This paper contributes to the normative debate over capital punishment by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. The answer to the latter question turns on the kind of justification the agent can give for what she does in carrying out the role. So our inquiry concerns whether the justifications available to an executioner could provide him with the kind of justification necessary for him to take pride in (...) what he does. If they cannot, I argue, this sheds some light on their adequacy as justifications. The main argument of the paper is that social control arguments for the death penalty fail to provide an adequate justification. I also give some consideration to retributive justifications. The argument is developed through close attention to the depiction of Albert Pierrepoint in the film, Pierrepoint: The Last Hangman. (shrink)
Death and the meaning of life -- Which lives count? -- How much can morality require us to do for one another? -- Utilitarianism -- Kantian ethics -- Aristotelian virtue ethics -- Ethics and religion -- Morality as contract -- Critiques of morality.
Christopher Bennett presents a theory of punishment grounded in the practice of apology, and in particular in reactions such as feeling sorry and making amends. He argues that offenders have a 'right to be punished' - that it is part of taking an offender seriously as a member of a normatively demanding relationship (such as friendship or collegiality or citizenship) that she is subject to retributive attitudes when she violates the demands of that relationship. However, while he claims that punishment (...) and the retributive attitudes are the necessary expression of moral condemnation, his account of these reactions has more in common with restorative justice than traditional retributivism. He argues that the most appropriate way to react to crime is to require the offender to make proportionate amends. His book is a rich and original contribution to the debate over punishment and restorative justice. (shrink)
In my response to Golash I distinguish between two steps in my original argument. The first relates to the special value of conjugal (two-person) love relationships. I defend this step against criticisms, arguing that the two-person relationship provides a form of recognition that is of special importance to us and cannot be found in other sorts of relationship. The two-person relationship is one that, at least as private individuals, we have special reason to pursue. The second step concerns the claim (...) that the special value of such relationships tends to promote the autonomy of those who have them. It is this second step that is important for the argument that a liberal state – one, at any rate, that takes itself to be in the business of safeguarding the pre-conditions of autonomy – could have reason to favour marriage or some form of civic partnership over other forms of intimate adult tie. However, I admit that Golash puts forward plausible – if anecdotal – arguments against this second step. I therefore agree that I need to be more tentative about this step than I was in the original paper. (shrink)
In this paper I am concerned with a problem for communicative theories of punishment. On such theories, punishment is justified at least in part as the authoritative censure or condemnation of crime. But is this compatible with a broadly liberal political outlook? For while liberalism is generally thought to take only a very limited interest in its citizens’ attitudes (seeing moral opinion as a matter of legitimate debate), the idea of state denunciation of crime seems precisely to be focused on (...) the attitudes expressed in action. In this paper I analyse the elements of the communicative theory of punishment, assessing the extent to which they can be considered anti-liberal. I argue that, understood in a certain way, the communicative theory, though in some sense communitarian, is compatible with at least one central and attractive non-perfectionist strand in liberalism. Key Words: communicative theory • Devlin • Duff • Hegel • von Hirsch • punishment. (shrink)
How can a state be morally justified in punishing some of its citizens? In tackling this I shall set aside three important matters: we do not morally approve of all the laws of the land, so that sometimes there is a legal but not a moral case against an offender; we can do more things about crime than just punish the criminals, for example remedying the familial and social conditions that encourage it; and, thirdly, many actual penal institutions do things (...) to convicts that are indefensible by any decent standard. My topic may be humanly less important than any of those three; but I want to discuss it and not them. Like many others, I hold that the punishment is justified only to the extent that it does good, that is, leads to a better over-all state of affairs than would have obtained otherwise. Some versions of this view, however, assign to doing-good a role in which it swamps other considerations which most of us think are also essential to a defensible penal system. My aim in this paper will be remedy this defect - to reconcile a doing-good justification with the rest of what we think about punishment. The fear that this cannot be done has led some to question whether our having penal systems and procedures does any good. Jacobs may be right in stressing how hard it is to discover what the consequences are of any given system of punishment (1999: 540), but it would be lamentable if that led us to omit doing-good from our view of what justifies punishment. I shall return to this topic at the end of Section 7, offering to relieve Jacobs of his fears. I usually think of the good that punishment can do in terms of the deterrence of potential offenders - the punished person or others who learn about his punishment. In all the uncertainty about what our penal procedures achieve, it seems certain that they have a deterrent effect without which our society would be lost. There are other possible goods: making the convict a better person; placating victims and their kin; increasing our sense of the majesty and importance of the law; and so on.. (shrink)
This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships of conjugal love – the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage – on the grounds that they are essential to the development and maintenance of autonomy. A deep human need is that the detail of our lives be recognized (accepted, affirmed, granted importance) by others (or by an other). Autonomy can be compromised when this need is not met. So a state concerned (...) with autonomy ought to be concerned with relationships in which people can be given recognition. This argument justifies support for friendship as well as conjugal love; why is the latter particularly special? The answer is that in conjugal love partners value each other exclusively (i.e., in a way they do not value anyone else). Conjugal relations therefore recognise the uniqueness and individual value of a person's life in away that friendship does not. (shrink)
Some philosophers think that forgiveness should only be granted in response to the wrongdoer’s repentance, while others think that forgiveness can properly be given unconditionally. In this paper I show that both of these positions are partially correct. In redemptive forgiveness we wipe the wrong from the offender’s moral record. It is wrong to forgive redemptively in the absence of some atonement. Personal forgiveness, on the other hand, is granted when the victim overcomes inappropriate though humanly understandable feelings of hate (...) or vindictive anger towards the wrongdoer and comes to see them as deserving of a certain unconditional respect ’qua’ moral agent. Personal forgiveness is unconditionally admirable. (shrink)
Retribution is often dismissed as augmenting the initial harm done, rather than ameliorating it. This criticism rests on a crude view of retribution. In our actual practice in informal situations and in the workings of the reactive (properly called 'retributive') sentiments, retribution is true to the gravity of wrongdoing, but does aim to ameliorate it. Through wrongdoing, offenders become alienated from the moral community: their actions place their commitment to its core values in doubt. We recognize this status in blaming, (...) a withdrawal of civility and solidarity which symbolizes the moral distance wrongdoers have put between them and us. Atonement is the means by which they make themselves 'at one' again with the community. Retribution is properly understood as a cycle which recognizes disruption and alienation, but aims at reconciliation. (shrink)
This article addresses the question of whetherpersonal surveillance on the world wide web isdifferent in nature and intensity from that inthe offline world. The article presents aprofile of the ways in which privacy problemswere framed and addressed in the 1970s and1990s. Based on an analysis of privacy newsstories from 1999–2000, it then presents atypology of the kinds of surveillance practicesthat have emerged as a result of Internetcommunications. Five practices are discussedand illustrated: surveillance by glitch,surveillance by default, surveillance bydesign, surveillance by (...) possession, andsurveillance by subject. The article offerssome tentative conclusions about theprogressive latency of tracking devices, aboutthe complexity created by multi-sourcing, aboutthe robustness of clickstream data, and aboutthe erosion of the distinction between themonitor and the monitored. These trendsemphasize the need to reject analysis thatframes our understanding of Internetsurveillance in terms of its impact onsociety. Rather the Internet should beregarded as a form of life whose evolvingstructure becomes embedded in humanconsciousness and social practice, and whosearchitecture embodies an inherent valence thatis gradually shifting away from the assumptionsof anonymity upon which the Internet wasoriginally designed. (shrink)
