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  1. Byeong D. Lee (2014). Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity. Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  2. Byeong D. Lee (2013). BonJour's Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and His Explanatory Account. Dialogue 52 (2):287-304.
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  3. Byeong D. Lee (2013). Fales's Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason. Philosophia 41 (4):1217-1235.
    Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales’s defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being (...)
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  4. Byeong D. Lee (2013). Kitcher's Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action. Dialogue:1-11.
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  5. Byeong D. Lee (2011). A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction. Dialogue 50 (1):95-115.
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  6. Byeong D. Lee (2008). A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge. Dialogue 47 (3-4):565-.
    ABSTRACT: Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance will a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal will a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to (...)
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  7. Byeong D. Lee (2006). On Davidson's Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument. Dialogue 45 (3):529-535.
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  8. Byeong D. Lee (2004). Finkelstein on the Difference Between Conscious and Unconscious Belief. Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without (...)
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  9. Byeong D. Lee (2003). Douven on Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (1):7--12.
    The model-theoretic argument, which Putnam employs to argue againstmetaphysical realism, has faced serious objections of many realist opponents.Igor Douven in his recent paper offers a new interpretation of the model-theoreticargument, which avoids the previous objections. The purpose of this paper is toshow that Douven's reconstruction of Putnam's argument is not successful, andhence that the realist objections still stand.
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  10. Byeong D. Lee (2002). Davidson's Slingshot Argument Revisited. Dialogue 41 (03):541-.
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  11. Byeong D. Lee (2002). Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception. Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  12. Byeong D. Lee (2001). Moore's Paradox and Self-Ascribed Belief. Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370.
    Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents (...)
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  13. Byeong D. Lee (2000). The Knower Paradox Revisited. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):221-232.
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  14. Byeong D. Lee (1998). Burge on Epistemic Paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):337 - 348.
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  15. Byeong D. Lee (1998). Kroon on Rationality and Epistemic Paradox. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):169-174.
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