). Antirealism and Realist Claims of Invariance. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):1-19.score: 285.0
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  50. Crawford L. Elder (1996). Contrariety and "Carving Up Reality". American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):277 - 289.score: 285.0
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